Brain death: understanding the organism as a whole

1999 ◽  
Vol 48 (3) ◽  
pp. 497-515
Author(s):  
J. Bonelli ◽  
E.H. Prat ◽  
N. Auner ◽  
R. Bonelli

Since intensive care medicine enables us to maintain blood circulation and respiration artificially for some time, the usual criteria for death, such as cardiac arrest and cessation of respiration, are not applicable in all cases. Thus, the irreversible breakdown of the brain functions have come to be accepted as the most prominent factor for the occurence of death. This criterion is linked primarily to the disintegration of the organism as a whole. Yet the controversy surrounding the moment when a man can be declared dead or alive has not yet been resolved. The decisive weak point in this controversial discussion seems to be that the notion of the “organism as a whole” is inadequately defined. The aim of this study is to fill this void. Thus, at a first approximation, a rough definition of the “organism as a whole” is given. In a second step we turn to examine the empirical evidence related to the question of whether this attribute is possessed or not by a human body with an irreparably damaged brain. For the characterization of life and death, as related to our question, it is important to distingnish between derivated biological life (isolatedly living cells or organs, cell cultures, heart-lung-compound) and a living being. For this distinction the criteria of completion, indivisibility, auto-finality and identity have been considered. If these are missing a living being does not exist. Then a man is no longer a living man, he is dead. In brain-dead body one finds a number of signs of life such as heartbeat, metabolism, growth of cells, regeneration an so forth. These signs of life, however, are not signs of an organsim as a whole but signs of a physiological combination of organs whose parts - directed from the outside - are dependent on each other. The brain-dead body lacks, however, the four criteria of a living being. Thus it is no longer a living man. It is a purely derivated biological life. If we regard the brain-dead body indirectly by considering the status of the brain itself and its functions we can say that the brain is the constitutive foundation (the guarantor) for the identity and completion of an individual as a whole. With the loss of the brain this wholeness is lost. The man is dead.

2019 ◽  
Vol 86 (4) ◽  
pp. 381-393
Author(s):  
Elinor Gardner

Questions of life and death are primarily philosophical questions, as philosopher Robert Spaemann argues. Spaemann argues that “brain death” is philosophically unsatisfactory as a definition of death, and as the exclusive criterion for determining death, for two main reasons: first, because it attempts to annul the basic perceptions of the ordinary person in regard to death. Second, because the cause of life and unity in a living being cannot be reduced to the brain. This essay is an explication of Spaemann’s contribution to the “brain death” question, which consists in illuminating the philosophical issues at stake. Summary: This article presents Robert Spaemann’s philosophical case that “brain death” suffices neither as a definition of death nor as the sole criterion of death.


Entropy ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 20 (9) ◽  
pp. 660 ◽  
Author(s):  
Román Baravalle ◽  
Osvaldo Rosso ◽  
Fernando Montani

The electroencephalogram (EEG) is an electrophysiological monitoring method that allows us to glimpse the electrical activity of the brain. Neural oscillations patterns are perhaps the best salient feature of EEG as they are rhythmic activities of the brain that can be generated by interactions across neurons. Large-scale oscillations can be measured by EEG as the different oscillation patterns reflected within the different frequency bands, and can provide us with new insights into brain functions. In order to understand how information about the rhythmic activity of the brain during visuomotor/imagined cognitive tasks is encoded in the brain we precisely quantify the different features of the oscillatory patterns considering the Shannon–Fisher plane H × F . This allows us to distinguish the dynamics of rhythmic activities of the brain showing that the Beta band facilitate information transmission during visuomotor/imagined tasks.


Author(s):  
Elena Vladimirovna Berezina ◽  
Anna Sergeevna Balandina ◽  
Ol'ga Svyatoslavovna Belomyttseva

This article presents a historical overview of the emergence of tax monitoring in the Russian Federation, as well as the analysis of its peculiarities within the context of trends of global taxation practice. Modern nations apply new approaches to tax administration, but commonly emerging and practically established ideas do not receive due scientific research. The object of this research is the process of digitalization of tax administration based on Russian and foreign experience. The subject of this research is the theoretical aspects of tax monitoring, as well as historical analysis of the emergence of a new format of interaction between tax administration and taxpayers in Russia and global practice. The goal of this work is to determine the role and importance of tax monitoring within taxation system of the Russian Federation, as well definition of tax monitoring as the means of digitalization of tax administration. The scientific novelty of this work consists in the comprehensive research of implementation of tax monitoring from the moment of its emergence in the global practice of taxation and determination of its essential features, which allowed concluding on incorrectness of legislator’s definition of tax monitoring as a form of tax control, and call for legislative definition of the concept of “tax administration”, as well as amending the Taxation Code of the Russian Federation for clarification of the status of taxpayers, who transitioned to the digital model of tax administration. The results of this research can be used in development of amendments to the legislation and criteria for assessing efficiency of tax monitoring.


