Social Cognition and the Second Person in Human Interaction

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Diana I. Pérez ◽  
Antoni Gomila
Keyword(s):  
Social Cognition ◽  
Human Interaction ◽  
Second Person

Intersubjectivity at Close Quarters: How Dancers of Tango Argentino Use Imagery for Interaction and Improvisation

2012 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 76-124
Author(s):  
Michael Kimmel
Keyword(s):  
Social Cognition ◽  
Time Lag ◽  
Phenomenological Analysis ◽  
Second Person ◽  
Action Unit ◽  
Single Action ◽  
Image Schemas ◽  
Small Increments ◽  
Two Bodies ◽  
Blind Spots

Abstract The article explores the prerequisites of embodied ‘conversations’ in the improvisational pair dance tango argentino. Tango has been characterized as a dialog of two bodies. Using first- and second-person phenomenological methods, I investigate the skills that enable two dancers to move as a super-individual ensemble, to communicate without time lag, and to feel the partner’s intention at every moment. How can two persons - walking in opposite directions and with partly different knowledge - remain in contact throughout, when every moment can be an invention? I analyze these feats through the lens of image schemas such as BALANCE, FORCE, PATH, and UP-DOWN (Johnson 1987). Technique-related discourse - with its use of didactic metaphor - abounds with image-schematic vectors, geometries, and construal operations like profiling. These enable the tango process: from posture, via walking technique and kinetics, to attention and contact skills. Dancers who organize their muscles efficiently - e.g., through core tension - and who respect postural ‘grammar’ - e.g., a good axis - enable embodied dialog by being receptive to their partners and being manoeuvrable. Super-individual imagery that defines ‘good’ states for a couple to stick to, along with relational attention management and kinetic calibration of joint walking, turns the dyad into a single action unit. My further objective is a micro-phenomenological analysis of joint improvisation. This requires a theory to explain dynamic sensing, the combining of repertory knowledge with this, and the managing of both in small increments. Dancers strategically sense action affordances (Gibson 1979) or recognize and exploit them on the fly. Dynamic routines allow them to negotiate workable configurations step-wise, assisted by their knowledge of node points where the elements of tango are most naturally connected and re-routed. The paper closes with general lessons to learn from these highly structured and embodied improvisational skills, especially regarding certain blind spots in current social cognition theory.

Social perception and “spectator theories” of other minds

2013 ◽  
Vol 36 (4) ◽  
pp. 434-435 ◽  
Author(s):  
Søren Overgaard ◽  
Joel Krueger
Keyword(s):  
Social Cognition ◽  
Social Perception ◽  
Crucial Role ◽  
Social Understanding ◽  
Other Minds ◽  
Second Person ◽  
The Social

AbstractWe resist Schilbach et al.'s characterization of the “social perception” approach to social cognition as a “spectator theory” of other minds. We show how the social perception view acknowledges the crucial role interaction plays in enabling social understanding. We also highlight a dilemma Schilbach et al. face in attempting to distinguish their second-person approach from the social perception view.

scholarly journals Brain games: Toward a neuroecology of social behavior

2013 ◽  
Vol 36 (4) ◽  
pp. 424-425 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean-François Gariépy ◽  
Steve W. C. Chang ◽  
Michael L. Platt
Keyword(s):  
Social Cognition ◽  
Social Behavior ◽  
Social Interactions ◽  
Behavioral Ecology ◽  
Neural Basis ◽  
Second Person ◽  
Target Article ◽  
Nonhuman Animals

AbstractIn the target article, Schilbach et al. defend a “second-person neuroscience” perspective that focuses on the neural basis of social cognition during live, ongoing interactions between individuals. We argue that a second-person neuroscience would benefit from formal approaches borrowed from economics and behavioral ecology and that it should be extended to social interactions in nonhuman animals.

scholarly journals Toward a second-person neuroscience

2013 ◽  
Vol 36 (4) ◽  
pp. 393-414 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leonhard Schilbach ◽  
Bert Timmermans ◽  
Vasudevi Reddy ◽  
Alan Costall ◽  
Gary Bente ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Dark Matter ◽  
Social Cognition ◽  
Social Neuroscience ◽  
Neural Mechanisms ◽  
Other Minds ◽  
Second Person ◽  
Theoretical Conception ◽  
Social Encounters ◽  
Remarkable Progress ◽  
Made In

AbstractIn spite of the remarkable progress made in the burgeoning field of social neuroscience, the neural mechanisms that underlie social encounters are only beginning to be studied and could – paradoxically – be seen as representing the “dark matter” of social neuroscience. Recent conceptual and empirical developments consistently indicate the need for investigations that allow the study of real-time social encounters in a truly interactive manner. This suggestion is based on the premise that social cognition is fundamentally different when we are in interaction with others rather than merely observing them. In this article, we outline the theoretical conception of a second-person approach to other minds and review evidence from neuroimaging, psychophysiological studies, and related fields to argue for the development of a second-person neuroscience, which will help neuroscience to really “go social”; this may also be relevant for our understanding of psychiatric disorders construed as disorders of social cognition.

Debtors, creditors, and sovereign money: A case for institutional blending and the amalgamated mind

2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Todd Oakley
Keyword(s):  
Social Cognition ◽  
Social Roles ◽  
Second Person ◽  
Social Facts ◽  
Comprehensive Account ◽  
Person Perspective ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
History Of ◽  
Second Person Perspective ◽  
Prior Analysis

AbstractMuch social cognition and action is dialogical in nature and profitably understood from a second-person perspective. The elemental social roles of “debtor” and “creditor” are of great importance in explaining the structure and history of a wide range of social facts and institutions. Yet these person-level experiences of indebtedness and the mental spaces they engender are not sufficient to account for complex social facts. Sovereign money systems are a leading example where our person-level experiences of exchange lead us astray by actively hindering our ability to grasp money’s macroeconomic functions. This article provides a comprehensive account of money as a distributed cognitive phenomenon. It summarizes and critiques a prior analysis of money as a conceptual blend enabling

Intersubjectivity

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shannon Spaulding
Keyword(s):  
Social Cognition ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Human Interaction ◽  
Collective Intentionality ◽  
Mutual Understanding ◽  
Other Minds ◽  
Enactive Cognition ◽  
Group Minds ◽  
René Descartes ◽  
Problem Of Other Minds

Intersubjectivity is the shared or mutual understanding among agents. Edmond Husserl first developed the concept of intersubjectivity as a critique of René Descartes’ problem of other minds. Husserl argued that the problem of other minds portrayed human interaction as inappropriately solipsistic. More recently, the concept of intersubjectivity has played a role in phenomenological accounts of social cognition, embodied and enactive cognition, debates about whether we can directly perceive others’ mental states, collective intentionality, and group minds.

scholarly journals The Private Language Argument and a Second-Person Approach to Mindreading

2013 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 75-86
Author(s):  
Joshua Johnson
Keyword(s):  
Social Cognition ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Simulation Theory ◽  
Theory Theory ◽  
Other Minds ◽  
Private Language ◽  
Second Person ◽  
Private Language Argument

I argue that if Wittgenstein’s Private language Argument is correct, then both Theory-Theory and Simulation Theory are inadequate accounts of how we come to know other minds since both theories assume the reality of a private language. Further, following the work of a number of philosophers and psychologists, I defend a ‘Second-Person Approach’ to mindreading according to which it is possible for us to be directly aware of at least some of the mental states of others. because it is not necessary to assume a private language within the Second-Person Approach, I argue that this account of social cognition is superior to Theory-Theory and Simulation Theory since it avoids the objections of the PlA.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document