scholarly journals Board of Directors’ Interest in Share Ownership and Earnings Management

2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-40
Author(s):  
Philip Jehu ◽  
Mohammad Azhar Ibrahim
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Management Practices ◽  
Board Members ◽  
Managerial Ownership ◽  
Executive Directors ◽  
Managerial Opportunism ◽  
Opportunistic Behaviour ◽  
Board Ownership

In this study, we examine the effect of directors’ ownership on earnings management practices. Explicitly, we draw from the agency theory to distinguish between ownership by non-executive directors and ownership by executive directors to investigate reasons for directors and managerial opportunistic behaviour. Utilising data from a sample of 864-firm-year observations ranging from 2009 to 2017 period, we test our hypothesis through OLS regression. We find that non-executive directors’ interests in shareholding are significantly associated with higher levels of earnings management. We observed a decrease in abnormal accruals on the overall basis of the combined ownership of both executive and non-executive directors. Overall, ownership by all directors combined significantly reduces managerial opportunism. By contrast, there is no evidence that executive directors’ ownership mitigates managerial opportunism. This paper contributes to corporate governance literature, particularly when the independence of board members is essential. This study disaggregates board ownership into executive holdings and non-executive holdings, dimensions which were hitherto rendered as managerial ownership or board ownership. These findings imply firms’ corporate governance policy and regulations.

scholarly journals Opportunistic Behavior, External Monitoring Mechanisms, Corporate Governance, and Earnings Management

2018 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 44-52
Author(s):  
Linda Wimelda ◽  
Agustina Chandra
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Cash Flow ◽  
Firm Size ◽  
Management Practices ◽  
Free Cash Flow ◽  
Managerial Ownership ◽  
Opportunistic Behavior ◽  
Manufacturing Companies ◽  
External Monitoring

Objective - The purpose of this research is to analyze the effect of motivational bonus, leverage, firm size, corporate governance (audit committee's size, the proportion of independent commissioners, institutional ownership, managerial ownership) and free cash flow on earnings management. Methodology/Technique - Earnings management is analyzed in this research using the modified Jones model. The population for the research consists of manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange (IDX) between 2013-2015. The final sample includes 60 manufacturing companies. Findings - The result of this study indicate that motivational bonus, leverage, firm size and free cash flow have an influence on earnings management practices. Motivational bonuses and free cash flow as opportunistic behavior also influence earnings management. In addition, leverage and firm size as external monitoring mechanism influence earnings management practices while audit committee size, the proportion of independent commissioners, institutional ownership and managerial ownership as corporate governance practices in companies has no significant effect on earnings management practices. Hence, it is concluded that corporate governance has no effect on earnings management practices in Indonesia. Type of Paper: Empirical Keywords: Opportunistic Behavior; External Monitoring Mechanisms; Corporate Governance; Earnings Management. JEL Classification: G34, G02.

scholarly journals Corporate governance and board of directors in Greek listed companies

2017 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 38-45 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chryssoula Tsene
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
Company Law ◽  
Board Members ◽  
Executive Directors ◽  
Shareholder Protection ◽  
Key Factor ◽  
Code Of Corporate Governance ◽  
Legal Mechanism

Corporate governance is widely acknowledged as a key factor of market’s efficiency and corporate performance. Greek company law, under the influence of the financial crisis, has responded actively by incorporating in national law EU directives on corporate governance of listed companies and by adopting recently self-regulatory provisions. This regulatory framework contributes essentially to enhance board accountability and transparency, empower shareholder protection and promote financial disclosure. In that regard, two pillars should be illustrated as regards board of directors in listed companies: Greek company law provides traditionally for the establishment of the general duties of loyalty and care of all board members in companies limited by shares, which are furthermore reinforced by the provisions of the Hellenic Code of Corporate Governance for listed companies. Secondly, hard law rules introduce the participation of non-executive and non-executive independent directors as a legal mechanism of confronting agency problems in listed companies. These provisions have been strongly argued as regards the exact content of the obligations of all board members of listed companies to promote the corporate interest and especially as regards the monitoring role of non-executive directors. These conceptions should be followed by empirical researches in order to address a completely legal and functional approach.

