scholarly journals La Reconnaissance, la justice, et la vie bonne

2014 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 79-89
Author(s):  
Charles Reagan
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Good Life ◽  
Private Property ◽  
Paul Ricoeur ◽  
Modern Society ◽  
The Good Life ◽  
Paul Ricœur ◽  
Multiple Meanings ◽  
The Many

This article deals with recognition, justice, and the good life separately, then as tied together in a web of interdependence. I begin with the multiple meanings of “recognition” and “to recognize.” I follow the order that Paul Ricoeur has in established in The Course of Recognition. Ricoeur groups these definitions into three kinds: epistemological definitions, recognition of oneself, and recognition of others. Next, I describe two kinds of justice, that of the judiciary and courts, both civil and criminal. Finally, I point out the many systems that must function to have a good life in a modern society. These include systems of transportation, communication, commerce, banking, private property, as well as many others. Their importance is brought home when we look at countries in civil war, such as Syria, or ones that have been mostly destroyed by natural forces such as Haiti after the massive earthquake. My conclusion is that the good life requires recognition of one another and of legitimate governments as well as functioning systems of justice.

scholarly journals Etre fidèle à soi: Féminisme, éthique et justice à la lumière de la philosophie de Paul Ricœur

2013 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 92-112 ◽  
Author(s):  
Damien Tissot
Keyword(s):  
Emmanuel Levinas ◽  
Good Life ◽  
Paul Ricoeur ◽  
Judith Butler ◽  
Self Esteem ◽  
Feminist Research ◽  
The Good Life ◽  
Feminist Discourse ◽  
Paul Ricœur ◽  
The Subject

In this paper, I read Paul Ricoeur in dialogue with Judith Butler, Emmanuel Levinas and Annie Léchenet. I suggest that Ricoeur’s philosophy provides interesting tools to articulate two simultaneous feminist claims, that is, a claim for recognition and a claim of justice. This article particularly highlights how the Ricoeurian hermeneutics of the subject, which puts self-esteem at the centre of the good life with and for others within just institutions, can provide an interesting frame for feminist research. Through my reading of Ricoeur, by linking more precisely the notions of promise and self-esteem, I argue that Ricoeur’s philosophy allows us to develop a theory of faithfulness to oneself, which, I suggest, is an implicit claim of feminist discourse.

scholarly journals De la pulsión a la solicitud por el otro: Bases antropológicas para la “pequeña ética” de Ricœur

2011 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 15-32
Author(s):  
Marie-France Begué
Keyword(s):  
Good Life ◽  
Paul Ricoeur ◽  
Human Person ◽  
Self Esteem ◽  
Human Condition ◽  
The Good Life ◽  
Critical Remark ◽  
Paul Ricœur

The intention of this work is to trace in the most archaic human condition the anthropological roots that justify the foundation of an ethics, as conceived by Paul Ricœur in his book Oneself as Another. To do this, first I will try to expose the route that the creative image follows from its genesis in drives to its full semantics in the symbol, according to the dialogue that the author engaged with Freud in his work Freud and Philosophy based on his hermeneutic concerns. Second, considering a critical remark that Ricœur makes about Freud, I will explore the intentional orientation towards “the good life”, whose reflexive sense, “self-esteem”, integrates the symbolic dimension of action and sets the basis for the realization (épanouissement) of the human person.

scholarly journals Ricœur’s Affirmation of Life in this World and his Journey to Ethics

2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 104-123
Author(s):  
Morny Joy
Keyword(s):  
Good Life ◽  
Paul Ricoeur ◽  
The Good Life ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Paul Ricœur ◽  
Affirmation Of Life

Although Paul Ricœur never wrote a book on acting and suffering, the essay focuses on Ricœur’s engagement with this topic. It was one of Ricœur’s abiding interests that consistently appeared over the years in a number of his works. Given his compassionate affirmation of life in this world, he was vitally concerned about human beings’ inhumanity, in the form of inflicting unmerited suffering on their fellow beings. His distress on this issue was clearly evident. This essay is an overview of Ricœur’s endeavors to try and alleviate such injustice by a commitment to an ethically grounded approach that aimed at “the good life with and for others, in just institutions.”

