scholarly journals Note biogiuridiche sulla recente sentenza della CEDU su PMA, IVG e DGP

2012 ◽  
Vol 61 (5) ◽  
Author(s):  
Aldo Rocco Vitale

L’articolo esamina la recente decisione della Corte Europea dei Diritti dell’Uomo che ha censurato la legge 40/2004 in tema di procreazione medicalmente assistita per il suo divieto di diagnosi genetica preimpianto. La Corte ha accusato di incoerenza l’ordinamento giuridico italiano perché esso vieta la diagnosi genetica preimpianto, ma ammette l’aborto terapeutico. Il contributo analizza brevemente il caso e la sentenza riguardante una coppia di portatori sani di fibrosi cistica che chiedeva l’accesso alle tecniche previste dalla legge 40/2004 lamentando la violazione del diritto alla vita privata e familiare e il divieto di discriminazione contemplati dagli art. 8 e 14 della Convenzione Europea per i Diritti dell’Uomo. Quindi si passa ad una critica etica, filosofica e giuridica del problema trattato, soffermandosi sulla differenza e sul rapporto tra la legge italiana sull’aborto e quella sulla procreazione medicalmente assistita, sulla diagnosi genetica preimpianto e sul rischio di eugenetica che essa porta con sé. ---------- The article examines the recent decision of the European Court of human rights which has censored the Italian law 40/2004 on assisted reproductive technology for its ban on preimplantation genetic diagnosis. The Court accused of inconsistency the Italian legal system because it prohibits preimplantation genetic diagnosis, but admits the therapeutic abortion. The contribution analyses briefly the case and the ruling concerning a pair of healthy carriers of cystic fibrosis that sought access to techniques foreseen by law 40/2004 complaining of the violation of the right to private and family life and the prohibition of discrimination covered by art. 8 and 14 of the European Convention on human rights. So we then move on to a philosophical, legal and ethics critique of the problem issued, dwelling on the difference and relationship between the Italian law on abortion and on assisted reproductive technology, on preimplantation genetic diagnosis and on the risk of eugenics that it brings.

Author(s):  
Angelo Dube

On 16 July 2019, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) rejected an application by Russian human rights activist, Nikolay Alekseyev, on the basis that he had published personally offensive and threatening material online, directed towards the ECtHR. This was in the matter of Zhdanov and Others v Russia Applications Nos 12200/08, 35949/11 and 58282/12. Even though the published material fell afoul of the European Convention in that it amounted to an abuse of the court process, nothing offensive was contained in the applicant’s own submissions before the court. In like fashion to the ECtHR’s admissibility requirements, the African Charter contains a much more pointed exclusionary clause which renders inadmissible any communication that contains disparaging or insulting language. The difference between the two systems is that the European system relies on an open-ended concept of ‘abuse of the right of individual petition’, whilst the African system specifically proscribes insulting language. In this article, I analyse the approach of the ECtHR in the Zhdanov matter, and contrast it with the approach of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the African Commission) under Article 56(3) of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. I further interrogate whether there were any instances where, in similar fashion to the Zhdanov matter, the African Commission declared a communication inadmissible on account of insulting language occurring externally, and not contained within the submission itself. Alive to the fact that the concept of ‘abuse’ in the European system is wide, the article is limited to cases in which the abuse of the right of individual petition under the European Convention manifests in disparaging or insulting language.