scholarly journals Pengaruh Praktik Good Corporate Governance Terhadap Praktik Manajemen Laba (Studi Pada Perusahaan Perbankan Yang Terdaftar Di Bursa Efek Indonesia Tahun 2013-2017)

1970 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 75-92
Author(s):  
Rahma Febrina ◽  
Ulfi Maryati ◽  
Ferdawati
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Institutional Ownership ◽  
Discretionary Accruals ◽  
Managerial Ownership ◽  
Financial Reports ◽  
Positive Direction ◽  
Good Corporate Governance

Financial reports are a medium for companies to convey information about the accountability of management to the needs of external parties. Earnings management is a deliberate process of taking steps within the limits of general accounting principles both inside and outside the limits. This study aims to analyze the influence of good corporate governance consisting of independent board of directors, managerial ownership and institutional ownership on earnings management by using modified jones models with proxy discretionary accruals. The sample used was a banking company listing in the Indonesia Stock Exchange in the 2013-2017 period using purposive sampling with a sample of 22 companies and analyzed by multiple regression. The results of this study state that partially that the independent board of directors affects earnings management in a positive direction, while managerial ownership and institutional ownership do not affect earnings management. Simultaneously the board of commissioners, independent board of directors, managerial ownership and institutional ownership have no significant effect on earnings management.

Corporate Governance, Earnings Management dan Kinerja Perbankan di Indonesia

2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 68
Author(s):  
Made Ratih Baskaraningrum ◽  
Agus Fredy Maradona
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Management Practices ◽  
Banking Industry ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Institutional Ownership ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Managerial Ownership ◽  
Good Corporate Governance

ABSTRACT            The purpose of this research is to investigate the concept of the importance of the role of good corporate governance in the banking industry in Indonesia. Specifically, this study intends to examine whether good corporate governance plays a role in improving company performance, especially by limiting earnings management practices. This study focuses on banking companies in Indonesia that are listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX). Determination of company samples in this study was carried out by purposive sampling method, with the criteria of banking companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange during the 2014-2016 period. The data collection method used in this study was the method of documentation study. The data analysis method used is Path Analysis.The results of the Square Multiple Correlation for earnings management amounted to 0.795 and banking performance was 0.860, so for earnings management variables influenced by managerial ownership, institutional ownership, the size of the independent board of commissioners, the audit committee amounted to 79.5%. While banking performance variables are influenced by managerial ownership, institutional ownership, board of commissioners size, the proportion of independent commissioners, audit committees and earnings management is 86%. Empirical benefits in research are about the application of corporate governance, earnings management and financial performance in the banking industry in Indonesia. The practical benefits in this study can provide benefits for companies in the application of appropriate corporate governance and benefits for investors who invest their capital in the company and can also be taken into consideration for companies to reduce profit management in the company so as to improve banking performance in Indonesia.

scholarly journals Effect of Good Corporate Governance (GCG) Mechanism on Earning Management Practices and the Impact on Stock Returns (Case Study on LIQUID (lQ 45) Companies Listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange Period 2013-2017)

2015 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 11
Author(s):  
M. Noor Salim ◽  
M. Rusman HN
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Stock Returns ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Management Practices ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Institutional Ownership ◽  
Earning Management ◽  
Managerial Ownership ◽  
Good Corporate Governance

