scholarly journals Internal Control Disclosure and Corporate Governance: Empirical Research from Chinese Listed Companies

2011 ◽  
Vol 02 (04) ◽  
pp. 286-294 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jianfei Leng ◽  
Yiran Ding
2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 31-36
Author(s):  
Francesco Di Tommaso

This work is a research that applies the organizational model of the business organization of corporate governance, to a process of changing in the organizational structure. This paper defines the various organizational solutions and the various levels of complexity that the corporate governance structure, through its reference context, the load of available information and objectives, must support by choosing the optimal organizational solution. Before 2005 Enron under the management of the American government with logic of mass production not very attentive to the different needs of customers. Today the optimal organizational solution adopted is the "perfect integration with its distributors" throughout the peninsula, maximizing the quality of service to the customer and the knowledge of the various areas of expertise making the company more flexible and more competitive. The growing generalized attention (businesses, investors, academic circles) towards of the internal control system is part of a complex evolutionary process characterized from greater competition/boost to efficiency, emphasis on information transparency, innovative regulatory evolution. The importance of the theme of corporate governance in the world is further increased thanks to the drafting of the international Corporate Governance Code for listed companies, which aims to reassure the community of international investors on the existence, in listed companies, of an organizational model which provides for adequate allocation of responsibilities and powers, and a correct one balance between management and control.


2019 ◽  
Vol 31 (6) ◽  
pp. 923-942 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qiang Li ◽  
Wenjuan Ruan ◽  
Tiantian Sun ◽  
Erwei Xiang

Using a data set of Chinese listed companies over the period 2008 to 2015, this paper empirically examines whether corporate governance affects the environmental investment decisions. We find that the separation of controlling shareholder’s control right and cash flow right is negatively correlated to corporate environmental investment. Moreover, managerial ownership strengthens the abovementioned negative correlation, which is consistent with the controlling shareholder–manager collusion hypothesis. A further test suggests that internal control effectively weakens the controlling shareholder–manager collusion in their environmental investment decisions.


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