scholarly journals Classic and Romantic Trends in Plato

1917 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 215-236
Author(s):  
J. Loewenberg
Keyword(s):  
Good Life ◽  
The Good Life ◽  
One And Many ◽  
The Many ◽  
The One ◽  
As If

The problem of the One and the Many is a problem essentially Platonic. Characteristically Platonic is the saying of Socrates in the Phaedrus: “If I find any man who is able to see a ‘One and Many’ in nature, him I follow, and ‘walk in his footsteps as if he were a god.’” The problem of the One and the Many may indeed be said to be the point around which Plato's deepest concerns center. It occurs in most of his dialogues. It appears in different formulations, and it receives a variety of emphasis. It is certainly at the root of his morals. “Not life, but a good life, is to be chiefly valued,” is Plato's fundamental teaching. And the good life is a life of law, order, justice. The diverse elements of the soul must be set in order; they must submit to one organizing principle; they must become a well-ordered unity.

The Measure of Greatness

2019 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Good Life ◽  
Natural World ◽  
The Good Life ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
The Social ◽  
Moral Nature ◽  
Complex Trajectory ◽  
The Many ◽  
Human Excellence ◽  
Ethical Perspectives

Magnanimity is a virtue that has led many lives. Foregrounded early on by Plato as the philosophical virtue par excellence, it became one of the crown jewels in Aristotle’s account of human excellence and was accorded an equally salient place by other ancient thinkers. One of the most distinctive elements of the ancient tradition to filter into the medieval Islamic and Christian worlds, it sparked important intellectual engagements there and went on to carve deep tracks through several later philosophies that inherited from this tradition. Under changing names, under reworked forms, it continued to breathe in the thought of Descartes and Hume, Kant and Nietzsche, and their successors. Its many lives have been joined by important continuities. Yet they have also been fragmented by discontinuities—discontinuities reflecting larger shifts in ethical perspectives and competing answers to questions about the nature of the good life, the moral nature of human beings, and their relationship to the social and natural world they inhabit. They have also been punctuated by moments of controversy in which the greatness of this vision of human greatness has itself been called into doubt. This volume provides a window to the complex trajectory of a virtue whose glitter has at times been as heady as it has been divisive. By exploring the many lives it has lived, we will be in a better position to decide whether and why this is a virtue we might still want to make central to our own ethical lives.

Division and Classification

2019 ◽  
pp. 34-54
Author(s):  
Paolo Crivelli
Keyword(s):  
Spatial Location ◽  
One And Many ◽  
The Many ◽  
The One ◽  
Spatial Locations ◽  
Different Parts

The Philebus presents some arguments for the paradoxical claim that the many are one and the one many. The most serious of these arguments concerns the multiple spatial locations of an attribute. For instance, since the attribute man belongs to many men, it is in them, and it is therefore both one and many (for it is in them either by having different parts of itself contained in them or by being wholly contained in each of them). Plato maintains that this argument goes astray. He appeals to division and collection, the procedures linked with definition and classification. He probably has in mind a mereological model of particulars, whereby perceptible particulars are mixtures whose ingredients are the attributes which they partake of. Among the ingredients of a perceptible particular there are properties that specify its spatial location, so the problem of the multiple spatial location of an attribute evaporates.

scholarly journals The Modernity of Aristotle’s Ethics

MANUSYA ◽  
1998 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 23-38
Author(s):  
Charles Freeland
Keyword(s):  
Political Discourse ◽  
Good Life ◽  
Theory And Practice ◽  
The Good Life ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Philosophical Discourse ◽  
Course Of Action ◽  
Aristotle's Ethics ◽  
The Many ◽  
Theoretical Science

Aristotle understood ethics to be a practical rather than a theoretical science. It is a pragmatics, if you will, concerned with bringing about a good life . But the problem and the question from which Aristotle’s ethics begins arid to which it constantly returns concerns the relation of the theoretical to the practical: his concern is for the type or mode of discourse one could use in providing an account of the good life (Eudaimonia). Is this a propositional, apophantic discourse, a discourse claiming to represent the truth and what is true and from which one could then go on to prescribe a course of action, or, and this may be closer to Aristotle, is the philosophical discourse on ethics rather a descriptive one which takes humankind for what it is, not what it ought to be? This relation between theory and practice, between description and prescription, between science and action, is a question and a problem for Aristotle. It is my purpose to take up this question in connection with Aristotle’s texts on Eudaimonia. Another question shall be raised here: What is the relevance of Aristotle’s treatment of Eudaimonia to our contemporary, “modern” concern for ethics and the good life? I would assume, naively perhaps, that even today we are not indifferent to this question of what is a good life, and that we are not indifferent to the many ways in which the “good life” has been described. It would seem, then, that Aristotle’s texts have a particularly striking importance for us today insofar as we prolong the philosophical questioning of the possibilities for ethical and political discourse today and continue to ask who and what we are as human beings.

