Economic Interdependence and International Conflict

This study examines the effect of polarization and interdependence on systemic conflict. It argues that both polarization and interdependence must be conceptualized in terms of different types of relations among states and that different relationships would reflect varied levels of polarization and inter-dependence. Accordingly, this study develops general measures of network polarization and interdependence that allow measurement of these concepts over a wide array of international relations. Hypotheses are deduced from the realist and liberal paradigms about how alliance polarization, trade polarization, and cultural polarization affect systemic conflict. Likewise, hypotheses are deduced regarding the expected effects of strategic and economic interdependence on conflict. These hypotheses are tested using data on alliance, trade, linguistic, and religious networks over the period 1816–2002. The findings suggest that alliance polarization and strategic interdependence increase the amount of systemic conflict, while trade polarization and economic interdependence have a dampening effect on the amount of conflict in the international system. The theoretical implications of these results are discussed.

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Economic Interdependence and International Conflict: Some Cross-National Evidence

International Studies Quarterly ◽

10.2307/2600435 ◽

1986 ◽

Vol 30 (1) ◽

pp. 23 ◽

Cited By ~ 107

Author(s):

Mark J. Gasiorowski

Keyword(s):

International Conflict ◽

Economic Interdependence ◽

Cross National

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Economic Interdependence and International Conflict: New Perspectives on an Enduring Debate

Foreign Affairs ◽

10.2307/20033988 ◽

2004 ◽

Vol 83 (3) ◽

pp. 138

Author(s):

G. John Ikenberry ◽

Edward D. Mansfield ◽

Brian M. Pollins

Keyword(s):

International Conflict ◽

Economic Interdependence

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The Uncertainty Trade-off: Reexamining Opportunity Costs and War

International Studies Quarterly ◽

10.1093/isq/sqz050 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 63 (4) ◽

pp. 1025-1034 ◽

Cited By ~ 2

Author(s):

William Spaniel ◽

Iris Malone

Keyword(s):

International Conflict ◽

Order Effect ◽

Second Order ◽

Conventional Wisdom ◽

Economic Interdependence ◽

Opportunity Costs ◽

Trade Off ◽

Indian Relations

Abstract Conventional wisdom about economic interdependence and international conflict predicts that increasing opportunity costs make war less likely, but some wars occur after costs grow. Why? We develop a model that shows that a nonmonotonic relationship exists between the costs and probability of war when there is uncertainty over resolve. Under these conditions, increasing the costs of an uninformed party's opponent has a second-order effect of exacerbating informational asymmetries about that opponent's willingness to maintain peace. We derive conditions under which war can occur more frequently and empirically showcase the model's implications through a case study of Sino-Indian relations from 1949 to 2007. This finding challenges how scholars traditionally believe economic interdependence mediates incentives to fight: instruments such as trade have competing effects on the probability of war.

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