1988 ◽  
Vol 41 (7) ◽  
pp. 285-296 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ahmed K. Noor

The status and some recent developments of continuum modeling for repetitive lattice structures are summarized. Discussion focuses on a number of aspects including definition of an effective substitute continuum; characterization of the continuum model; and the different approaches for generating the properties of the continuum, namely, the constitutive matrix, the matrix of mass densities, and the matrix of thermal coefficients. Also, a simple approach is presented for generating the analytic expressions and/or numerical values of the continuum properties. Sample numerical results are presented to demonstrate the effectiveness of the continuum modeling approach. Future directions of research on continuum modeling are identified. These include needed extensions and applications of continuum modeling as well as computational strategies and modeling techniques.


2020 ◽  
Vol 46 (4) ◽  
pp. 372-383
Author(s):  
David K C Cooper

The development of heart surgery is briefly reviewed, and the impact it has made on our concepts of life and death are considered. For centuries, death was defined by the cessation of heart beat. In the early days of heart surgery in the 1940s and 1950s, the heart sometimes temporarily stopped beating, but could be resuscitated, and some concluded that the patient had been ‘dead’ for a period of time. Subsequently, when the patient’s brain and other vital organs were protected either by the induction of a state of total body hypothermia or by the support of a heart-lung machine, the heart was purposely stopped from beating for periods of a few minutes to even several hours, but the patient remained alive. When heart transplantation was introduced in 1967, for a period of time the patient not only had no heartbeat, but had no heart, yet was not dead. When total artificial hearts were introduced, the patient permanently had no heart, but remained alive. In the near future, it is likely that the native heart will be permanently replaced by a genetically-engineered pig heart. Organ transplantation, particularly of the heart, contributed further to our changing concepts of life and death. In 1963, surgeons began to remove organs from donors whose brain had been irreversibly damaged, and had been diagnosed as being ‘brain-dead’, but in whom the heart was still beating. By 1968, the beating heart was routinely removed from brain-dead donors and transplanted into recipients, but this was no longer considered to be illegal as brain death had become the definitive definition of death, not lack of a heart beat or even lack of a heart.


2020 ◽  
pp. 175114372091897
Author(s):  
Alex Warren ◽  
Sarah Kelly ◽  
Antonia Karus-McElvogue ◽  
Rowan Burnstein

Increasingly, reports are emerging of maternal physiological support after brain death in pregnant women declared brain dead long before the gestational age of foetal viability. While these ‘miracle babies’ often receive significant media attention – such as the recent case of Catarina Sequeira – it is difficult to estimate the probability of a live birth in such circumstances given a clear publication bias in favour of reporting good outcomes. In a number of highly publicised cases, continuation of maternal physiological support after brain death has been attempted against the express wishes of the patient's family in jurisdictions where a foetal right to life is given weight in law. The legal issues around discontinuation of maternal physiological support after brain death have not yet been assessed by a UK court. The scenario is easily envisioned, however, where conflict emerges as to the appropriateness of such support. While there is no statutory definition of death in the UK, the courts have accepted brain-dead patients as legally dead upon completion of brainstem testing. However, as UK law grants few explicit legal rights to a foetus, it is unclear as to how conflicts are to be resolved. This article is not intended as a systematic review of the medical or legal academic literature, nor as a review of the clinical management of the pregnant brain-dead patient; rather, it aims to summarise the evidence base for maternal physiological support after brain death and the relevant case law. Using a recent case as an example, this article will outline the legal approach to death in the UK, contrast the status in law of a brain-dead mother and her foetus, and advance an argument of the circumstances in which maternal physiological support after brain death may be ethically justifiable. The authors hope this will assist the UK intensivist in the complex decision-making such cases demand.