The Autonomy-Based Liberalism of Joseph Raz

1989 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 151-162 ◽  
Author(s):  
W. J. Norman
Keyword(s):  
Good Life ◽  
Liberal Theory ◽  
Recent Book ◽  
The Good Life ◽  
Political Morality ◽  
Philosophical Aspect ◽  
History Of ◽  
Joseph Raz ◽  
The One ◽  
Conception Of The Good

Ask a practising liberal to define her political creed, and more likely than not she will begin by describing the wonderful life of the free person. That is, in the parlance of modern political philosophers, she will begin with a conception of the good. The good life is the free life, and the good society is the one where people are as free as possible. By contrast, recent liberal philosophers have for the most part grounded their theories in principles of right or rights. Indeed, some have argued that what is unique about liberalism as a political doctrine is that it is not committed to the advancement of any particular conception of the good, let alone to that of the free person. In his celebrated recent book, The Morality of Freedom, Joseph Raz sides with the practitioner and confronts the pedlars of right-based or deontological liberalism head-on. Believing the history of liberal theory to be against them, he labels his opponents ‘revisionists’. The Morality of Freedom has already been hailed as the most significant new statement of liberal principles since Mill’s On Liberty. And while this may be a bit over-enthusiastic, Raz would welcome at least one philosophical aspect of the comparison with Mill. Both are teleologists who ground their theories of political morality on considerations of the value of the free or autonomous life. I shall dub such theories ‘autonomarian’. And I shall examine Raz’s autonomarian reaction in detail here, for it may well be the most important such theory in the post-Rawlsian era.

scholarly journals Creatures Bound for Glory: Biotechnological Enhancement and Visions of Human Flourishing

2019 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 241-253 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Burdett ◽  
Victoria Lorrimar
Keyword(s):  
Good Life ◽  
Human Enhancement ◽  
The Other ◽  
The Good Life ◽  
Human Being ◽  
Human Flourishing ◽  
The One ◽  
Secular Humanist ◽  
Grand Vision

The human enhancement debate is fundamentally based on divergent ideals of human flourishing. Using the complementary, though often contrasting, foci of creaturehood and deification as fundamental to the good life, we examine these visions of human flourishing inherent in transhumanist, secular humanist and critical posthumanist positions on human enhancement. We argue that the theological anthropologies that respond to human enhancement and these other ideologies tend to emphasise either creaturehood or deification to the neglect or detriment of the other. We propose in response that understanding humans as creatures bound for glory integrates both dimensions of the human being into the one grand vision of flourishing God has for humanity.

Between One and Many: Multiples, Multiplication and the Huayan Metaphysics

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hsueh-Man Shen
Keyword(s):  
Art History ◽  
Modern Art ◽  
Visual Language ◽  
Buddhist Doctrine ◽  
Multiple Copies ◽  
One And Many ◽  
The Many ◽  
The One ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
The Universe

Modern art history practice often treats Buddhist icons or ritual objects as unique objects, focusing on their originality and uniqueness. This text investigates how the paradoxical Buddhist doctrine of ‘the one and the many’ was translated into visual language through manipulation of the relationship between copies and the original. It analyses the different tactics and strategies formulated around given socio-historical frameworks to visualise the notion of infinity, and ultimately the structure of the universe, and suggests that multiple copies of a single design were more potent a vehicle than single objects in expressing ideas related to the Buddhist metaphysics.

Reply to Elinor Mason and Alastair Norcross

Utilitas ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 398-406
Author(s):  
FRED FELDMAN
Keyword(s):  
Good Life ◽  
Propositional Attitude ◽  
Dartmouth College ◽  
The Good Life ◽  
Sensory Pleasure ◽  
The One

In comments originally presented at the ISUS conference at Dartmouth College in 2005, Elinor Mason and Alastair Norcross raised a number of objections to various things I said in Pleasure and the Good Life. One especially interesting objection concerns one of my central claims about the nature of pleasure. I distinguished between sensory pleasure and attitudinal pleasure. I said that a feeling counts as a sensory pleasure if the one who feels it takes intrinsic attitudinal pleasure in the fact that he is then feeling it. I also said that attitudinal pleasure is a propositional attitude that does not intrinsically involve any particular ‘feelings’. On my view, a person can take attitudinal pleasure in things at a time even though he does not feel any pleasurable feelings at that time. In their comments, Mason and Norcross expressed doubts about my account of attitudinal pleasure. In my reply, I try to answer those doubts.