This study aims to analyze the effect of the mechanism of good corporate governance (GCG) on earnings management practices and their impact on stock returns. The population used in this study is the companies included in the go public LQ 45 group listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in 2017. The analytical tool used in this study is Eviews software version 8.0. The results of the analysis in this study indicate that (1) Institutional Ownership has a negative and significant effect on Earning Management Practices, (2) Managerial Ownership has a negative and significant effect on Earning Management Practices, (3) Independent Board of Commissioners has a negative and significant effect on Earnings Management, (4) The Audit Committee has a negative and significant effect on Earning Management Practices, (5) Institutional Ownership, Managerial Ownership, Independent Board of Commissioners and Simultaneous Audit Committee (Together) have a significant effect on earnings management, (6) Earning Management Practices have a negative and significant effect on stock returns(7) Institutional Ownership has a positive and significant effect on stock returns, (8) Managerial ownership has a positive and significant effect on stock returns, (9) The Independent Board of Commissioners has a positive and significant effect on stock returns, (10) The Audit Committee has a positive and significant to stock returns, and (11) Earning Management is able to mediate the influence of Institutional Ownership, Managerial Ownership, Independent Board of Commissioners, and the Audit Committee simultaneously (jointly) on Stock Returns. It is recommended that the LQ45 company increase the portion of Institutional ownership as part of a supervision for management in managing the company so as to increase stock returns on an ongoing basis.

scholarly journals Does the competency attributes of board members’ enhance the monitoring of earning management? Evidence from a developing country

2017 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 100-108 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anas Najeeb Mosa Ghazalat ◽  
Md.Aminul Islam ◽  
Idris Bin Mohd Noor ◽  
Ayman Ahmad Abu Haija
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Management Practices ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Industrial Firms ◽  
Time Period ◽  
Opportunistic Behaviour ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
High Level ◽  
The Impact

The monitoring role of the board of directors has been extensively slammed as being ineffective since it depends on several factors. This study sheds light on some of the directors’ attributes and the impact on mitigating the opportunistic behaviour. By adopting different perspectives, we argued whether the directors with more expertise, tenure, outside directorships become more effective in mitigating the opportunistic behaviour. These attributes could have a curvilinear effect since such optimal attributes could improve the competency level of the directors. Hence, the board becomes more effective. Meanwhile, its effect could turn inversely to make the directors ineffective. This study adopted discretionary accruals as an indicator for earnings management. A sample of 114 service and industrial firms listed in Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) from 2009-2015 were chosen for this study. Pooled OLS regression model is enlisted to avoid the inconsistently of the slope across individual units and time period. Results show that the directors with financial expertise are more effective to minimise the level of earnings management practices. Conversely, the independent directors with high tenure besides the higher directors with outside directorships are engaged with a high level of earnings management practices. This implies the existence of each of the friendliness hypothesis and the busyness hypothesis in the Jordanian market. Similarly, this also explains the weakness of the board of directors in complying to their monitoring role in the emerging markets in general.

scholarly journals Impact of internal ownership on the monitoring and mitigating mechanisms of earnings management practices

2017 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 289-295 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anas Najeeb Mosa Ghazalat ◽  
Md.Aminul Islam ◽  
Idris Bin Mohd Noor
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Management Practices ◽  
Business Environment ◽  
Family Ownership ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
The Relationship

This paper attempts to review on how the effectiveness of board of directors and the executive compensations are moderated by internal ownership such as managerial and family ownership to mitigate earnings management. Most of prior studies focused on the traditional interaction among corporate governance mechanisms and earnings management, thus neglected that the variance of these practices that can be attributed to the business environment and the nature of ownership structure. This paper revisits the literature on the relationship between the factors of effectiveness of the board of directors in the individual level such as board independence, size, meeting frequency, CEO duality, audit and nominations-compensations committees, directors financial expertise, tenures and multiple directorship etc. and as a bundle through creating a score of effectiveness on the earnings management practices. It also reviews on whether the managerial and family ownership can moderate the relationship between the factors of effectiveness of the board of directors (as a score) and the total executive compensation with the earnings management practices. Panel data analysis method will applied over the data collected for ASE for the Jordanian listed firms for the period after the issuing of the Jordanian corporate codes in 2009. This paper’s contributes to the existing literature by providing an in-depth review of corporate governance mechanisms and earning management.

