scholarly journals From socialist command to a capitalist market economy: the case for an active state

2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 327-343
Author(s):  
Hubert Gabrisch
Keyword(s):  
Market Economy ◽  
Active State ◽  
Market Economies ◽  
Economics And Politics

Kazimierz Łaski belonged to the group of economists who particularly clearly and convincingly criticized the application of neoliberal doctrines to the transition of socialist countries into market economies. His analysis of the transition agendas was deeply rooted in the Kaleckian tradition of reasoning and brought him much respect but also fierce opposition in the international arena. In answering the why and how of his work, this article will summarize his contributions to the economics and politics of transition.

scholarly journals The macroeconomics of COVID-19: a two-sector interpretation

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 165-174
Author(s):  
Halvor Mehlum ◽  
Ragnar Torvik
Keyword(s):  
Developing Countries ◽  
Market Economy ◽  
Liquidity Constraints ◽  
Market Economies ◽  
New Type

For a developed market economy, the COVID-19 crisis is a new type of crisis, but such a crisis has parallels with economies at other times, and with crises in many places. We discuss some mechanisms from the traditional macro literature and from the literature on macroeconomics for developing countries. Phenomena such as bottlenecks, rationing, forced savings, production constrained by access to inputs, liquidity constraints, sector heterogeneity, and costs running despite production being shut down, are all permanent phenomena in developing countries. During the COVID-19 crisis, however, they have also emerged as key mechanisms in developed market economies. We discuss some of these well-developed but partially forgotten mechanisms by extending simple textbook descriptions, and we provide some examples of how the effects of policy are changed in a time of crisis.

Christian Personalism and Democratic Capitalism

Horizons ◽  
1994 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 313-331 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard C. Bayer
Keyword(s):  
Eastern Europe ◽  
Market Economy ◽  
Social Theory ◽  
Moral Concern ◽  
Market System ◽  
Market Economies ◽  
John Paul Ii ◽  
Democratic Capitalism ◽  
Collapse Of Communism ◽  
Centesimus Annus

AbstractIn his recent works Michael Novak offers an affirmation of “democratic capitalism” based on a Christian personalist perspective. Novak's scholarship has received increasing attention since the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, and particularly since the recent encyclical Centesimus Annus. In that encyclical John Paul II offered a qualified affirmation of market economies. This article addresses an important question: to what extent can a Christian personalist social theory be used to offer an affirmation of a market economy, and how might it offer vision and constructive critique? I initiate a creative dialogue between the personalism of Emmanuel Mounier and Michael Novak's presentation of democratic capitalism. I argue that Novak has shed important light on the positive moral aspects of a market system, but I identify and emphasize the important remaining areas for moral concern.

Commerce and Selfishness

1982 ◽  
Vol 8 ◽  
pp. 211-232 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard J. Arneson
Keyword(s):  
Market Economy ◽  
Karl Marx ◽  
Public Authority ◽  
Character Trait ◽  
Character Traits ◽  
Market Economies ◽  
Empirical Hypothesis

Does the existence of a capitalist market economy foster the character trait of selfishness? Does a market elicit narrowly self-interested conduct? Many great minds have advanced notably weak arguments to support affirmative answers to these questions. In section I, I canvass several unsuccessful attempts by Karl Marx to demonstrate that market economies are causally implicated in the production of undesirable character traits. Sections II and Ill venture a suggestion that partially vindicates Marx's hunch. The suggestion I develop relies on the truth of an empirical hypothesis regarding the effect on the disposition to altruism of activity by public authority that is perceived by those affected to be fair.

scholarly journals Towards a Broader View of Competition Policy

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph E Stiglitz
Keyword(s):  
Developing Countries ◽  
Emerging Markets ◽  
Market Economy ◽  
Competition Policy ◽  
Legal Framework ◽  
Antitrust Law ◽  
The Past ◽  
Economics Profession ◽  
Economics And Politics

For over 100 years, competition policy has been a central part of a market economy’s legal framework. Over the past third of a century, however, the scope and effectiveness of competition policy has been narrowed, under the influence of certain ideas about the functioning of the market economy—ideas which have subsequently been widely discredited within the economics profession, but whose influence within antitrust law remains significant. This chapter argues that, to the contrary, changes in our economy and our understandings of the interplay between economics and politics necessitates a broader reach for competition policy than envisaged by the original advocates of antitrust law, and that this is especially so in developing countries and emerging markets.

scholarly journals The integration between and common prosperity of government and market: China's experience of economic development

2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 353-366
Author(s):  
Leming Hu
Keyword(s):  
Economic Development ◽  
Market Economy ◽  
Economic Transition ◽  
Emerging Market ◽  
Emerging Market Economies ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Market Economies ◽  
Economic Liberalism ◽  
Government And Market ◽  
The Relationship

PurposeThe relationship between government and market is the key to the economic development performance of market economy countries. Due to the limits such as the state/market dichotomy, the focus on static allocation efficiency and the ignorance of the diversity of the market economy and the relationship between government and market, economic liberalism and state interventionism can hardly position and explain the role and evolution of government and market in the real world accurately.Design/methodology/approachChina’s economic transition has always adhered to the reform direction of the socialist market economy and the development goal of a modern socialist country as well as the symbiosis and positive and progressive evolution of government and market, blazing a “third way” in handling the relationship between government and market.FindingsThe “China’s experience” shows that the key for emerging market economies to achieve good economic development performance lies in whether they can build a new relationship of the mutual integration between and common prosperity of government and market regarding target selection, production organisation, technological innovation, institutional change and regulatory adjustment.Originality/valueThe second part of this paper analyses the inherent defects of economic liberalism and state interventionism as well as the reasons why they can hardly be adopted as the theoretical guidance for emerging market economies to handle the relationship between government and market. The third part analyses how China has transcended the inherent thinking of liberalism and interventionism and shaped the new relationship between government and market through goal-oriented, active and progressive, two-way interactive exploration and practice to ensure the success of China's economic transition.