Political philosophy, Confucian

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Chan
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Good Life ◽  
The State ◽  
The Good Life ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
The Poor ◽  
The People ◽  
Natural Tendency ◽  
The Many ◽  
Egalitarian Justice

Confucianism is a tradition of ethical and political thought in which ethics and politics are tightly connected. Confucianism endorses a politics of virtue that can be understood in two ways. First, politics in Confucianism aims to promote certain virtues and social relationships it defines as good; second, Confucianism conceives that politics can be successful only if the people in power are virtuous. Confucian political philosophy is therefore a kind of perfectionism which says that the state should promote the good life, and it is therefore directly opposed to the contemporary liberal view that the state and its officials should take no stance regarding what constitutes the good life. This entry introduces the Confucian vision of politics and explores its implications for three issues, namely: the source of political authority, the scope of people’s rights and liberties, and the responsibilities of the state towards its people’s welfare. The politics of virtue as conceived in Confucianism naturally tends to endorse rule by the wise instead of rule by the many; it tends to stress the need for people to cultivate virtues rather than to enjoy rights and liberties; and it sees people’s care for the poor and needy as stemming from virtues or duties rather than imperatives of social equality or justice. Despite this natural tendency, however, it is not obvious that the politics of virtue leaves no room for democracy, rights, and egalitarian justice. Indeed some commentators have argued that a number of these liberal-democratic ideas are either present in Confucianism or consistent with its central tenets. It is arguable that classical Confucian texts do not contain any ideas of democracy, human rights, or egalitarian justice, but do leave room for endorsement of the first two ideals under certain circumstances.

The Flight from the Good Life: Fahrenheit 451 in the Context of Postwar American Dystopias

1994 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 225-240
Author(s):  
David Seed
Keyword(s):  
New World ◽  
Good Life ◽  
Seventh Century ◽  
The Other ◽  
The Good Life ◽  
Two Dimensional ◽  
Aldous Huxley ◽  
Brave New World ◽  
Grand Inquisitor ◽  
The One

Surveying the American scene in 1958, Aldous Huxley recorded his dismay over the speed with which Brave New World was becoming realized in contemporary developments: “The nightmare of total organization, which I had situated in the seventh century After Ford, has emerged from the safe, remote future and is now awaiting us, just around the next corner.” Having struck a keynote of urgency Huxley then lines up a series of oppositions between limited disorder, individuality and freedom on the one hand, and order, automatism and subjection on the other in order to express his liberal anxieties that political and social organization might hypertrophy. Huxley sums up an abiding fear which runs through American dystopian fiction of the 1950s that individuals will lose their identity and become the two-dimensional stereotypes indicated in two catch-phrases of the period: the “organization man” and the “man in the grey flannel suit. ” William H. Whyte's 1956 study diagnoses the demise of the Protestant ethic in American life and its replacement by a corporate one which privileges “belongingness. ” The result might be, he warns, not a world controlled by self-evident enemies familiar from Nineteen Eighty-Four, but an antiseptic regime presided over by a “mild-looking group of therapists who, like the Grand Inquisitor, would be doing what they did to help you.”

Good Lives: Prolegomena

1992 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 15-37 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lawrence C. Becker
Keyword(s):  
Good Life ◽  
The Good Life ◽  
Philosophical Essay ◽  
Self Actualization ◽  
History Of ◽  
Good Lives ◽  
As If

A philosophical essay under this title faces severe rhetorical challenges. New accounts of the good life regularly and rapidly turn out to be variations of old ones, subject to a predictable range of decisive objections. Attempts to meet those objections with improved accounts regularly and rapidly lead to a familiar impasse — that while a life of contemplation, or epicurean contentment, or stoic indifference, or religious ecstasy, or creative rebellion, or self-actualization, or many another thing might count as a good life, none of them can plausibly be identified with the good life, or the best life. Given the long history of that impasse, it seems futile to offer yet another candidate for the genus “good life” as if that candidate might be new, or philosophically defensible. And given the weariness, irony, and self-deprecation expected of a philosopher in such an impasse, it is difficult for any substantive proposal on this topic to avoid seeming pretentious.

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