The Measure of Greatness

2019 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Good Life ◽  
Natural World ◽  
The Good Life ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
The Social ◽  
Moral Nature ◽  
Complex Trajectory ◽  
The Many ◽  
Human Excellence ◽  
Ethical Perspectives

Magnanimity is a virtue that has led many lives. Foregrounded early on by Plato as the philosophical virtue par excellence, it became one of the crown jewels in Aristotle’s account of human excellence and was accorded an equally salient place by other ancient thinkers. One of the most distinctive elements of the ancient tradition to filter into the medieval Islamic and Christian worlds, it sparked important intellectual engagements there and went on to carve deep tracks through several later philosophies that inherited from this tradition. Under changing names, under reworked forms, it continued to breathe in the thought of Descartes and Hume, Kant and Nietzsche, and their successors. Its many lives have been joined by important continuities. Yet they have also been fragmented by discontinuities—discontinuities reflecting larger shifts in ethical perspectives and competing answers to questions about the nature of the good life, the moral nature of human beings, and their relationship to the social and natural world they inhabit. They have also been punctuated by moments of controversy in which the greatness of this vision of human greatness has itself been called into doubt. This volume provides a window to the complex trajectory of a virtue whose glitter has at times been as heady as it has been divisive. By exploring the many lives it has lived, we will be in a better position to decide whether and why this is a virtue we might still want to make central to our own ethical lives.

scholarly journals Social Hermeneutics Study On the Meaning of Jihad by Students of Mulawarman University

2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-5
Author(s):  
Langgeng Saputra ◽  
Sri Murlianti ◽  
Martinus Nanang
Keyword(s):  
University Students ◽  
Paul Ricoeur ◽  
Good Effort ◽  
The World ◽  
Paul Ricœur ◽  
Two Factors ◽  
The Many ◽  
Social Hermeneutics

ABSTRACT: Jihad has been an integral part of Islamic discourse from its early days until today. This research was conducted to determine variations in the meaning of jihad that developed in Mulawarman University students. I use Paul Ricoeur's theory of Social Hermeneutics to explain how the process of interpreting meaning from a text. Ricoeur views that text has a life of its own regardless of the author's intention or intent (text autonomy). In interpreting the text, Ricoeur also argues that understanding and explanation are not two contradictory methods of interpreting the text. The workings of Paul Ricoeur's social hermeneutics include three factors, namely the world of text, the world of presenters, and the world of readers, whereas in this paper there are only two factors, namely the world of text and the world of readers. Jihad in al-Qur'an is repeated 41 times in 23 verses and by Ibn Al-Qayyim it is divided into four meanings, namely jihad against lust, jihad against Satan, jihad against infidels, and hypocrites, and jihad against injustice and wickedness. Meanwhile, readers only divide jihad into two meanings, namely jihad against lust and war jihad. In the process of interpreting, readers are greatly influenced by the trajectories of life that they have been through. This can be seen from the many meanings of jihad they express, namely war, defending, doing good, effort/strength, being serious, preaching, and enthusiasm. ABSTRAK: Jihad merupakan bagian integral wacana Islam sejak masa awal kedatangannya hingga sampai saat ini. Penelitian ini dilakukan untuk mengetahui variasi makna jihad yang berkembang pada Mahasiswa Universitas Mulawarman. Teori Paul Ricouer tentang Hermenutika Sosial saya gunakan untuk menjelaskan tentang bagaimana proses menafsir sebuah makna dari sebuah teks. Ricouer berpandangan bahwa teks memiliki kehidupannya sendiri terlepas dari intensi atau maksud pengarang (otonomi teks). Dalam menginterpretasi teks, Ricoeur juga berpendapat bahwa pemahaman dan penjelasan bukanlah dua metode yang bertentangan dalam menafsirkan teks. Cara kerja hermenutika sosial Paul Ricoeur mencakup tiga faktor yaitu dunia teks, dunia pemateri dan dunia pembaca sedangkan dalam tulisan ini hanya ada dua faktor yaitu dunia teks dan dunia pembaca. Jihad dalam al-Qur’an terulang 41 kali dalam 23 ayat dan oleh Ibn Al-Qayyim dibagi menjadi empat makna, yakni jihad melawan hawa nafsu, jihad melawan setan, jihad memerangi kaum kafir dan kaum munafik serta jihad melawan kezaliman dan kefasikan. Sedangkan pembaca hanya membagi jihad dalam dua makna yakni jihad melawan hawa nafsu dan jihad perang. Dalam proses penafsirannya, pembaca sangat dipengaruhi oleh trajektori kehidupan yang mereka pernah lalui. Hal ini dapat dilihat dari banyaknya makna jihad yang mereka ungkapkan, yaitu perang, membela, melakukan kebaikan, usaha/kekuatan, bersungguh-sungguh, dakwah serta semangat.

