Sequential persuasion
This paper studies sequential Bayesian persuasion games with multiple senders. We provide a tractable characterization of equilibrium outcomes. We apply the model to study how the structure of consultations affects information revelation. Adding a sender who moves first cannot reduce informativeness in equilibrium and results in a more informative equilibrium in the case of two states. Moreover, with the exception of the first sender, it is without loss of generality to let each sender move only once. Sequential persuasion cannot generate a more informative equilibrium than simultaneous persuasion and is always less informative when there are only two states.
2014 ◽
Vol 51
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pp. 55-68
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1974 ◽
Vol 32
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pp. 254-255
1983 ◽
Vol 41
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pp. 270-271
1973 ◽
Vol 31
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pp. 144-145
1973 ◽
Vol 31
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pp. 132-133
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1983 ◽
Vol 41
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pp. 194-195
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1983 ◽
Vol 41
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pp. 160-161
1983 ◽
Vol 41
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pp. 72-73
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1973 ◽
Vol 31
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pp. 420-421