Economic Interdependence and International Conflict: Some Cross-National Evidence

1986 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 23 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark J. Gasiorowski
2011 ◽  
Vol 41 (4) ◽  
pp. 795-817 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael T. Koch

Research suggests that the costs of international conflict (e.g. casualties) alter public opinion, executive approval and policy positions of elected officials. However, do casualties affect voting in terms of aggregate outcomes and individual vote choices? This article examines how casualties from interstate conflicts affect voter behaviour, specifically incumbent vote share. Using the investment model of commitment to model individual vote choice, it is argued that increases in the costs of conflict (i.e., more casualties) can increase the probability that voters will support the incumbent, increasing incumbent vote share. This model is tested with both cross-national aggregate data from twenty-three countries and individual-level British survey data. The results support the argument.


Author(s):  
George W Williford ◽  
Douglas B Atkinson

Scholars and practitioners in international relations have a strong interest in forecasting international conflict. However, due to the complexity of forecasting rare events, existing attempts to predict the onset of international conflict in a cross-national setting have generally had low rates of success. In this paper, we apply Bayesian methods to develop a forecasting model designed to predict the onset of international conflict at the yearly level. We find that this model performs substantially better at producing accurate predictions both in and out of sample.


2006 ◽  
Vol 43 (4) ◽  
pp. 391-411 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zeev Maoz

This study examines the effect of polarization and interdependence on systemic conflict. It argues that both polarization and interdependence must be conceptualized in terms of different types of relations among states and that different relationships would reflect varied levels of polarization and inter-dependence. Accordingly, this study develops general measures of network polarization and interdependence that allow measurement of these concepts over a wide array of international relations. Hypotheses are deduced from the realist and liberal paradigms about how alliance polarization, trade polarization, and cultural polarization affect systemic conflict. Likewise, hypotheses are deduced regarding the expected effects of strategic and economic interdependence on conflict. These hypotheses are tested using data on alliance, trade, linguistic, and religious networks over the period 1816–2002. The findings suggest that alliance polarization and strategic interdependence increase the amount of systemic conflict, while trade polarization and economic interdependence have a dampening effect on the amount of conflict in the international system. The theoretical implications of these results are discussed.


2004 ◽  
Vol 83 (3) ◽  
pp. 138
Author(s):  
G. John Ikenberry ◽  
Edward D. Mansfield ◽  
Brian M. Pollins

2019 ◽  
Vol 63 (4) ◽  
pp. 1025-1034 ◽  
Author(s):  
William Spaniel ◽  
Iris Malone

Abstract Conventional wisdom about economic interdependence and international conflict predicts that increasing opportunity costs make war less likely, but some wars occur after costs grow. Why? We develop a model that shows that a nonmonotonic relationship exists between the costs and probability of war when there is uncertainty over resolve. Under these conditions, increasing the costs of an uninformed party's opponent has a second-order effect of exacerbating informational asymmetries about that opponent's willingness to maintain peace. We derive conditions under which war can occur more frequently and empirically showcase the model's implications through a case study of Sino-Indian relations from 1949 to 2007. This finding challenges how scholars traditionally believe economic interdependence mediates incentives to fight: instruments such as trade have competing effects on the probability of war.


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