scholarly journals Corporate governance and board of directors in Greek listed companies

2017 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 38-45 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chryssoula Tsene

Corporate governance is widely acknowledged as a key factor of market’s efficiency and corporate performance. Greek company law, under the influence of the financial crisis, has responded actively by incorporating in national law EU directives on corporate governance of listed companies and by adopting recently self-regulatory provisions. This regulatory framework contributes essentially to enhance board accountability and transparency, empower shareholder protection and promote financial disclosure. In that regard, two pillars should be illustrated as regards board of directors in listed companies: Greek company law provides traditionally for the establishment of the general duties of loyalty and care of all board members in companies limited by shares, which are furthermore reinforced by the provisions of the Hellenic Code of Corporate Governance for listed companies. Secondly, hard law rules introduce the participation of non-executive and non-executive independent directors as a legal mechanism of confronting agency problems in listed companies. These provisions have been strongly argued as regards the exact content of the obligations of all board members of listed companies to promote the corporate interest and especially as regards the monitoring role of non-executive directors. These conceptions should be followed by empirical researches in order to address a completely legal and functional approach.

2018 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 22-33 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jill Atkins ◽  
Mohamed Zakari ◽  
Ismail Elshahoubi

This paper aims to investigate the extent to which board of directors’ mechanism is implemented in Libyan listed companies. This includes a consideration of composition, duties and responsibilities of the board directors. This study employed a questionnaire survey to collect required data from four key stakeholder groups: Boards of Directors (BD), Executive Managers (EM), Regulators and External Auditors (RE) and Other Stakeholders (OS). The results of this study provided evidence that Libyan listed companies generally comply with the Libyan Corporate Governance Code (LCGC) requirements regarding the board composition: the findings assert that most boards have between three and eleven members, the majority of whom are non-executives and at least two or one-third of whom (whichever is greater) are independent. Moreover, the results indicate that general assemblies in Libyan listed companies are practically committed to the LCGC’s requirements regarding the appointment of board members and their length of tenure. The findings provide evidence that boards in Libyan listed companies are carrying out their duties and responsibilities in accordance with internal regulations and laws, as well as the stipulations of the LCGC (2007). Furthermore, the stakeholder groups were broadly satisfied that board members are devoting sufficient time and effort to discharge these duties and responsibilities properly. This study helps to enrich our understanding and knowledge of the current practice of corporate boards as a significant mechanism of corporate governance (CG) by being the first to address the board of directors’ mechanism in Libyan listed companies.


2012 ◽  
Vol 9 (4-2) ◽  
pp. 221-229 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elsa Satkunasingam ◽  
Aaron Yong ◽  
Sern Cherk

The Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance 2000 emphasises the monitoring role of the Board of Directors, especially that of independent directors. It has not however taken into account the cultural values in Malaysia which do not encourage differences of opinion or criticisms and has failed to provide sufficient safeguards for directors to exercise their role effectively. As a result, it is relatively easy for dominant Chairmen or CEOs especially in government-linked companies or CEO dominated companies to control the Board or senior management with very little opposition. This paper will discuss several incidences of financial mismanagement in companies caused by dominant directors with very little opposition from the rest of the board. It will highlight that the law has to take cultural values more seriously in order to equip the Board and especially independent directors with the ability to challenge dominant Board members.


2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-40
Author(s):  
Philip Jehu ◽  
Mohammad Azhar Ibrahim

In this study, we examine the effect of directors’ ownership on earnings management practices. Explicitly, we draw from the agency theory to distinguish between ownership by non-executive directors and ownership by executive directors to investigate reasons for directors and managerial opportunistic behaviour. Utilising data from a sample of 864-firm-year observations ranging from 2009 to 2017 period, we test our hypothesis through OLS regression. We find that non-executive directors’ interests in shareholding are significantly associated with higher levels of earnings management. We observed a decrease in abnormal accruals on the overall basis of the combined ownership of both executive and non-executive directors. Overall, ownership by all directors combined significantly reduces managerial opportunism. By contrast, there is no evidence that executive directors’ ownership mitigates managerial opportunism. This paper contributes to corporate governance literature, particularly when the independence of board members is essential. This study disaggregates board ownership into executive holdings and non-executive holdings, dimensions which were hitherto rendered as managerial ownership or board ownership. These findings imply firms’ corporate governance policy and regulations.