scholarly journals Corporate Governance and Earnings Management: The Role of Board of Directors and Audit Committee in Financially Distressed Firms

2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 113
Author(s):  
Emita W. Astami ◽  
Rusmin Rusmin
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Financial Distress ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Management Practices ◽  
Positive Role ◽  
Cross Sectional ◽  
Distressed Firms ◽  
Financially Distressed

This study investigates the association between corporate governance and earnings management practices of Australian’s financially distressed firms. Based on a sample of 164 firm-year incorporating non-financial firmsexperiencing financial distress, the cross-sectional modified Jones (1991) model is used to measure discretionary accruals (the proxy for earnings management). Board of directors and audit committee characteristic variables are employed as the key predictor variables for measuring the effectiveness of corporate governance. This study finds that the companies are seeking to reduce their reported earnings to increase the likelihood of making a profit in the following year with the goal of avoiding bankruptcy;a larger number of directors on a board is less effective in detecting and constraining the practices of earnings management by managers of distressed firms; an active audit committee plays a positive role in detecting and reducing the probability of earnings management. The findings of this study have implications especially to regulators and corporate governance reformists that determine corporate governance rules. This is primarily in regard to the efforts made by listed companies in maintaining their sustainability through more emphases on the process for monitoring and selection of board of directors and audit committee members to reinforceeffectiveness in managerial performance evaluation.

scholarly journals Implication of good corporate governance and leverage on earnings management

2018 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Joni Hendra ◽  
Hery Koesharjono ◽  
Seger Priantono
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Management Practices ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Financial Statements ◽  
Funding Sources ◽  
Good Corporate Governance ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
Fundamental Value

Company management (agent) is the party most concerned to practice earnings management to deceive the users of financial statements so that management gain private gain (obtaining privat gains). In addition, firms with high leverage ratios are influential in performing earnings management practices because the company is in default. The existence of the principle of good corporate governance is expected to minimize earnings management resulting in financial statements do not describe the fundamental value of the company actually.The study aims at stating wheader is proves significant influence between the institutional ownership, the composition of independent commissioners, the size of the board of directors, the size of the company and the leverage on earnings management.The results of research on non-bank companies listed in LQ 45 in Indonesia Stock Exchange year 2013-2016 show that partially the composition of independent commissioners, firm size and leverage have a positive effect on earnings management. When tested simultaneously indicate that instisional ownership, composition of commissioner independent, the composition of the board of directors, the size of the company and leverage have a significant effect on  earnings management.  The size of the company is a research variable that has a dominant influence on earnings management, because the larger the size or scale of the company it will be easier for the company in obtaining funding sources, both internal and external.

scholarly journals Board of directors and board of statutory auditors’ diversity and earnings management: Evidence from Italy

2017 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 42-51 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pier Luigi Marchini ◽  
Alice Medioli ◽  
Veronica Tibiletti ◽  
Silvia Triani
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Earnings Quality ◽  
Corporate Boards ◽  
International Regulation ◽  
Opportunistic Behaviour ◽  
Management Behaviour ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
The Impact

The importance of diversity within corporate boards has been demonstrated both from the literature and also from the national and international regulation. The aim of this paper is to analyse the impact of diversity on the Board of Directors and in the Board of Statutory Auditor on Earnings Management behaviour. Starting with a random sample of 121 non-financial Italian listed companies, we hand-collected corporate governance data from the corporate governance report to investigate how firms deal with the opportunistic behaviour of EM, through the appointment of members with specific features. Our findings show that, even though diversity within the Board of Directors is not associated with Earnings Management, the presence of female and member expertise on Board of Statutory Auditor instead curb Earnings Management. Based on these findings we argue that pursuing a good degree of diversity in the corporate boards could help to improve the earnings quality and, in particular, to reduce Earnings Management behaviour.

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