Author(s):  
Ivanna Maryniv ◽  
◽  
Aljona Babich ◽  

This article is devoted to highlighting the content and nature of women's right to abortion and opportunities for its protection. Since this right is attributed by scientists to the fourth generation of human rights and it is relatively new, it is extremely relevant to clarify the issue of the relationship between the rights and interests of a pregnant woman and an unborn child. The authors point out the existence of an urgent problem associated with the absence in European сountries of a unified approach to determining the criteria and conditions under which abortion is considered legal. It is also necessary to pay attention to the fact that a separate article dedicated to the right to abortion is absent in the European Convention on Human Rights. Since one of the conditions of acceptability of an individual complaint is the requirement to refer to violation of only those rights that are provided and guaranteed by the ECHR. The only opportunity for women to protect their right or receive compensation for violation of the right to abortion - is appeal to the European Court of Human Rights, referring to Article 8 of the European Convention, which determines the right of everyone to respect for privacy. Thus, the right to abortion is considered through the prism of the right to privacy. The main emphasis in this article is made on the analysis of the most important decisions of the European Court of Human Rights in Affairs, where women complain about violation of their rights due to imprisonment of abortion, which led to terrible consequences. The authors clarified the relation of the ECHR to abortion and deprivation of the right of a woman on their conduct. The court has developed criteria that help determine whether there was a violation of a woman's right to respect for privacy, guaranteed by Article 8. In the article the main problems due to which women in most cases cannot implement their right in their own country properly are identified. Also, in the context of the court decisions, the difference between the ECHR positions regarding this issue and the internal legislation of some European countries, against which the complaints are most often served is analyzed. The authors draw the attention of states to the need to take into account the conclusions of the European Court and lead laws and other regulatory acts in accordance with its decisions.


2014 ◽  
pp. 33-48
Author(s):  
Przemysław Florjanowicz-Błachut

The core function of the judiciary is the administration of justice through delivering judgments and other decisions. The crucial role for its acceptance and legitimization by not only lawyers, but also individulas (parties) and the hole society plays judicial reasoning. It should reflect on judge’s independence within the exercise of his office and show also judicial self-restraint or activism. The axiology and the standards of proper judicial reasoning are anchored both in constitutional and supranational law and case-law. Polish Constitutional Tribunal derives a duty to give reasoning from the right to a fair trial – right to be heard and bring own submissions before the court (Article 45 § 1 of the Constitution), the right to appeal against judgments and decisions made at first stage (Article 78), the rule of two stages of the court proceedings (Article 176) and rule of law clause (Article 2), that comprises inter alia right to due process of law and the rule of legitimate expactation / the protection of trust (Vertrauensschutz). European Court of Human Rights derives this duty to give reasons from the guarantees of the right to a fair trial enshrined in Article 6 § 1 of European Convention of Human Rights. In its case-law the ECtHR, taking into account the margin of appreciation concept, formulated a number of positive and negative requirements, that should be met in case of proper reasoning. The obligation for courts to give sufficient reasons for their decisions is also anchored in European Union law. European Court of Justice derives this duty from the right to fair trial enshrined in Articles 6 and 13 of the ECHR and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Standards of the courts reasoning developed by Polish constitutional court an the European courts (ECJ and ECtHR) are in fact convergent and coherent. National judges should take them into consideration in every case, to legitimize its outcome and enhance justice delivery.


Author(s):  
Guido Raimondi

This article comments on four important judgments given by the European Court of Human Rights in 2016. Al-Dulimi v. Switzerland addresses the issue of how, in the context of sanctions regimes created by the UN Security Council, European states should reconcile their obligations under the UN Charter with their obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights to respect the fundamentals of European public order. Baka v. Hungary concerns the separation of powers and judicial independence, in particular the need for procedural safeguards to protect judges against unjustified removal from office and to protect their legitimate exercise of freedom of expression. Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v. Hungary is a judgment on the interpretation of the Convention, featuring a review of the “living instrument” approach. Avotiņš v. Latvia addresses the principle of mutual trust within the EU legal order and the right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the Convention.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Léon E Dijkman

Abstract Germany is one of few jurisdictions with a bifurcated patent system, under which infringement and validity of a patent are established in separate proceedings. Because validity proceedings normally take longer to conclude, it can occur that remedies for infringement are imposed before a decision on the patent’s validity is available. This phenomenon is colloquially known as the ‘injunction gap’ and has been the subject of increasing criticism over the past years. In this article, I examine the injunction gap from the perspective of the right to a fair trial enshrined in Art. 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. I find that the case law of the European Court of Human Rights interpreting this provision supports criticism of the injunction gap, because imposing infringement remedies with potentially far-reaching consequences before the validity of a patent has been established by a court of law arguably violates defendants’ right to be heard. Such reliance on the patent office’s grant decision is no longer warranted in the light of contemporary invalidation rates. I conclude that the proliferation of the injunction gap should be curbed by an approach to a stay of proceedings which is in line with the test for stays as formulated by Germany’s Federal Supreme Court. Under this test, courts should stay infringement proceedings until the Federal Patent Court or the EPO’s Board of Appeal have ruled on the validity of a patent whenever it is more likely than not that it will be invalidated.