Critical theory

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Raymond Geuss ◽  
J. M. Bernstein
Keyword(s):  
Critical Theory ◽  
Good Life ◽  
Social Research ◽  
Modern Society ◽  
Human Action ◽  
Instrumental Rationality ◽  
Individual Autonomy ◽  
The Good Life ◽  
Contemporary Society ◽  
Conception Of The Good

The term ‘critical theory’ designates the approach to the study of society developed between 1930 and 1970 by the so-called ‘Frankfurt School’. A group of theorists associated with the Institute for Social Research, the School was founded in Frankfurt, Germany in 1923. The three most important philosophers belonging to it were Max Horkheimer, Theodor Wiesengrund Adorno and Herbert Marcuse. The project was renewed by the second- and third-generation critical theorists, most notably, Jürgen Habermas and Axel Honneth. Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse feared that modern Western societies were turning into closed, totalitarian systems in which all individual autonomy was eliminated. In their earliest writings from the 1930s they presented this tendency towards totalitarianism as one result of the capitalist mode of production. In later accounts they give more prominence to the role of science and technology in modern society, and to the concomitant, purely ‘instrumental’, conception of reason. This conception of reason denies that there can be any such thing as inherently rational ends or goals for human action and asserts that reason is concerned exclusively with the choice of effective instruments or means for attaining arbitrary ends. ‘Critical theory’ was to be a form of resistance to contemporary society; its basic method was to be that of ‘internal’ or ‘immanent’ criticism. Every society, it was claimed, must be seen as making a tacit claim to substantive (and not merely instrumental) rationality; that is, making the claim that it allows its members to lead a good life. This claim gives critical theory a standard for criticism which is internal to the society being criticized. Critical theory demonstrates in what ways contemporary society fails to live up to its own claims. The conception of the good life to which each society makes tacit appeal in legitimizing itself will usually not be fully propositionally explicit, so any critical theory will have to begin by extracting a tacit conception of the good life from the beliefs, cultural artefacts and forms of experience present in the society in question. One of the particular difficulties confronting a critical theory of contemporary society is the disappearance of traditional substantive conceptions of the good life that could serve as a basis for internal criticism, and their replacement with the view that modern society needs no legitimation beyond simple reference to its actual efficient functioning, to its ‘instrumental’ rationality. The ideology of ‘instrumental rationality’ thus itself becomes a major target for critical theory.

Critical theory

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Raymond Geuss
Keyword(s):  
Critical Theory ◽  
Good Life ◽  
Social Research ◽  
Modern Society ◽  
Human Action ◽  
Instrumental Rationality ◽  
Individual Autonomy ◽  
The Good Life ◽  
Contemporary Society ◽  
Conception Of The Good

The term ‘critical theory’ designates the approach to the study of society developed between 1930 and 1970 by the so-called ‘Frankfurt School’. A group of theorists associated with the Institute for Social Research, the School was founded in Frankfurt, Germany in 1923. The three most important philosophers belonging to it were Max Horkheimer, Theodor Wiesengrund Adorno and Herbert Marcuse. Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse feared that modern Western societies were turning into closed, totalitarian systems in which all individual autonomy was eliminated. In their earliest writings from the 1930s they presented this tendency towards totalitarianism as one result of the capitalist mode of production. In later accounts they give more prominence to the role of science and technology in modern society, and to the concomitant, purely ‘instrumental’, conception of reason. This conception of reason denies that there can be any such thing as inherently rational ends or goals for human action and asserts that reason is concerned exclusively with the choice of effective instruments or means for attaining arbitrary ends. ‘Critical theory’ was to be a form of resistance to contemporary society; its basic method was to be that of ‘internal’ or ‘immanent’ criticism. Every society, it was claimed, must be seen as making a tacit claim to substantive (and not merely instrumental) rationality; that is, making the claim that it allows its members to lead a good life. This claim gives critical theory a standard for criticism which is internal to the society being criticized. Critical theory demonstrates in what ways contemporary society fails to live up to its own claims. The conception of the good life to which each society makes tacit appeal in legitimizing itself will usually not be fully propositionally explicit, so any critical theory will have to begin by extracting a tacit conception of the good life from the beliefs, cultural artefacts and forms of experience present in the society in question. One of the particular difficulties confronting a critical theory of contemporary society is the disappearance of traditional substantive conceptions of the good life that could serve as a basis for internal criticism, and their replacement with the view that modern society needs no legitimation beyond simple reference to its actual efficient functioning, to its ‘instrumental’ rationality. The ideology of ‘instrumental rationality’ thus itself becomes a major target for critical theory.

