scholarly journals Diritto di proprietà vs diritto alla vita? Una nuova questione dinanzi alla Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo

2013 ◽  
Vol 62 (6) ◽  
Author(s):  
Carlo Casini ◽  
Marina Casini

Il recente ricorso alla Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo (n. n. 46470/11) nasce dalla pretesa di usare gli embrioni umani per la ricerca scientifica sul presupposto che si tratti di “cose”. Infatti, la ricorrente invoca il suo diritto di proprietà sugli embrioni appellandosi all’art. 1 del Protocollo n. 1 addizionale alla Convenzione Europea per la salvaguardia dei diritti e delle libertà fondamentali. L’attacco è diretto contro la legge italiana sulla procreazione medicalmente assistita (Legge 40 del 19 febbraio 2004) il cui art. 13/1 vieta “qualsiasi sperimentazione su ciascun embrione umano”. Gli Autori, ritengono che sia infondata scientificamente e giuridicamente la pretesa di considerare l’embrione umano una cosa; mostrano come il riconoscimento del il concepito soggetto titolare di diritti (art.1), sia supportato da un importante complesso normativo; contestano la pretesa contraddizione tra la Legge 40 del 2004 con la legge 194 del 1978; sostengono la ragionevolezza scientifica, etica e giuridica di orientare la scienza verso la ricerca sulle staminali adulte, anziché su quelle embrionali. L’indagine viene condotta passando in rassegna numerose disposizioni a partire dall’art. 18 della Convenzione di Oviedo. Ampio spazio è dato alla giurisprudenza della Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo in materia di bioetica in relazione alla dottrina del margine di apprezzamento che dovrebbe essere applicata anche in senso favorevole all’Italia nel caso in esame. Il contributo auspica che i giudici tengano conto di quanto scritto nell’articolo 2 del Trattato di Oviedo che sotto il titolo “Primato dell’essere umano”, dichiara “l’interesse ed il bene dell’essere umano devono prevalere sul solo interesse della società e della scienza”. ---------- The recent appeal to the European Court of Human Rights (Application n. 46470/11) originates from the demand to use human embryos for scientific research on the ground that they are “things”. Indeed the appellant claims her right to property of the embryos pleading to the art. 1 of the Additional Protocol n. 1 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The attack is directed against the Italian Law on medically assisted procreation (Law n. 40 of 19 February 2004) which bans any experimentation on human embryo. The Authors argue that the demanded evaluation of the human embryo as a “thing” is scientifically and legally baseless. They also show how the Italian Law n. 40/2004, which recognizes the embryo as a subject holder of rights (art.1), is backed by an important normative complex. In this article the thesis on the inconsistency between Law n. 40/2004 and Law n. 194/178 is rejected and it is claimed the scientific, ethical and legal reasonableness to lead the science to adult stem cells instead embryonic stem cells. The analysis is conducted reviewing numerous dispositions from art. 18 of the Oviedo Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine. In this article a wide space is allowed to the Bioethics case-law of the European Court of Human Rights as for the doctrine of the margin of appreciation which should be applied also to defend Italy in the examined case. The article hope that the Court set great store by what is written in art. 2 (“Primacy of the Human Being”): “The interests and welfare of the human being shall prevail over the sole interest of society or science”.

2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Markus Hengstschläger ◽  
Margit Rosner

AbstractIt is known that in countries, in which basic research on human embryos is in fact prohibited by law, working with imported human embryonic stem cells (hESCs) can still be permitted. As long as hESCs are not capable of development into a complete human being, it might be the case that they do not fulfill all criteria of the local definition of an embryo. Recent research demonstrates that hESCs can be developed into entities, called embryoids, which increasingly could come closer to actual human embryos in future. By discussing the Austrian situation, we want to highlight that current embryoid research could affect the prevailing opinion on the legal status of work with hESCs and therefore calls for reassessment of the regulations in all countries with comparable definitions of the embryo.


