scholarly journals The Circulation of Worthless Tokens Aids Cooperation: An Experiment Inspired by the Kula

Games ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 63
Author(s):  
Giuseppe Danese ◽  
Luigi Mittone
Keyword(s):  
Regression Analysis ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Cheap Talk ◽  
Public Good Game ◽  
The Public ◽  
Traditional Societies ◽  
Control Study

Many anthropological records exist of seemingly worthless tokens exchanged in traditional societies. The most famous instances of such tokens are probably the Kula necklaces and armbands first described by B. Malinowski. In our experiment, each participant can send a token to another participant before each round of a repeated public good game. We use as examples of tokens a bracelet built by the participants in the lab, a simple piece of cardboard provided by the experimenter, and an object brought from home by the participants. Notwithstanding the cheap-talk nature of the decision to send the token, both sending and receiving the token are associated with a significant increase in contributions to the public good. Regression analysis shows that contributions to the public good in the treatments featuring a bracelet and a cardboard piece are higher than in a control study. The home object appears not to have been equally useful in increasing contributions.

scholarly journals Social Pressure in Networks Induces Public Good Provision

Games ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 4
Author(s):  
David Jimenez-Gomez
Keyword(s):  
Public Good ◽  
Small Group ◽  
Dynamic Model ◽  
Network Topology ◽  
Social Pressure ◽  
Public Good Provision ◽  
Public Good Game ◽  
The Public ◽  
Best Response ◽  
Good Provision

I develop a dynamic model with forward looking agents, and show that social pressure is effective in generating provision in a public good game: after a small group of agents start contributing to the public good, other agents decide to contribute as well due to a fear of being punished, and this generates contagion in the network. In contrast to earlier models in the literature, contagion happens fast, as part of the best response of fully rational individuals. The network topology has implications for whether contagion starts and the extent to which it spreads. I find conditions under which an agent decides to be the first to contribute in order to generate contagion in the network, as well as conditions for contribution due to a self-fulfilling fear of social pressure.

Do Young People Adapt Their Prosocial Behaviour to That of Their Peers? An Experimental Exploration

2019 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 332-352
Author(s):  
Mauricio Salgado ◽  
Alejandra Vásquez ◽  
Alejandra Yáñez
Keyword(s):  
High School Students ◽  
Young People ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Field Experiments ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
Prosocial Behaviour ◽  
Public Good Game ◽  
School Students ◽  
The Public

Moral decisions – that is, decisions that consider the consequences for the welfare of others – can be highly inconsistent across contexts. Here, we explore whether the altruism of young people is related to their willingness to cooperate with others, even in groups comprising non-reciprocating peers. Using the distinction between normative and cognitive expectations, we address this topic conducting several lab-in-the-field experiments with high-school students who played the dictator and linear public good games. We found that the altruism of young people in the dictator game and cooperation in the public good game were related, but only in the first rounds of the public good game. This indicates that young people orient their prosocial behaviour based on cognitive expectations, that is, they consider the information they receive regarding the free riding behaviour of peers and adapt their own. Nonetheless, young people who demonstrated high altruism tended to cooperate unconditionally, regardless of whether they belonged to a cooperative or uncooperative group, and despite disappointments. Finally, self-regarding young people were less likely to defect among cooperative peers. Therefore, group characteristics provide the boundary conditions for the consistency of the prosocial behaviour of young people. Some conceptual and policy implications are discussed.

The Effect of Fiscal Transparency on the Provision of a Public Good: An Experimental Analysis

2020 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 309-323
Author(s):  
Julian Krause
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Experimental Analysis ◽  
Government Spending ◽  
Decision Making Process ◽  
Public Good Game ◽  
The Public ◽  
Fiscal Transparency ◽  
City District ◽  
Set Up

This paper presents a model and experimental results of a public good game to explore the effects of fiscal transparency on the provision of a public good. Two types of fiscal transparency are explored. The first is the transparency of the decision-making process and the second is the transparency of government spending. To answer this question a model for the public good “city district quality” with heterogeneous agents is set up and the design and the results of the experiment are presented.

scholarly journals The Effect of Disclosing Identities in a Socially Incentivized Public Good Game

Games ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 32
Author(s):  
Britta Butz ◽  
Christine Harbring
Keyword(s):  
Laboratory Experiment ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Public Good Game ◽  
Previous Evidence ◽  
Charitable Donations ◽  
The Public ◽  
Identity Disclosure ◽  
Parametric Statistics ◽  
Group Members ◽  
Non Parametric

We investigate whether revealing the identities in a public good game that includes a donation incentive leads to higher contributions to the public good. Previous evidence suggests that contributions to a public good increase significantly when these take place in public. Also, the amount of money given in charitable donations seems to be sensitive to the revealing of identities. Using a laboratory experiment, we implement a 20% donation share that is dependent on participants’ contributions to a public good. The donation is either costless (because it is financed by the experimenter) or deducted from a team’s contributions. In both settings, we explore whether informing participants that group members’ identities will be disclosed at the end of the experiment leads to higher contributions to the public good. Non-parametric statistics indicate that when donations are costly for the participants, the announcement of subsequent identity disclosure results in significantly higher contributions in the second half of the repeated public good game. In contrast, revealing identities in settings with costless donations reduces contributions to the public good significantly. The regression results indicate that conditional cooperators might be one subgroup driving these results.

Positional Commitments and the Public Good: Perceptions of a Defecting Group Leader

1999 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark E. Sibicky ◽  
Cortney B. Richardson ◽  
Anna M. Gruntz ◽  
Timothy J. Binegar ◽  
David A. Schroeder ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Public Good ◽  
Group Leader ◽  
The Public
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