scholarly journals The Evolution of the Crime-Terror Nexus in Europe

2020 ◽  
pp. 51-66
Author(s):  
Noemi Rocca

Empirical evidence confirms that in Europe there are growing links between criminal organizations (OCs) and terrorist groups (GTs) – known as the “crime-terror nexus”. After the end of the Cold War and, particularly, since global financial operations came under greater control, the financing of illicit and criminal actions has consequently been conditioned. This resulted in greater proximity and cooperation between OCs and WGs not only in fragile states or undemocratic regimes, but in the western democracies themselves. The article also analyzes the content of the judicial sentences on cooperation and collusions between terrorist groups and criminal organizations.

Author(s):  
David C. Rapoport

By the 1960s the international world changed dramatically. While the nuclear balance of terror created by the atomic bomb prevented war between the First and the Second Worlds, proxy wars between the superpowers were conducted in the “Third World.” The Cold War began and the Soviet Union attempted to arouse radical groups in the Third World, an effort that grew immensely as overseas empires of Western states dissolved. The UN membership expanded because of the great number of “new” states. Two events in Third World countries were critical: Castro’s triumph in Cuba and the long Vietnam War. Vietnam was particularly crucial in animating terrorist groups throughout the West. A total of 404 groups emerged: 192 Revolutionaries and 212 Separatists. There were two Revolutionary types: 143 Nationals and 49 Transnational. The Transnationals, a product of the developed world, saw themselves as Third World agents. Nationals and Separatists aimed to remake their own states. Nationals sought equality and Separatists sought a new state that often included elements from neighboring states. Separatists were present everywhere except Latin America where all groups were Nationals. As in the First Wave, university students provided most of the initial terrorist recruits. Women became important again except among Separatists. Cuban and PLO training facilities intensified bonds with foreign groups. The PLO was the most conspicuous group because it conducted more assaults abroad than at home. Groups from different countries cooperated in attacks, that is, OPEC ministers kidnapping (1975). At home, targets with international significance like embassies were struck. Publicity again became a principal concern, which made hostage taking preeminent for the first time, a practice that became very lucrative for some groups. Over 700 hijacked airlines intensified the wave’s international character. The Sandinista took Nicaragua’s Congress hostage in 1978, which sparked a successful insurrection. Many Third World hostages were foreigners from the developed world involved in commerce, and their companies quickly paid enormous ransoms. Earlier waves produced more deaths. The wave began ebbing in the 1980s; new groups stopped emerging. Israel eliminated PLO facilities for training terrorist groups. International counterterrorist cooperation became effective. Terrorists now found the UN hostile. Six of the eight successes occurred when the Cold War ended and Soviet support disappeared. Most were very limited. The PLO became so weak it was allowed to return home and negotiate for a two-state solution, one still not achieved. The South African ANC produced the only real success partly because its tactics were so restrained.


2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 31-70
Author(s):  
Luca Falciola

This article examines the transnational ties between the Italian revolutionary left and Palestinian militants from the mid-1960s through the early 1980s. Some observers have cited these connections to explain the magnitude of Italian terrorism in the 1970s and early 1980s. However, in the absence of empirical research, the issue has remained murky. The archival sources and detailed interviews with protagonists used in the article shed light on this phenomenon by addressing four questions: first, the reception of the Palestinian cause within the Italian revolutionary left; second, the way Palestinian terrorist groups established roots in Italy and how the political context facilitated those efforts; third, the interactions between Italian and Palestinian militants both in Italy and in the Middle East; and fourth, the factors that strengthened or weakened the relationships between these entities. The evidence indicates that although Italian revolutionaries forged concrete ties with Palestinian militants and terrorists, these ties were not as extensively developed as some of the Italian leftists had hoped. The interactions encouraged radicalization but did not significantly foster violent escalation and terrorism in Italy.


2017 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 235-253
Author(s):  
Elaheh Koolaee ◽  
Ziba Akbari

After the Cold War and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the term “fragile states” has gained increasing prominence in security debates and the international community turned its attention to how to deal with such countries. These security concerns originate from several factors: emphasis on building peace and security, spread of this idea that development and security are related, and the principle that the stability of state plays an influential role in its development. The term “fragile state” refers to weak states that are vulnerable to internal and external threats and have a poor government that is incapable of managing internal affairs and external policy. In this regard, Iraq was considered as a fragile state after 2003, and its stability has been evaluated poor since ever. The present study employed indices of fragile state and human security in order to investigate the effect of Iraq’s fragile state on development of threats to women security. Violation of human security in Iraq after 2003 was caused by failure in nation state-building process and weakness of Iraqi government in maintaining societal order and unity. Therefore, the main question that the present study aims to address is: “How has women security been threatened by Iraq’s crisis and its fragile state?”


Modern Italy ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 349-369 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roberto Bartali

With the removal of Khrushchev in 1964 the Soviet Union adopted—at the level of the secret service—a more aggressive policy towards western countries, with a more intensive recourse to so-called ‘covert operations’. These operations regarded even western communist parties, such as the Italian Communist Party (PCI), which were close to being viewed as ‘orthodox’ by the Soviet leadership. The so-called ‘active measures’ which resulted were realised through the infiltration of agents, the training of (usually young) extremists, and (through them) the sending of warnings to the PCI leadership about its divergence from the Soviet line. This context helps us to understand better than before three key events of the years 1968–1973: the emergence of the first terrorist groups in Italy (the Partisans Action Groups and the Red Brigades); the bombing of the electric mains line where Giangiacomo Feltrinelli lost his life; and the car crash in which Enrico Berlinguer was involved in 1973 during an official visit to Bulgaria. An analysis of the Cold War context in which Italian terrorism (and specifically the Red Brigades) developed reveals origins and patterns that are different to those usually identified in the literature.