2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 48-53
Author(s):  
Kaushik Paul

In recent years, the wearing of Islamic dress in public spaces and elsewhere has generated widespread controversy all over Europe. The wearing of the hijab and other Islamic veils has been the subject of adjudication before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) on many occasions. The most recent case before the ECtHR as to the prohibition on wearing the hijab is Lachiri v Belgium. In this case, the ECtHR held that a prohibition on wearing the hijab in the courtroom constitutes an infringement of Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which guarantees the right to freedom of religion or belief. From the perspective of religious freedom, the ruling of the Strasbourg Court in Lachiri is very significant for many reasons. The purpose of this comment is critically to analyse the ECtHR's decision in Lachiri from the standpoint of religious liberty.


2003 ◽  
Vol 52 (2) ◽  
pp. 297-332 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emmanuel Voyiakis

This comment discusses three recent judgments of the European Court of Human Rights in the cases of McElhinney v Ireland, Al-Adsani v UK, and Fogarty v UK. All three applications concerned the dismissal by the courts of the respondent States of claims against a third State on the ground of that State's immunity from suit. They thus raised important questions about the relation the European Convention on Human Rights (the Convention)—especially the right to a fair trial and access to court enshrined in Arcticle 6(1)—and the law of State immunity.


2011 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 165-176 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dennis Kurzon

In two English cases which reached the European Court of Human Rights in the mid-2000s, it was argued that the statutory requirement on the part of a motorist who has been caught speeding to give the police information concerning the identity of the driver of the car at the time of the offence is a violation of the right of silence by which a person should not be put into a position that s/he incriminates him/herself. The right of silence is one of the conventional interpretations of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. As well as a study on the right of silence with regard to written texts, this paper also investigates the two cases in terms of icons and indices: a text may be indexical of a basic human right, and then may become an icon of that right. The European Court of Human Rights considers the particular section of the relevant statute as an icon of the "regulatory regime".


De Jure ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ilmira Ilieva ◽  
◽  
◽  

This article examines the organization and functioning of Bulgarian military courts to determine to what extent they are compatible with fair trial standards. The guarantees and institutional requirements for providing the right to a fair trial are analyzed in the light of the European Convention on Human Rights and the practice of the European Court of Human Rights. This research is focused on the issue whether Bulgarian military courts could provide a fair trial, held by an independent and impartial court, mainly with regard to civil citizens. For the purpose of the research is scrutinized the ECHR Judgment from 28.11.2019 on the case Mustafa vs. Bulgaria.


2017 ◽  
Vol 6 (s2) ◽  
pp. 9-17
Author(s):  
Pir Ali Kaya ◽  
Ceyhun Güler

Abstract According to The European Social Charter, the European Convention on Human Rights, the ILO Conventions, the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, the decisions of the European Social Rights Committee and the ILO supervisory bodies, the right to collective action is a democratic right that aims to protect and correct the economic and social interests of workers in the workplace or in another place appropriate for the purpose of action. The above-mentioned institutions accept the right to collective action as a fundamental human right. According to the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, the right to collective action is regarded as a democratic right, including strike. In particular, the right to collective action is being used as a resistance mechanism against new working relations, which are imposed on working conditions, right to work and the right to organize. However, the tendency of this right to political field, leads to some debate about the legality of the right to collective action. In this context, In the decision of the European Court of Human Rights, the ILO's supervisory bodies and the European Committee on Social Rights, it is emphasized that collective action rights should be a basic human right. In this study, the legal basis of the right to collective action will be discussed in accordance with the decisions and requirements of the European Court of Human Rights and the decisions of the ILO supervisory bodies.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document