2005 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 125 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wilfried A. Kues ◽  
Joseph W. Carnwath ◽  
Heiner Niemann

Pluripotent embryonic stem cells (ESCs) from the inner cell mass of early murine and human embryos exhibit extensive self-renewal in culture and maintain their ability to differentiate into all cell lineages. These features make ESCs a suitable candidate for cell-replacement therapy. However, the use of early embryos has provoked considerable public debate based on ethical considerations. From this standpoint, stem cells derived from adult tissues are a more easily accepted alternative. Recent results suggest that adult stem cells have a broader range of potency than imagined initially. Although some claims have been called into question by the discovery that fusion between the stem cells and differentiated cells can occur spontaneously, in other cases somatic stem cells have been induced to commit to various lineages by the extra- or intracellular environment. Recent data from our laboratory suggest that changes in culture conditions can expand a subpopulation of cells with a pluripotent phenotype from primary fibroblast cultures. The present paper critically reviews recent data on the potency of somatic stem cells, methods to modify the potency of somatic cells and implications for cell-based therapies.


2020 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 69-80
Author(s):  
Анастасия Пестрикова

At the present stage of the development of genetic engineering, the question is raised about the legal status of a human embryo in connection with the commercialization and patenting of parthenogenetic embryonic stem cells. Aim: the article considers the main directions of developing criteria for distinguishing between cellular substances included in the definition of a human embryo, taking into account the latest achievements in the field of genetic engineering and judicial practice of the European Union. Methods: the author uses a comparative analysis of the main scientific achievements in the field of genetic engineering and emerging international practice of legal research in this field. Results: the author proves the importance of distinguishing between the definition of the concept of an embryo in terms of biology and genetics, and the consolidation of legal status and the need for legal protection, in order to avoid abuse of law and evasion of law in the commercial use of human stem cells and human embryos.


2004 ◽  
pp. U7-12 ◽  
Author(s):  
C Mummery

Stem cell research holds the promise of treatments for many disorders resulting from disease or trauma where one or at most a few cell types have been lost or do not function. In combination with tissue engineering, stem cells may represent the greatest contribution to contemporary medicine of the present century. Progress is however being hampered by the debate on the origin of stem cells, which can be derived from human embryos and some adult tissues. Politics, religious beliefs and the media have determined society's current perception of their relative value while the ethical antipathy towards embryonic stem cells, which require destruction of a human embryo for their derivation, has in many countries biased research towards adult stem cells. Many scientists believe this bias may be premature and basic research on both cell types is still required. The media has created confusion about the purpose of stem cell research: treating chronic ailments or striving for immortality. Here, the scientific state of the art on adult and embryonic stem cells is reviewed as a basis for a debate on whether research on embryonic stem cells is ethically acceptable.


2015 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 565-587 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nahshon Perez

Abstractin 2011, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) published its seminal decision in theLautsi vs. Italycase, arguing that the requirement in Italian law that all public schools will display crucifixes in each classroom does not violate the European Convention on Human Rights. This decision gave rise to a storm of reactions. The goal of this article is to argue, that the ECHR used “majoritarianism” in an under-theorized way and/or unattractive way, and that this usage of the concept can be identified in other cases as well (see the highly controversialDahlab vs. Swiss, ECHR). Demonstrating the procedural, monopoly based and circularity problems within the ECHR decision point to potential ways to criticize the court decision, without taking sides in the heated and highly divisive debate between so called “neutrality supporters” and (roughly) “endorsed church — majoritarian supporters,” sides of the debate surrounding “Lautsi.”


2012 ◽  
Vol 61 (5) ◽  
Author(s):  
Aldo Rocco Vitale

L’articolo esamina la recente decisione della Corte Europea dei Diritti dell’Uomo che ha censurato la legge 40/2004 in tema di procreazione medicalmente assistita per il suo divieto di diagnosi genetica preimpianto. La Corte ha accusato di incoerenza l’ordinamento giuridico italiano perché esso vieta la diagnosi genetica preimpianto, ma ammette l’aborto terapeutico. Il contributo analizza brevemente il caso e la sentenza riguardante una coppia di portatori sani di fibrosi cistica che chiedeva l’accesso alle tecniche previste dalla legge 40/2004 lamentando la violazione del diritto alla vita privata e familiare e il divieto di discriminazione contemplati dagli art. 8 e 14 della Convenzione Europea per i Diritti dell’Uomo. Quindi si passa ad una critica etica, filosofica e giuridica del problema trattato, soffermandosi sulla differenza e sul rapporto tra la legge italiana sull’aborto e quella sulla procreazione medicalmente assistita, sulla diagnosi genetica preimpianto e sul rischio di eugenetica che essa porta con sé. ---------- The article examines the recent decision of the European Court of human rights which has censored the Italian law 40/2004 on assisted reproductive technology for its ban on preimplantation genetic diagnosis. The Court accused of inconsistency the Italian legal system because it prohibits preimplantation genetic diagnosis, but admits the therapeutic abortion. The contribution analyses briefly the case and the ruling concerning a pair of healthy carriers of cystic fibrosis that sought access to techniques foreseen by law 40/2004 complaining of the violation of the right to private and family life and the prohibition of discrimination covered by art. 8 and 14 of the European Convention on human rights. So we then move on to a philosophical, legal and ethics critique of the problem issued, dwelling on the difference and relationship between the Italian law on abortion and on assisted reproductive technology, on preimplantation genetic diagnosis and on the risk of eugenics that it brings.