2018 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 65-126
Author(s):  
John O. Iatrides

In May 1948, as the Cold War escalated and the Communist insurgency in Greece intensified, the assassination of CBS News journalist George Polk in Salonica became an international cause célèbre. Polk had openly criticized the Greek government and questioned the U.S. government's support of an undemocratic regime. Most probably, he was killed trying to reach an insurgent command post to interview guerrilla leaders about the civil war. With no claims of responsibility for the murder and no credible forensic evidence, suspicions of culpability fell on many actors, including the Communists, extreme rightwing elements, common criminals, and rogue British intelligence operatives. Although responsibility for identifying and bringing to justice the guilty fell squarely on the Greek authorities, the country's heavy dependence on U.S. assistance enabled U.S. officials and journalists to influence the case. Eager to blame the crime on the Communists and produce quick results, Greek police and justice officials fabricated a case against two known Communists (never apprehended) and a small-time reporter, Gregory Staktopoulos, whose incoherent confessions were clearly coerced. Staktopoulos's trial, conviction, long imprisonment, and failed appeals to the country's highest court left an indelible stigma on Greek justice. Polk's murder—which has never been solved—and Staktopoulos's cruel fate illustrate the powerfully corrosive impact of Cold War perceptions and priorities on the institutions of Western democracies.


2011 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 126-148 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maarten Van Alstein

This article draws on recently declassified documents from the Belgian archives to assess the division within the Belgian diplomatic service about Soviet intentions at the start of the Cold War. The diplomatic corps was divided between those who viewed the Soviet Union favorably and believed that continued close cooperation after the war was both feasible and essential, and those who were wary of Soviet intentions in Eastern Europe and believed that Western democracies would have to be united in opposing Soviet encroachments. Paul-Henri Spaak, the long-time Belgian foreign minister, was initially in the former camp, but events at the close of the war and soon thereafter brought him and Belgian foreign policy much closer to the latter's position.


2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 76-82
Author(s):  
Andi Mihail BĂNCILĂ

The disintegration of the USSR in December 1991 marked the end of the Cold War. Many foreign policy analysts were quick to point out that Russian Federation had ceased to be a threat to the Western world. Despite facing a multitude of economic, social and military problems, under the leadership of Vladimir Putin the Russian state managed to be reborn. Russian Federation's miraculous return was made possible by the successful implementation of a policy of economic centralization that overlapped with a period of rising global oil prices. Economic prosperity encouraged the Russian Federation government to return to the old practices of the Soviet period, succeeding in unbalancing the fragile states of Eastern Europe and once again endangering the peace of the entire continent.   Keywords: Russian Federation; Cold War; Crimea; hydrocarbons; conflict.  


Author(s):  
Kimberly Marten

As a response to the new policy problems facing the international community after the end of the Cold War, the security studies literature on weak and failing states and their relationship to various forms of conflict emerged. Two sets of events caused policy makers to focus on state weakness as a threat to international security. The first wave of research was generated by the new United Nations (UN)-sponsored peace operations of the post-Cold War era. The second overlapping wave of research followed the al-Qaeda attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001, and the resulting perception that non-state terrorist groups were likely to use failed or failing states as their base of global operations. There has been no agreement among researchers about how to define the concept or varieties of state failure. As such, it has not coalesced into something that could truly be called a scholarly research program. Nevertheless, a vibrant literature has emerged on the political economy of “ungoverned territories.” Warlords are actors who use a combination of force, charisma, and patronage to control small slices of territory inside of what is purportedly a sovereign state. They usually profit from organized criminal activities that threaten both the peace and the legal institutions of the state, but can be used to help weak states to survive and reconstitute themselves in wartime. Meanwhile, scholars argue whether states should necessarily be reconstructed after they fail, given that many failed states were unnatural and authoritarian postcolonial creations.


Author(s):  
David Kilcullen

This chapter lays out the book’s overall thesis: that in the quarter century of western military dominance since the Cold War, adversaries have learned to defeat the west’s military model as pioneered during the 1991 Gulf War. The chapter recounts James Woolsey’s “dragon and snakes” testimony of February 1993, then provides a survey of major developments among nonstate actors such as terrorist groups and state adversaries including Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea. The chapter introduces the concept of liminal strategies, where adversaries (recognizing their inability to compete directly with western militaries) ride the edge of detectability, sidestepping our conventional military strength while doing just enough to achieve their goals without provoking a direct military retaliation.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maria-Louise Clausen ◽  
Peter Albrecht

Abstract Through the lens of security sector reform, this article explores shifts in international interventions since the Cold War. Identifying three phases, it traces the global North's failure to transform fragile states into liberal democratic polities and changes to intervention practices in response to that failure. Immediately after the Cold War, an unfettered belief in the liberal peace thesis, and its global applicability, drove interventions that sought to establish an integrated liberal internationalist system of states shaped by mutuality. This changed with 9/11, shifting the focus towards extensive statebuilding exercises to replace, by force if necessary, security sectors and reconstruct failed states as liberal democracies. The current phase reflects lost faith in the global North's transformative potential following experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan. New forms of intervention from a distance have emerged, relying on delegation to technology and militaries of the global South. This type of intervention allows the global North to maintain a sense of influence while shifting the burden of intervention onto the global South's populations and militaries—and foreclosing comprehensive statebuilding. The global North can no longer claim to act on behalf of universally applicable norms, but alternatives have yet to materialize, leaving interventions in an ideological limbo.


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