The New York Times on the Supreme Court, 1857-2008

Author(s):  
Kenneth Jost
AJIL Unbound ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 109 ◽  
pp. 51-56 ◽  
Author(s):  
Catherine Powell

When the Supreme Court held that the executive branch has exclusive authority to recognize foreign sovereigns in the Jerusalem passport case, Zivotofsky v. Kerry (Zivotofsky II), Jack Goldsmith hailed the decision as a “vindication” of presidential signing statements and executive power. Indeed, in the context of the debate over the treatment of the terror suspects, the New York Times had called such signing statements the “constitutionally ludicrous” work of an overreaching, “imperial presidency.”


Author(s):  
Andrew Needham

This chapter addresses how The New York Times challenged the long-held claims of Arizona officials that their state was entitled to a portion of the Colorado River by rights, a claim recently upheld by the Supreme Court. The paper also argued that Arizona's attempt to realize those claims endangered the Colorado River and the Grand Canyon itself. Transforming the flowing energy of water into flowing electricity, the Times suggested, was not in the national interest. Such critiques of Arizona's growth emerged in the wake of the Interior Department's development of the Pacific Southwest Water Plan, a plan designed in 1963 to realize Arizona's Colorado River claims. The critiques emerged from several different conservationist groups, but most powerfully from the Sierra Club, which was gradually changing the description of its politics from “conservation” to “environmentalism” and assuming a far more public voice in disputes over the proper use of public lands.


2008 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 447-481 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Ernst

Readers of theNew York Timeswere not accustomed to encountering in its pages a Cabinet official picking a fight with the Supreme Court, but that is what they did on May 8, 1938. Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, writing for a majority of the Supreme Court, had recently ruled that Secretary of Agriculture Henry A. Wallace had used the wrong procedures to set the rates that “commission men” charged farmers for marketing cattle, pigs, and sheep at Kansas City's stockyards. It was the second time the case had come before the Court. On the previous occasion, the justices had sent the case back to the lower courts to determine whether the secretary had personally studied the factual record before issuing the rates. In fact, Wallace had given the matter “more personal attention than any previous Secretary of Agriculture had ever given to any case under the Packers and Stockyards Act or for that matter any half dozen cases,” so when the case returned to the Court, the justices had to shift their ground. Now they objected that the Department of Agriculture had not revealed its case to the commission men, leaving them with no way of addressing the government's arguments. Wallace fumed that Hughes had implied that “the present Administration” was to blame for the procedures he followed, when in fact earlier, Republican administrations had established them. Besides, the procedures had already been revised in light of the Supreme Court's first decision in the case.


1992 ◽  
Vol 69 (1) ◽  
pp. 195-203 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jerome O'Callaghan ◽  
James O. Dukes

Citizens hold the Supreme Court in high regard, and this esteem necessarily, for most, must be based on mass media news coverage. Content analysis of Supreme Court coverage by three networks, three news magazines and three major newspapers finds the press is selective in type of cases covered. The best coverage fit to actual types of cases decided was in the New York Times. All sampled news media gave more coverage to civil rights cases than the number of these cases would justify. First Amendment issues also received close news media attention, but economic and other issues did not. High public esteem of the Supreme Court is based on an incomplete look at the court's workload.


2005 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 833-854
Author(s):  
Edward G. Hudon

Pendant presque deux cents ans aux États-Unis, le droit du libelle a relevé exclusivement de la common law d'origine anglaise dont les États-Unis ont hérité au moment de la révolution américaine. Quiconque publiait, publiait à ses risques et périls. Selon le système constitutionnel américain à cette époque, toute expression diffamatoire, écrite ou verbale, même sans l'intention de diffamer autrui, était hors de la protection accordée par la constitution à la liberté de parole et de presse. Mais tout cela a changé avec le jugement de la Cour suprême des États-Unis dans New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, décidé en 1964. En effet, ce jugement a déclaré que le droit du libelle selon la common law était, en bonne partie, incompatible avec la protection accordée à la liberté de parole et de presse par le premier amendement à la constitution des États-Unis. Dans le présent article, l'auteur analyse les changements qui ont résulté de New York Times Co. v. Sullivan depuis que ce jugement a été rendu. Il montre comment la Cour suprême elle-même a, de temps à autre, changé son interprétation de ce jugement, explique que ce changement résulte du changement de personnel du tribunal lui-même et prédit qu'il y aura encore plus de changements dans le proche avenir.


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