Managervergütung, Mindestlohn, Mietpreisbremse

Der Staat ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 60 (3) ◽  
pp. 353-386
Author(s):  
Ann-Katrin Kaufhold ◽  
Sonja Heitzer
Keyword(s):  
Market Economy ◽  
Consumer Protection ◽  
Market Failure ◽  
Foreign Object ◽  
Central Importance ◽  
Market Economies ◽  
Goods And Services ◽  
Minimum Price

Die Freiheit, den Preis für eine Leistung auszuhandeln, gehört zum Kern der Privatautonomie. Es überrascht daher nicht, dass staatliche Entgeltvorgaben regelmäßig von intensiven politischen und rechtlichen Auseinandersetzungen begleitet werden. Diese Debatten werden jedoch in der Regel sachbereichsbezogen geführt. Entgeltvorschriften werden dabei als Einzelerscheinungen und Fremdkörper in einer marktwirtschaftlichen Ordnung beschrieben. Empirisch trifft diese Einschätzung nicht zu, in normativer Hinsicht greift sie zu kurz. Der Staat nutzt Entgeltregelungen in allen zentralen Wirtschaftsbereichen, insbesondere um die Funktionsfähigkeit eines Marktes zu sichern und um Verbraucher zu schützen. Wir führen diese Vorschriften unter dem Ordnungsbegriff „Vergütungsregelung“ zusammen, analysieren sie vergleichend und beschreiben die Gestaltungsmodelle, die der Gesetzgeber nutzen kann. Die Leistungsfähigkeit dieser Modelle testen wir am Beispiel eines Mindestpreises für Fleisch. The freedom to negotiate the price of goods and services is of central importance in every market economy. Therefore, it is not surprising that the legislator is regularly causing intense debates and is facing accusations of unconstitutionality when restricting this freedom. However, these discussions are often limited to the respective regulatory area. This is one of the reasons why price regulations are widely considered a foreign object in market economies, which is empirically not accurate and falls short in normative terms. The legislator uses price regulations in all important economic areas, especially to tackle market failure and for the purpose of consumer protection. We bring these provisions together under the classification term “price regulations”, analyze them comparatively and describe the models, which can be used by the legislator. We test the potential of these models by the example of a minimum price for meat.

COORDINATION, CREDIT, AND AN ELASTIC CURRENCY

1997 ◽  
Vol 1 (4) ◽  
pp. 770-779 ◽  
Author(s):  
JOHN BRYANT
Keyword(s):  
At Risk ◽  
Elastic Medium ◽  
Market Economy ◽  
Production System ◽  
Joint Production ◽  
Coordination Failure ◽  
Trade Off ◽  
Market Economies ◽  
Monetary System ◽  
Monetary Instability

The market economy is modeled as a decentralized joint production system. Markets in such an economy require the use of money or credit instruments to facilitate exchange. As a result, market economies are at risk for monetary instability induced by real-side production coordination failure. In particular, economies decentralized via centralized wholesaling markets are subject to precipitous collapses. The most stable monetary system is trade in specie. However, there very likely is a scarcity of specie, which generates inefficiency and discourages production. There is, then, a need for an elastic currency. Bank-issued bills of exchange are a perfectly elastic medium and eliminate the scarcity of specie and its attendant inefficiency, but are a less stable monetary system than is trade in specie. In the trade-off between elasticity and stability, fiduciary currency (or fiduciary deposits) lies between specie and bank-issued bills of exchange.

Towards a Political Theory of the Market Economy

2014 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 281-311
Author(s):  
Frank Nullmeier
Keyword(s):  
Political Theory ◽  
Market Economy ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Market Regulation ◽  
Political Equality ◽  
Current Crisis ◽  
Market Economies ◽  
Further Development ◽  
Western Democracies ◽  
The Welfare State

AbstractSome authors make the dominance of markets responsible for the current crisis of Western democracies. In order to prevent a further development in a post-democratic direction political science has to scrutinize all strategies that aim to establish a predominance of politics including strategies beyond a better market regulation and a further expansion of the welfare state. The paper examines selected contributions to normative political theory in search for models of (1) the democratization of the market economy, (2) the creation of a just economy and (3) the moralization of market economies. Are justifiable models for a democratized economy, a just economy or a moralized market presented in the literature? The distinction between organizations and transactions proves to be important in order to answer the question of how a reconfiguration of the market economy dominated by standards of justice and political equality could look like. Models of internal democratization and self-management have been developed for companies as the organizational part of market economies. In contrast, there is no way to democratize market transactions themselves. With reference to John Rawls and his conception of a property-owning democracy the article analyses the inherent tendency of market transactions to contribute to an accumulation of inequality and the institutional models to limit or to compensate for these side effects of markets.

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