Minority Party Misery

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacob Smith
Keyword(s):  
Minority Party

All is Not Fair

2000 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 328-354
Author(s):  
R. BRUCE ANDERSON
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Party Membership ◽  
Committee Decision ◽  
Time Period ◽  
Minority Party ◽  
Committee Decision Making

This article addresses the problem of the causes of party conflict in former one-party legislatures. Some argue that as the minority party gains ground in the legislature, partisan floor conflict will rise. Yet, literature on committees and the changing status of the committee system seems to suggest that conflict is lowered in chambers where the minority party participates in committee decision making. This study is based on tests of data from a 10-year time period. The author reports that the proportion of minority party membership on committees has a direct dampening effect on the level of conflict on the floor. This analysis also finds that the effect is variable by bill type and that the overall effect on conflict is greater than the effect of chamber share in determining the level of party conflict in the chamber.

Party Brands and the Democratic and Republican National Committees, 1952–1976

2018 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 79-102 ◽  
Author(s):  
Boris Heersink
Keyword(s):  
Service Providers ◽  
National Minority ◽  
National Committee ◽  
National Party ◽  
White House ◽  
Policy Positions ◽  
Party Leaders ◽  
Party Organizations ◽  
Minority Party ◽  
Party Brands

Political scientists have traditionally dismissed the Democratic and Republican National Committees as “service providers”—organizations that provide assistance to candidates in the form of campaign funding and expertise but otherwise lack political power. I argue this perspective has missed a crucial role national committees play in American politics, namely that national party organizations publicize their party's policy positions and, in doing so, attempt to create national party brands. These brands are important to party leaders—especially when the party is in the national minority—since they are fundamental to mobilizing voters in elections. In case studies covering the Democratic National Committee (DNC) and Republican National Committee (RNC) in the period 1952–1976, I show that minority party committees prioritize their branding role and invest considerably in their publicity divisions, inaugurate new publicity programs, and create new communication tools to reach out to voting groups. Additionally, I show that in cases where the party is out of the White House, the national committees have considerable leeway in deciding what party image to publicize. Rather than being mere powerless service providers, I show that party committees have played crucial roles in debates concerning questions of ideology and issue positioning in both parties.

A Theory of Competitive Partisan Lawmaking

2015 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 423-448 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keith Krehbiel ◽  
Adam Meirowitz ◽  
Alan E. Wiseman
Keyword(s):  
Two Dimensions ◽  
Canonical Model ◽  
Analytic Framework ◽  
Party Leaders ◽  
Minority Party

Motivated by polar extremes of monopartisanship and nonpartisanship in existing literature on parties in legislatures, we introduce and analyze a more moderate theory of competitive partisan lawmaking. The distinguishing feature of competitive partisanship is that the minority party, although disadvantaged, has some guaranteed opportunities to influence lawmaking. Our analytic framework focuses on two dimensions of parties in legislatures: agenda-based competition, operationalized as a minority party right to make an amendment to the majority party’s proposal, and resource-based competition, characterized as the ability of both party leaders to use transferable resources when building winning or blocking coalitions. Building on the canonical model, we find that giving voice to the minority party in either one of these ways alone results in outcomes that, on the whole, are less lopsided and more moderate than those predicted by the existing monopartisan and nonpartisan theories.

Constitutional Politics In Germany

2002 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Donald P. Kommers
Keyword(s):  
National Level ◽  
Immigration Law ◽  
Constitutional Politics ◽  
Social Democratic ◽  
Technical Point ◽  
National Parliament ◽  
Legislative Body ◽  
Minority Party ◽  
Vital State ◽  
First Time

A landmark in German immigration law could founder on a technical point of procedure in the Bundesrat, the legislative body in Germany that represents the states at the national level. A bill acknowledging, for the first time, that Germany is a country of immigration won a majority of votes in the popularly elected branch of the national parliament. Introduced and championed by the governing Social Democratic-Green coalition, the controversial bill survived the stiff opposition of Christian Democrats, the minority party. But Germany is a federal republic and, accordingly, this bill, like others involving vital state interests, constitutionally requires the Bundesrat's consent.

Reviewing Minority Issues in the Middle of a Large-Scale Political Crisis: Analysis of Key Developments and Events during 2015 in Macedonia

2017 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 171-185
Author(s):  
Marina Andeva
Keyword(s):  
Large Scale ◽  
Implementation Process ◽  
Party Politics ◽  
Political Crisis ◽  
Major Focus ◽  
Framework Agreement ◽  
Minority Politics ◽  
Rights Protection ◽  
Minority Party ◽  
The Republic

This article addresses minority politics and rights protection in the Republic of Macedonia, through scrutiny of key developments and events during 2015. The main events relate to the existing political situation in the country, minority party politics and dynamics, and the implementation process of the Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA). Although it has been more than a decade since the OFA, the Macedonian system is still fragile and subject to further modifications; experts often discuss the need for its ‘revision’ or ‘review’. The major focus of this article is put specifically on the OFA and the discussions on its review.

Challenges for Spanish party could weaken government

2019 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Content Type ◽  
Minority Party

Headline SPAIN: Government faces weakness over minority party

Voter Responses to Electoral Complexity: Ticket Splitting, Rational Voters and Representation in the Federal Republic of Germany

1999 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 487-505 ◽  
Author(s):  
KATHLEEN BAWN
Keyword(s):  
Federal Republic ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Federal Republic Of Germany ◽  
Electoral Rules ◽  
Substantial Evidence ◽  
Major Party ◽  
Minority Party ◽  
Political Outcomes ◽  
Election Results ◽  
Party Support

In order to understand how electoral rules affect political outcomes, we need to know whether and how voters react to them. The ability of voters to react strategically to electoral rules may be limited in cases where the electoral rules are complex. In this article, I look for evidence of rational reactions to a moderately complex electoral system, that used in the Federal Republic of Germany. By examining district-level election results, I find substantial evidence that voters do react rationally, despite the complexity of the two-vote system. The rational reactions by voters lead to excess first votes for incumbents, for candidates of the major party expected to be in government, to major-party candidates in close races and to major-party candidates in districts with significant minority-party support. The findings support both the general claim that voters can react strategically to complex electoral rules, and more specific claims about the value of the two-vote ballot in Germany.

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