The Changing Face of Corporate Governance Regulation in the United States: The Evolving Roles of the Federal and State Governments

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter V. Letsou
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Corporate Governance ◽  
The United States ◽  
State Governments

scholarly journals The Effect of Partisan Representation at Different Levels of Government on Satisfaction with Democracy in the United States

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-27 ◽  
Author(s):  
Julie VanDusky-Allen ◽  
Stephen M. Utych
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
State Government ◽  
The United States ◽  
State Governments ◽  
Satisfaction With Democracy ◽  
National Election Study ◽  
American National Election Study ◽  
Respective State ◽  
Different Levels ◽  
Analyze Data

AbstractIn this paper, we analyze how variations in partisan representation across different levels of government influence Americans’ satisfaction with the democracy in the United States. We conduct two survey experiments and analyze data from the 2016 American National Election Study postelection survey. We find that Americans are the most satisfied with democracy when their most preferred party controls both the federal and their respective state governments. However, we also find that even if an individual’s least preferred party only controls one level of government, they are still more satisfied with democracy than if their most preferred party controls no levels of government. These findings suggest that competition in elections across both the national and state government, where winning and losing alternates between the two parties, may have positive outcomes for attitudes toward democracy.

Comment

1980 ◽  
Vol 2 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 108-109
Author(s):  
Mark Kesselman
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Local Government ◽  
Federal Government ◽  
The United States ◽  
State Governments ◽  
Local Autonomy ◽  
Fundamental Change ◽  
Local Expenditures

Acentral ingredient of democracy in the United States, according to Tocqueville, was local autonomy – yet the data presented by Professor Austin suggests a fundamental change in the United States since Tocquevilles time. Most local expenditures are now provided by the federal and state governments, most “local” programs are not local at all, for many (if not most) purposes the local government has become an extension of the federal government, and it is often replaced altogether by federally created field agencies (what the French call deconcentrated administration).

Comparative Environmental Federalism: Subsidiarity and Central Regulation in the United States and China

2017 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 531-549 ◽  
Author(s):  
Huiyu Zhao ◽  
Robert Percival
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Environmental Protection ◽  
Environmental Governance ◽  
The United States ◽  
Conclusive Evidence ◽  
State Governments ◽  
Race To The Bottom ◽  
Environmental Laws ◽  
National Governments ◽  
National Environmental

AbstractThe proper division of responsibility for environmental protection between national and state governments has long been the subject of fierce debate. During the 1970s the United States Congress decided to shift the most important environmental responsibilities from state governments to the federal government. The main reason for this decision was to prevent a ‘race to the bottom’ in that states competing for industries could otherwise be lax in implementing and enforcing federal environmental standards. Yet, some scholars have argued that there could just as easily be a ‘race to the top’ among states as they compete to attract people and businesses concerned with environmental protection. China, in turn, is plagued with severe air and water pollution and soil contamination, which is attributed largely to ineffective enforcement of its national environmental laws. This article investigates whether China’s experience confirms the race-to-the-bottom theory. It demonstrates that devolution of responsibility for environmental protection to lower levels of government tends to result in lax implementation and enforcement of national environmental laws, particularly where national governments also create strong incentives for economic growth. It concludes that China’s highly devolved system of environmental governance is consistent with this theory, even if it does not provide conclusive evidence of its correctness.

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