2013 ◽  
Vol 52 (1) ◽  
pp. 323-344
Author(s):  
Djurdja Lazic

In Scoppola v. Italy (No. 3), the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights clarified its position on prisoner disenfranchisement under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The Grand Chamber upheld, by sixteen votes to one, the challenged Italian legislation as within the margin of appreciation granted to member states in determining the conditions under which the Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 right to vote is exercised. Following its precedent in Hirst v. United Kingdom (No. 2), the Grand Chamber ruled that the Italian law pursued the legitimate aim of preventing crime and enhancing civic responsibility and respect for the rule of law, and that the relevant measure was proportionate because it did not affect a group of people generally, automatically, and indiscriminately. Notably, the Grand Chamber differentiated Scopppola (No. 3) from Hirst (No. 2), stressing that the U.K. legislation challenged in the latter deprived all prisoners, regardless of the length of their sentences or the nature of their crimes, of their right to vote. Unlike Hirst (No. 2), the Grand Chamber noted, the Italian legislation adapted voting restrictions to the particular circumstances of each case.


2014 ◽  
pp. 33-48
Author(s):  
Przemysław Florjanowicz-Błachut

The core function of the judiciary is the administration of justice through delivering judgments and other decisions. The crucial role for its acceptance and legitimization by not only lawyers, but also individulas (parties) and the hole society plays judicial reasoning. It should reflect on judge’s independence within the exercise of his office and show also judicial self-restraint or activism. The axiology and the standards of proper judicial reasoning are anchored both in constitutional and supranational law and case-law. Polish Constitutional Tribunal derives a duty to give reasoning from the right to a fair trial – right to be heard and bring own submissions before the court (Article 45 § 1 of the Constitution), the right to appeal against judgments and decisions made at first stage (Article 78), the rule of two stages of the court proceedings (Article 176) and rule of law clause (Article 2), that comprises inter alia right to due process of law and the rule of legitimate expactation / the protection of trust (Vertrauensschutz). European Court of Human Rights derives this duty to give reasons from the guarantees of the right to a fair trial enshrined in Article 6 § 1 of European Convention of Human Rights. In its case-law the ECtHR, taking into account the margin of appreciation concept, formulated a number of positive and negative requirements, that should be met in case of proper reasoning. The obligation for courts to give sufficient reasons for their decisions is also anchored in European Union law. European Court of Justice derives this duty from the right to fair trial enshrined in Articles 6 and 13 of the ECHR and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Standards of the courts reasoning developed by Polish constitutional court an the European courts (ECJ and ECtHR) are in fact convergent and coherent. National judges should take them into consideration in every case, to legitimize its outcome and enhance justice delivery.


Author(s):  
Guido Raimondi

This article comments on four important judgments given by the European Court of Human Rights in 2016. Al-Dulimi v. Switzerland addresses the issue of how, in the context of sanctions regimes created by the UN Security Council, European states should reconcile their obligations under the UN Charter with their obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights to respect the fundamentals of European public order. Baka v. Hungary concerns the separation of powers and judicial independence, in particular the need for procedural safeguards to protect judges against unjustified removal from office and to protect their legitimate exercise of freedom of expression. Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v. Hungary is a judgment on the interpretation of the Convention, featuring a review of the “living instrument” approach. Avotiņš v. Latvia addresses the principle of mutual trust within the EU legal order and the right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the Convention.


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