scholarly journals The Modernity of Aristotle’s Ethics

MANUSYA ◽  
1998 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 23-38
Author(s):  
Charles Freeland
Keyword(s):  
Political Discourse ◽  
Good Life ◽  
Theory And Practice ◽  
The Good Life ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Philosophical Discourse ◽  
Course Of Action ◽  
Aristotle's Ethics ◽  
The Many ◽  
Theoretical Science

Aristotle understood ethics to be a practical rather than a theoretical science. It is a pragmatics, if you will, concerned with bringing about a good life . But the problem and the question from which Aristotle’s ethics begins arid to which it constantly returns concerns the relation of the theoretical to the practical: his concern is for the type or mode of discourse one could use in providing an account of the good life (Eudaimonia). Is this a propositional, apophantic discourse, a discourse claiming to represent the truth and what is true and from which one could then go on to prescribe a course of action, or, and this may be closer to Aristotle, is the philosophical discourse on ethics rather a descriptive one which takes humankind for what it is, not what it ought to be? This relation between theory and practice, between description and prescription, between science and action, is a question and a problem for Aristotle. It is my purpose to take up this question in connection with Aristotle’s texts on Eudaimonia. Another question shall be raised here: What is the relevance of Aristotle’s treatment of Eudaimonia to our contemporary, “modern” concern for ethics and the good life? I would assume, naively perhaps, that even today we are not indifferent to this question of what is a good life, and that we are not indifferent to the many ways in which the “good life” has been described. It would seem, then, that Aristotle’s texts have a particularly striking importance for us today insofar as we prolong the philosophical questioning of the possibilities for ethical and political discourse today and continue to ask who and what we are as human beings.

The Ethics of the Caring Conversation

2003 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 138-148 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lennart Fredriksson ◽  
Katie Eriksson
Keyword(s):  
Good Life ◽  
Paul Ricoeur ◽  
Self Esteem ◽  
Ethical Context ◽  
Paul Ricœur ◽  
Relationship Of

The aim of this study was to explore the ethical foundations for a caring conversation. The analysis is based on the ethics of Paul Ricoeur and deals with questions such as what kind of person the nurse ought to be and how she or he engages in caring conversations with suffering others. According to Ricoeur, ethics (the aim of an accomplished life) has primacy over morality (the articulation of aims in norms). At the ethical level, self-esteem and autonomy were shown to be essential for a person (nurse) to act with respect and responsibility. The ethical relationship of a caring conversation was found to be asymmetrical, because of the passivity inflicted by suffering. This asymmetry was found to be potentially unethical if not balanced with reciprocity. In the ethical context, the caring conversation is one in which the nurse makes room through the ethos of caritas for a suffering person to regain his or her self-esteem, and thus makes a good life possible.

scholarly journals Classic and Romantic Trends in Plato

1917 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 215-236
Author(s):  
J. Loewenberg
Keyword(s):  
Good Life ◽  
The Good Life ◽  
One And Many ◽  
The Many ◽  
The One ◽  
As If

The problem of the One and the Many is a problem essentially Platonic. Characteristically Platonic is the saying of Socrates in the Phaedrus: “If I find any man who is able to see a ‘One and Many’ in nature, him I follow, and ‘walk in his footsteps as if he were a god.’” The problem of the One and the Many may indeed be said to be the point around which Plato's deepest concerns center. It occurs in most of his dialogues. It appears in different formulations, and it receives a variety of emphasis. It is certainly at the root of his morals. “Not life, but a good life, is to be chiefly valued,” is Plato's fundamental teaching. And the good life is a life of law, order, justice. The diverse elements of the soul must be set in order; they must submit to one organizing principle; they must become a well-ordered unity.

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