2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 8-19
Author(s):  
Chryssoula E. Tsene

Corporate governance encompasses a multidisciplinary approach, which includes the internal and external factors that affect the interests of a company’s stakeholders. The Greek corporate governance framework of listed companies has initially been established in accordance with EU regulation and soft law recommendations, in order to enhance board accountability and transparency, empower shareholders’ activism and promote financial disclosure. In that regard, it has recently been reformed by the provisions of Law 4706/2020, aiming mainly: to empower the strategic and supervisory role of the board of directors, by introducing a clear description of the obligations of non-executive and independent non-executive directors and by including the establishment of an “adequacy (internal fit-and-proper) policy” for the appointment of board members. Accordingly, two new compulsory committees are added, the nomination and the remuneration committee, which should entirely be composed by non-executive members and are invested with an advisory role in determining the remuneration policy and proposing board candidates. Furthermore, the adoption of a Corporate Governance Code is rendered substantial for all listed companies. These provisions illustrate specifically the reform of the internal corporate governance structures, which should be implemented having regard to the general principles of transparency and proportionality


GIS Business ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 01-09
Author(s):  
Asma Rafique Chughtai ◽  
Afifa Naseer ◽  
Asma Hassan

The crucial role that implementation of Code of Corporate Governance plays on protecting the rights of minorities, shareholders, local as well as foreign investors cannot be denied. Companies all over the world are required to implement their respective Code of Corporate Governance for avoiding agency conflicts between companies management and stakeholders and for assuring transparency in accountability. This paper aims at exploring the impact of implementation of corporate governance practices (designed by Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan) have on the financial position of companies. For explanatory variables of the study, composition of the board as per the Code of Corporate Governance that comprises of presence of independent, executive and non-executive directors has been taken into consideration. Return on equity has been taken as an indicator of firms profitability i.e. the dependent variable. For this study, companies listed on food producing sector of Karachi Stock Exchange have been screened for excogitation of the relationship. It is an empirical research based on nine years data from 2007–2015. Using Hausman Test for selecting the data analysis technique between Fixed or Random, Fixed Cross Sectional Panel Analysis has been used for analysis of the data collected. Findings indicate that presence of independent, executive and non-executive directors as per the code requirements levies a significant impact on the profitability of companies indicated by return on equity. It is, thus concluded that companies should ensure compliance with code of governance practices to reduce not only the agency issues but also to increase their profitability.


2011 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 194-210
Author(s):  
Hyram Serretta ◽  
Mike Bendixen ◽  
Margie Sutherland

Directors and boards face many challenges in terms of managing complexity. A key factor of success in practicing good corporate governance is the board’s ability to cope with paradox. The purpose of this research has been to explore the core corporate governance dilemmas facing boards. The investigation was qualitative in nature using the Delphi technique. Six core corporate governance dilemmas facing board members were identified one of which is not mentioned in the international literature. The findings should provide directors with an ability to identify the nature of the paradoxes they need to respond to.


Obiter ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 40 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Maleka Femida Cassim

Effective shareholder control over the board of directors is patently in the interests of good corporate governance, accountability and transparency. In recognition of this modern reality, the policy focus in company law has shifted to encouraging shareholder participation and shareholder engagement in corporate affairs. Bearing in mind that very few shareholders of large public companies attend meetings in person, proxy voting is of vital importance to corporate democracy. This article discusses enhanced rights conferred by the Companies Act 71 of 2008 in relation to shareholder proxies who attend, speak and vote at shareholders’ meetings. It also considers the pressing practical question whether companies may impose a cut-off time for the lodgement of shareholder proxies.


Author(s):  
Fatima Albedal ◽  
Allam Mohammed Hamdan ◽  
Qasim Zureigat

This chapter investigates the relationship between the audit committee and earnings quality of listed companies in Bahrain Bourse and to examine whether those companies comply with the obligatory code of corporate governance. The sample of this study includes 40 companies listed in Bahrain Bourse for the period 2013-2017. The model of the study tested the relationship between the independent variables of audit committee characteristics and the dependent variable of earnings quality using pooled data regression. The findings of the study showed that the Bahraini listed companies comply and follow the code of corporate governance and some audit committee characteristics have an impact on earnings quality.


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