Mnemosyne ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 69 (3) ◽  
pp. 397-419 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aldo Tagliabue

This article demonstrates that Cnemon’s story in Heliodorus’ Aethiopica intertexts with the novella of Deinias in Lucian’s Toxaris. The closeness of three textual parallels, along with a subtle use of characters’ names, proves that Heliodorus is deliberately recalling Toxaris. The focus of this intertextuality is Chariclea, the courtesan of Deinias’ story. This immoral figure is a striking counterpart to the lustful Demaenete, the main character of Cnemon’s story and the first immoral lover of the Aethiopica. At the same time, the evocation by Heliodorus of a lustful woman who has the same name as the protagonist Chariclea, paradoxically enriches the characterization of the latter as chaste. Furthermore, this subtle evocation of Chariclea seems to have metaliterary implications as well. In the Aethiopica Chariclea stands for the entire novel: Heliodorus appears to define the nature of his text in opposition to Lucian’s Toxaris and to the different kind of fiction it represents. Heliodorus’ definition of his own novel by means of establishing a contrast with other texts is an important function of his intertextuality with Imperial literature and possibly sheds new light on the status of ancient fiction as a whole.


2020 ◽  
Vol 87 (3) ◽  
pp. 317-333 ◽  
Author(s):  
Doyen Nguyen

Prompted by concerns raised by the rise in litigations, which challenge the legal status of brain death (BD), Lewis and colleagues recently proposed a revision of the Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA). The revision consists of (i) narrowing down the definition of BD to the loss of specific brain functions, namely those functions that can be assessed on bedside neurological examination; (ii) requiring that the determination of BD must be in accordance with the specific guidelines designated in the revision; and (iii) eliminating the necessity for obtaining consent prior to performing the tests for BD determination. By analyzing Lewis and colleagues’ revision, this article shows that this revision is fraught with difficulties. Therefore, this article also proposes two approaches for an ethical revision of the UDDA; the first is in accordance with scientific realism and Christian anthropology, while the second is grounded in trust and respect for persons. If the UDDA is to be revised, then it should be based on sound ethical principles in order to resolve the ongoing BD controversies and rebuild public trust. Summary: This article critically examines the recent revision of the Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA) advanced by Lewis and colleagues. The revision only further reinforces the status quo of brain death without taking into account the root cause of the litigations and controversies about the declaration of death by neurological criteria. In view of this deficiency, this article offers two approaches to revising the UDDA, both of which are founded on sound moral principles.


2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 167-178
Author(s):  
Piotr Grzegorz Nowak

Abstract Singer claims that there are two ways of challenging the fact that brain-dead patients, from whom organs are usually retrieved, are in fact biologically alive. By means of the first, the so called dead donor rule may be abandoned, opening the way to lethal organ donation. In the second, it might be posited that terms such as “life” and “death” do not have any primary biological meaning and are applicable to persons instead of organisms. This second possibility permits one to acknowledge that brain-dead patients are deceased because they are irreversibly unconscious. In the commentary which follows, I will argue that Singer’s second option is preferable since it (a) provides a higher amount of organs available for transplant, and (b) is better suited to the meaning of “death” which occurs in ordinary language. I will also defend such a concept of death against the objections raised by Michael Nair-Collins in the article Can the brain-dead be harmed or wronged? On the moral status of brain death and its implications for organ transplantation.


Author(s):  
Sergei Valer'evich Krivov ◽  
Tat'yana Vladimirovna Baranova ◽  
Larisa Vsevolodovna Grekhneva ◽  
Sergey Valer'evich Starkin

The successful implementation of the Minsk Protocol has been impugned from the moment of its signing due to ambiguous interpretations of its nature and intentions. The main issues pertain to understanding of the conflict in the Southeast of Ukraine as an intergovernmental, internationalized or domestic political one, the legitimacy and status of the parties to agreement, as well as the role of the international community in settlement of the conflict. The indicated contradictions are also reflected in the difference of approaches towards definition of the conceptual apparatus, as well as its interpretation. The problem at hand goes beyond the scope of political science or legal analysis, and requires comprehensive examination based on the variety of theoretical and methodological approaches. The author agrees with the characterization of conflict in the Southeast of Ukraine as a formalized political unsettled situation. From the political and legal perspectives, the agreements on halting the war demonstrate typical examples of challenges and problems that emerge during negotiations and implementation of the internationalized peace treaties of the post-Cold War period. The refusal of one of the parties, usually the country which territorial integrity is disputed by the non-state party, to meet the other party in the course of peace negotiations is a typical complication of the negotiation processes. Direct negotiations, i.e. meetings where the parties to negotiation make eye contact, can be interpreted as the acts of implicit recognition of non-state parties, their representatives, as well as respective claims. Such different perspective on the mandate, accountability, responsibility, and the status of “direct” and “third” parties in course of negotiation and implementation of peace treaties are typical contradictions. Throughout the entire period of elaboration, signing, and implementation of the agreements, the clash of interests virtually shifted towards the interpretation of terminology.


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