Capital Markets and Corporate Governance in Japan, Germany and the United States

Assessing Canada’s Regulatory Response to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: Lessons for Canadian Policy Makers

Alberta Law Review ◽

10.29173/alr225 ◽

2009 ◽

Vol 46 (3) ◽

pp. 769 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Stephen P. Sibold, Q.C.

Keyword(s):

United States ◽

Corporate Governance ◽

Capital Markets ◽

The United States ◽

Regulatory Action ◽

Policy Makers ◽

Regulatory Response ◽

Perceived Need ◽

Governance Regime ◽

Sarbanes Oxley

The article sets out to show that by adopting the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 together with other rules of the United States corporate governance regime, Canadian securities regulators moved away from a Canadian, principles-based approach, and not necessarily for the better. It does so by first discussing the unique characteristics of the Canadian capital markets and providing a thorough background into Canada’s corporate governance regime. It then highlights the main provisions of the Act, describes the ensuing debate in Canada, and critically examines Canada’s corresponding regulatory action — the introduction of four rules and a policy. The article asserts that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was an inappropriate model to take for the regulators and recommends a re-evaluation of the perceived need to harmonize with the United States in the area of corporate governance.

Download Full-text

Corporate Governance, Capital Markets, and Securities Law

10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198743682.013.45 ◽

2015 ◽

Cited By ~ 2

Author(s):

A. C. Pritchard

Keyword(s):

United States ◽

Corporate Governance ◽

Capital Markets ◽

The United States ◽

Securities And Exchange Commission ◽

Market Forces ◽

Future Prospects ◽

Securities Law ◽

Dividing Line

This chapter explores the interrelationships among corporate governance, capital markets, and securities law. More specifically, it considers the role that securities law should play in encouraging corporate governance standards that hold managers and directors accountable to shareholders. It also examines whether disclosure, bolstered by market forces, is sufficient to promote efficient corporate governance provisions. After charting the origins of the dividing line between securities law and corporate governance in the United States, the article looks at the efforts of the Securities and Exchange Commission to push against that boundary. It then analyses the institutional connections between capital markets and corporate governance, especially whether there are practical limits to the link between securities law and corporate governance. Finally, it discusses future prospects concerning the boundary between corporate governance and securities law.

Download Full-text