scholarly journals TARB book review: Stephen Darwall, The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Accountability

2021 ◽  
Vol 31 ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Kosuke Bishago
Keyword(s):  
Second Person ◽  
Stephen Darwall

The Radical Demand in Løgstrup's Ethics

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Stern
Keyword(s):  
Social Norms ◽  
Practical Reason ◽  
Natural Law ◽  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Second Person ◽  
Life Itself ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Stephen Darwall ◽  
Ethical Demand

This book focuses on the ethics of the Danish philosopher and theologian K. E. Løgstrup (1905–81), and in particular on his key text The Ethical Demand (1956). The first part of the book provides a commentary on The Ethical Demand. The second part contains chapters on Løgstrup as a natural law theorist; his critique of Kant and Kierkegaard; his relation to Levinas; the difference between his position and the second-person ethics of Stephen Darwall; and the role of Luther in Løgstrup’s thinking. Overall, it is argued that Løgstrup rejects accounts of ethical obligation based on the commands of God, or on abstract principles governing practical reason, or on social norms; instead he develops a different picture, at the basis of which is our interdependence, which he argues gives his ethics a grounding in the nature of life itself. The book claims that Løgstrup offers a distinctive and attractive account of our moral obligation to others, which fits into the natural law tradition.

scholarly journals "Freedom and Resentment" and Consequentialism

2017 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-23 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dale E. Miller
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Reactive Attitudes ◽  
Second Person ◽  
Stephen Darwall

In The Second-Person Standpoint, Stephen Darwall offers an interpretation of P. F. Strawson’s “Freedom and Resentment” according to which the essay advances the thesis that good consequences are the “wrong kind of reason” to justify “practices of punishment and moral responsibility.” Darwall names this thesis “Strawson’s Point.” I argue for a different reading of Strawson, one according to which he holds this thesis only in a qualified way and, more generally, is not the unequivocal critic of consequentialism that Darwall makes him out to be. In fact, I contend, Strawson’s account of the reactive attitudes can potentially be a useful resource for consequentialists.

Morality, Accountability and the Wrong Kind of Reasons

Utilitas ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 28-40
Author(s):  
MICAH LOTT
Keyword(s):  
Second Person ◽  
Convincing Argument ◽  
The Right ◽  
Wrong Kind Of Reasons ◽  
Stephen Darwall ◽  
Do So

In The Second Person Standpoint, Stephen Darwall makes a new argument against consequentialism, appealing to: (a) the conceptual tie between obligation and accountability, and (b) the ‘right kind of reasons’ for holding others accountable. I argue that Darwall's argument, as it stands, fails against indirect consequentialism, because it relies on a confusion between our being right to establish practices, and our having a right to do so. I also explore two ways of augmenting Darwall's argument. However, while the second of these ways is more promising than the first, neither provides a convincing argument against indirect consequentialism.

Book Review

1999 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 71
Author(s):  
A. M. Heagerty
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