scholarly journals Iterated weak dominance and interval-dominance supermodular games

2019 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 71-102 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joel Sobel
Keyword(s):  
Supermodular Games ◽  
Weak Dominance

Implementation Via Information Design in Binary-Action Supermodular Games

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Edward Morris ◽  
Daisuke Oyama ◽  
Satoru Takahashi
Keyword(s):  
Information Design ◽  
Supermodular Games

If It Is Surely Better, Do It More? Implications for Preferences Under Ambiguity

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Soheil Ghili ◽  
Peter Klibanoff
Keyword(s):  
Expected Utility ◽  
Ambiguity Aversion ◽  
Upper Bounds ◽  
Maxmin Expected Utility ◽  
Weak Dominance ◽  
Choice Under Uncertainty ◽  
Tight Connection ◽  
Sales Agent ◽  
Utility Preferences ◽  
Sensitive Behavior

Consider a canonical problem in choice under uncertainty: choosing from a convex feasible set consisting of all (Anscombe–Aumann) mixtures of two acts f and g, [Formula: see text]. We propose a preference condition, monotonicity in optimal mixtures, which says that surely improving the act f (in the sense of weak dominance) makes the optimal weight(s) on f weakly higher. We use a stylized model of a sales agent reacting to incentives to illustrate the tight connection between monotonicity in optimal mixtures and a monotone comparative static of interest in applications. We then explore more generally the relation between this condition and preferences exhibiting ambiguity-sensitive behavior as in the classic Ellsberg paradoxes. We find that monotonicity in optimal mixtures and ambiguity aversion (even only local to an event) are incompatible for a large and popular class of ambiguity-sensitive preferences (the c-linearly biseparable class. This implies, for example, that maxmin expected utility preferences are consistent with monotonicity in optimal mixtures if and only if they are subjective expected utility preferences. This incompatibility is not between monotonicity in optimal mixtures and ambiguity aversion per se. For example, we show that smooth ambiguity preferences can satisfy both properties as long as they are not too ambiguity averse. Our most general result, applying to an extremely broad universe of preferences, shows a sense in which monotonicity in optimal mixtures places upper bounds on the intensity of ambiguity-averse behavior. This paper was accepted by Manel Baucells, decision analysis.

Social Organisation and Warren Use of the Burrowing Bettong, Bettongia lesueur (Macropodoidea : Potoroidae)

1997 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 143 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ute Sander ◽  
Jeff Short ◽  
Bruce Turner
Keyword(s):  
Dominance Hierarchy ◽  
Social Groups ◽  
Young Male ◽  
Social Organisation ◽  
Agonistic Interactions ◽  
Weak Dominance ◽  
Shark Bay ◽  
Day Range ◽  
The Social ◽  
Polygynous Mating System

This study describes the use of warrens and aspects of the social organisation of a population of the burrowing bettong, an endangered potoroid. Observations were made on 14 animals, maintained in a 4-ha enclosure of natural vegetation at Shark Bay, Western Australia. The population divided into three social groups, each of one male and one to many females. Individual bettongs used 1–10 warrens over a period of five months. Males changed warrens more often than females. Some females regularly shared warrens with other females. Many of these associations appeared to be mothers with their daughter or daughters. Sharing of warrens occurred regularly until the daughters were about 10 months old and occasionally after that. Day ranges of males were larger than those of females, exclusive of other males, and overlapped those of 1–6 females. Males shared warrens with the females within their day range. At night bettongs were not constrained to their day range and made use of the whole enclosure. Equal numbers of agonistic interactions between and within day-range groups, as well as the absence of feeding associations, indicated that bettongs operated independently of their day-range groups at night while feeding. Bettongs formed a weak dominance hierarchy with the oldest female on top and a young male at the bottom. Male–male interactions tended to be more aggressive than male–female interactions. Males were involved in significantly more agonistic interactions, particularly chases, than were females; chases usually entailed chasing another male away from a female. Use of space and social behaviour suggested a polygynous mating system.

Generalized Belief Operator and Robustness in Binary‐Action Supermodular Games

Econometrica ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 88 (2) ◽  
pp. 693-726 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daisuke Oyama ◽  
Satoru Takahashi
Keyword(s):  
Incomplete Information ◽  
High Probability ◽  
Equilibrium Selection ◽  
Common Belief ◽  
Supermodular Games ◽  
Prior Beliefs ◽  
Global Game ◽  
Game Equilibrium ◽  
Type Spaces ◽  
Action Profile

This paper studies the robustness of an equilibrium to incomplete information in binary‐action supermodular games. Using a generalized version of belief operator, we explore the restrictions that prior beliefs impose on higher order beliefs. In particular, we obtain a nontrivial lower bound on the probability of a common belief event, uniform over type spaces, when the underlying game has a monotone potential. Conversely, when the game has no monotone potential, we construct a type space with an arbitrarily high probability event in which players never have common belief about that event. As an implication of these results, we show for generic binary‐action supermodular games that an action profile is robust to incomplete information if and only if it is a monotone potential maximizer. Our study offers new methodology and insight to the analysis of global game equilibrium selection.

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