Welfare state regimes and social spending

2010 ◽  
pp. 97-124
2009 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-62 ◽  
Author(s):  
FRANCIS G. CASTLES

AbstractThis article suggests that an alternative to a social rights of citizenship approach to comparing welfare states is to use disaggregated programme expenditure data to identify the diverse spending priorities of different types of welfare state. An initial descriptive analysis shows that four major categories of social spending (cash spending on older people and those of working age; service spending on health and for other purposes) are almost entirely unrelated to one another and that different welfare state regimes or families of nations exhibit quite different patterns of spending. The article proceeds to demonstrate that both the determinants and the outcomes of these different categories of spending also differ quite radically. In policy terms, most importantly, the article shows that cross-national differences in poverty and inequality among advanced nations are to a very large degree a function of the extent of cash spending on programmes catering to the welfare needs of those of working age.


2011 ◽  
Vol 58 (5) ◽  
pp. 651-674 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kosta Josifidis ◽  
John Hall ◽  
Novica Supic ◽  
Olgica Ivancev

This inquiry analyzes how political orientations shape welfare states and labour market institutions when seeking to reduce poverty. In order to identify effects of these two key variables, we conduct a panel regression analysis that includes two poverty measures: poverty rates before and after social spending. This inquiry considers 14 EU countries, and in the period from 1995 to 2008, which are grouped according to welfare state regimes. We consider Social Democratic, Corporatist, Mediterranean and Liberal welfare state regimes. Panel regression results indicate that political orientation engenders no significant statistically measurable effects on poverty rates before social spending. Effects register, however, as significant when considering poverty rates after social spending. With respect to the first set of results, we advance two key explanations. First, we note a longer period of time is necessary in order to observe actual effects of political orientation on market generated poverty. Second, political parties with their respective programs do not register as influential enough to solve social problems related to income distribution when taken alone. Influences register as indirect and are expressed through changes in employment rates and social spending. The second set of results support the hypothesis that a selected political regime does indeed contribute to poverty reduction. In sum, political orientation and political regime does indeed affect poverty through welfare state institutions, as well as through labour market institutions.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-23
Author(s):  
VINCENT BAKKER ◽  
OLAF VAN VLIET

Abstract Raising employment has been at the heart of EU strategies for over twenty years. Social investment, by now a widely debated topic in the comparative welfare state literature, has been suggested as a way to pursue this. However, there are only a couple of systematic comparative analyses that focus on the employment outcomes associated with social investment. Analyses of the interdependence of these policies with regard to their outcomes are even more scarce. We empirically analyse the extent to which variation in employment rates within 26 OECD countries over the period 1990-2010 can be explained by effort on five social investment policies. We additionally explore the role of policy and institutional complementarities. Using time-series cross-section analyses we find robust evidence for a positive association between effort on ALMPs and employment rates. For other policies we obtain mixed results. ALMPs are the only policies for which we observe signs of policy interdependence, which point at diminishing marginal returns. Additionally, our analysis demonstrates that the interdependence of social investment policies varies across welfare state regimes. Together, this indicates that the employment outcomes of social investment policies are also contingent on the broader framework of welfare state policies and institutions.


2015 ◽  
Vol 21 (4) ◽  
pp. 577-595 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kosta JOSIFIDIS ◽  
John B. HALL ◽  
Novica SUPIC ◽  
Emilija BEKER PUCAR

This paper examines the nature of changes within the EU–15 welfare states affected by the 2008 crisis. We try to answer the question of whether the differences that exist among different welfare state regimes, according to prevailing welfare state typologies, lead to different responses to the consequences of the crisis. Welfare state regimes are the result of different institutional perceptions of social risks hence it is realistic to expect specific responses to the effects of crisis among different welfare state regimes, and similar responses among the countries that belong to the same welfare state regimes. In order to recognize convergent vs. divergent processes, we perform a comparative analysis of the dynamics of the key welfare state determinants of the EU–15 countries, grouping according to welfare state regimes, in the pre-crisis and crisis periods. The results indicate that institutional rigidity and inherent inertia has remained a key factor of convergent welfare state processes in countries that belong to the Social Democratic and Corporatist welfare state regimes. Deviations from such a course are the most evident in the Mediterranean welfare state regimes, especially in Greece and Portugal where austerity measures have been formulated under the strong influence of the Troika.


Author(s):  
Stefan Svallfors

Attitudes toward social spending, collective financing, and public organization, willingness to pay taxes, suspicion about welfare abuse, and trust in the task performance of the welfare state show a large degree of stability in Sweden, and where change is registered, it tends to go in the direction of increasing support. More people state their willingness to pay higher taxes for welfare policy purposes; more people want collective financing of welfare policies; and fewer people perceive extensive welfare abuse. Class patterns change so that the salaried and the self-employed become more similar to workers in their attitudes. Hence, no attitudinal corrosive effects from increased marketization of the Swedish welfare state can be detected on public support for welfare policies.


2019 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zachary Parolin ◽  
Linus Siöland

Debate around a universal basic income (UBI) tends to focus on the economic and social implications of the policy proposal. Less clear, however, are the factors influencing support for a UBI. Using the 2016 European Social Survey, we investigate how trade union membership and left political ideology (central to power resources theory) and attitudes towards immigrants’ access to welfare benefits (central to welfare state chauvinism) affect individual support for a UBI. We also investigate how country-level differences in levels of social spending moderate individual-level UBI support. Results from multi-level models suggest that a broader coalition of UBI supporters can generally be found in countries where social spending is low. Specifically, we find that welfare state chauvinism is more likely to be associated with negative attitudes towards a UBI in countries with high levels of spending, but has only a weak association with UBI support in low-spending countries. Similarly, political ideology is more consequential in explaining UBI support in countries with higher levels of spending. These tensions form a demand–capacity paradox: the countries which are presumably least equipped to implement a UBI see the most broad-based support for the policy.


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