The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in the Member States

2020 ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 771-798 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lucia Serena Rossi

Article 6 of the TEU states that the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights “shall have the same legal value as the Treaties.” This Article investigates the Charter's real status in the EU legal order. To this end, the Charter's force will be analyzed relative to EU institutions, the Member States, and individuals. The resulting picture will enable consideration of the Charter's place in the EU hierarchy of norms, as well as the question of its primacy and direct effect.


Araucaria ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 131-154
Author(s):  
Angela Di Stasi1

Starting from an overview on the current crisis in the European integration process, caused inter alia by the emergence of forms of “souverainisms”, the following paper focuses on the peculiarity of the European Union phenomenon and on the effects of the gradual enlargement of the European competences with respect to the classical concept of sovereignty. In this view, some observations will be made around the subtle limit which separates the EU competence from the one of its member States. For this purpose, the Charter of fundamental rights of the EU and the issue of the field of its application towards the member States is adopted as a privileged observation point.


2007 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
pp. 133-175 ◽  
Author(s):  
Olivier de Schutter

It has been argued in many places, and in different forms, that the establishment between the EU Member States of an internal market, and now of an area of freedom, security and justice, requires the European Union to legislate in the field of fundamental rights, either in order to avoid a form of regulatory competition between the Member States or in order to ensure mutual trust allowing for mutual cooperation between judicial, police and administrative national authorities. ‘Negative integration’, in the form of the lowering of barriers to the movement of goods, services, persons and capital, or in the form of mutual recognition of judicial decisions or exchange of information between national authorities, should thus be followed with, or compensated by, ‘positive integration’, in the form of the setting of common standards applicable throughout the EU Member States. The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, moreover, provides the baseline from which to act, since it represents a set of values which all the Member States have agreed to consider as fundamental. The question (so it would seem) is now that of implementing the Charter, by using the legal bases provided for in the treaties to the fullest extent possible.


2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-49
Author(s):  
Mihaela Vrabie

This article aims to determine when the national authorities have the obligation to comply with EU fundamental rights, in the framework of administrative procedures carried out in the EU Member States. It also aims to determine the legal remedies available at national level in the context of judicial review in case of violation, by the national authorities, of EU fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU or as general principles of EU law. To this end, this study explains the impact of the legally binding EU Charter on public administration of the Member States and the field of application of the EU Charter at national level. The article also deals with the distinction between EU fundamental rights as primary EU law guaranteed by the EU Charter and EU fundamental rights as general principles of EU law. With reference to the judicial remedies available to national courts, the study outlines the effects of EU law (primacy of EU law, direct effect, direct application) in relation to the EU fundamental rights and the measures that can be adopted by the national courts when the action of the national administrative authorities is not compatible with EU fundamental rights. Finally, the article presents the most important findings concerning judicial protection of EU fundamental rights at the national level, especially from the perspective of the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial stipulated by Article 47 of the EU Charter.  


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Oliver Gerstenberg

Abstract The EU, in its present configuration, has often been accused of a persistent and deep structural bias in favour of economic integration to the detriment of the democratic and social values of its Member States. In response to that accusation, can the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (CFREU) come to the rescue and be mobilized, ultimately before a judicially-activist Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU), as a vehicle of social justice, in an effort to correct bias and to counter-balance the expansive economic liberties of the European single market? Exploring this question is a timely topic given a clearly discernable new constitutional turn in the jurisprudence of the CJEU’s Grand Chamber, especially now under the current presidency of Koen Lenaerts. The ‘Lenaerts-Court’, as this article will argue, has embarked on a new EU fundamental-rights jurisprudence, visibly aimed at strengthening the dignitarian-social dimension of EU integration and at adding flesh to the bones of the commitment to a European social market economy in Article 3(3) of the Treaty of European Union (TEU). Yet proposals in support of greater reliance on the substantive, but open-textured, provisions of the CFREU, in the pursuit of a ‘fair balance’ between the EU’s economic and dignitarian-social dimensions, immediately run into democratic-minded concerns about sovereignty passing from the Member States to the courts, and ultimately to the CJEU itself. The persistent worry is that democratic sovereignty over constitutionally sensitive—but morally and politically divisive—choices is being turned into a ‘sovereignty of law’—in ways that not only risk foreclosure of democratic debate over yet unsettled key societal matters but gives up democratic legitimation as a central element of modern constitutionalism (‘over-constitutionalisation’, Dieter Grimm). Thus, the CJEU is being simultaneously criticized for its alleged economic bias and for its efforts to overcome that bias. In an effort to address—and disarm—this democratic-minded concern, this article argues that judicial emphasis on the CFREU’s dignitarian-social values need not per se lead to the consequence of over-constitutionalisation. Rather, this article proposes to look at the Grand Chamber’s new fundamental-rights jurisprudence in the single-market context as creating a framework for plural and inclusive democratic deliberation on key societal choices and values. To that end, the article proposes a new reading of the Grand Chamber’s jurisprudence on the efficacy of fundamental rights in the economic sphere and, in particular, on the horizontal direct effect of CFREU rights.


2018 ◽  
pp. 7-35
Author(s):  
Andrzej Wróbel

The analysis herein, while mainly descriptive, presents the main foundations of the Constitutional Tribunal’s jurisprudence in matters of hierarchical control of the constitutionality of laws concerning the EU. It distinguishes some principles, concepts and constitutional theories which, according to the Constitutional Tribunal, set the limits of European integration. The main thesis of the paper is that, in this context, the basic and decisive rule is the supremacy of the Constitution, which does not have exceptions or limitations. A hypothesis was also formulated that the Solange II maxim does not reflect the actual state of European constitutionalism, in which the level of protection of fundamental rights is significantly increased while possible collisions between the level of protection of fundamental rights in the EU and the Member States should be solved by means of the clauses provided in Articles 51–54 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.


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