scholarly journals Two revenue sharing contracts in a three-echelon supply chain with a risk-neutral or a risk-averse retailer

2015 ◽  
Vol 8 (5) ◽  
Author(s):  
Yumei Hou ◽  
Fangfang Wei ◽  
Xin Tian ◽  
Xiaoyun Liu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Risk Neutral

scholarly journals Coordinating Contracts for Two-Stage Fashion Supply Chain with Risk-Averse Retailer and Price-Dependent Demand

2013 ◽  
Vol 2013 ◽  
pp. 1-12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Minli Xu ◽  
Qiao Wang ◽  
Linhan Ouyang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Channel Coordination ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract ◽  
Risk Neutral ◽  
Mean Variance ◽  
Variance Approach ◽  
Dependent Demand

When the demand is sensitive to retail price, revenue sharing contract and two-part tariff contract have been shown to be able to coordinate supply chains with risk neutral agents. We extend the previous studies to consider a risk-averse retailer in a two-echelon fashion supply chain. Based on the classic mean-variance approach in finance, the issue of channel coordination in a fashion supply chain with risk-averse retailer and price-dependent demand is investigated. We propose both single contracts and joint contracts to achieve supply chain coordination. We find that the coordinating revenue sharing contract and two-part tariff contract in the supply chain with risk neutral agents are still useful to coordinate the supply chain taking into account the degree of risk aversion of fashion retailer, whereas a more complex sales rebate and penalty (SRP) contract fails to do so. When using combined contracts to coordinate the supply chain, we demonstrate that only revenue sharing with two-part tariff contract can coordinate the fashion supply chain. The optimal conditions for contract parameters to achieve channel coordination are determined. Numerical analysis is presented to supplement the results and more insights are gained.

scholarly journals Risk-Averse Co-Decision for Lower-Carbon Product Family Configuration and Resilient Supplier Selection

2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 384
Author(s):  
Dengzhuo Liu ◽  
Zhongkai Li ◽  
Chao He ◽  
Shuai Wang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supplier Selection ◽  
Programming Model ◽  
Ghg Emissions ◽  
Product Family ◽  
Mixed Integer ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Worst Case ◽  
Risk Neutral ◽  
Disruption Risks

Due to global pandemics, political unrest and natural disasters, the stability of the supply chain is facing the challenge of more uncertain events. Although many scholars have conducted research on improving the resilience of the supply chain, the research on integrating product family configuration and supplier selection (PCSS) under disruption risks is limited. In this paper, the centralized supply chain network, which contains only one major manufacturer and several suppliers, is considered, and one resilience strategy (i.e., the fortified supplier) is used to enhance the resilience level of the selected supply base. Then, an improved stochastic bi-objective mixed integer programming model is proposed to support co-decision for PCSS under disruption risks. Furthermore, considering the above risk-neutral model as a benchmark, a risk-averse mixed integer program with Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR) is formulated to achieve maximum potential worst-case profit and minimum expected total greenhouse gases (GHG) emissions. Then, NSGA-II is applied to solve the proposed stochastic bi-objective mixed integer programming model. Taking the electronic dictionary as a case study, the risk-neutral solutions and risk-averse solutions that optimize, respectively, average and worst-case objectives of co-decision are also compared under two different ranges of disruption probability. The sensitivity analysis on the confidence level indicates that fortifying suppliers and controlling market share in co-decision for PCSS can effectively reduce the risk of low-profit/high-cost while minimizing the expected GHG emissions. Meanwhile, the effects of low-probability risk are more likely to be ignored in the risk-neutral solution, and it is necessary to adopt a risk-averse solution to reduce potential worst-case losses.

scholarly journals Coordination of Time-Varying Price Supply Chain with Risk-Averse Members under Random Order Response Time

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Shuanjun Song ◽  
Minyan Zhang ◽  
Sheng Hu
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Random Order ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Specific Form ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Time Varying ◽  
Decentralized Decision Making ◽  
Coordination Effect ◽  
Decision Making Model

A joint contract is proposed to coordinate the time-varying supply chain of risk-averse manufacturers and retailers. The joint contract uses price reduction subsidies and revenue-sharing strategies to enable manufacturers and retailers to share risks and achieve overall coordination of the supply chain. Firstly, a centralized and a decentralized decision-making model of the risk-averse supply chain are established. On this basis, reasons for the supply chain failure to coordinate are analyzed, and a joint contract is designed. Then, the specific form of the joint contract is given. Finally, the coordination effect of the joint contract is quantitatively analyzed through numerical analysis.

SUPPLY CHAIN COORDINATION WITH CVaR CRITERION

2009 ◽  
Vol 26 (01) ◽  
pp. 135-160 ◽  
Author(s):  
LEI YANG ◽  
MINGHUI XU ◽  
GANG YU ◽  
HANQIN ZHANG
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Value At Risk ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Conditional Value At Risk ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Mild Conditions ◽  
Quantity Flexibility ◽  
Buy Back

We study the coordination of supply chains with a risk-neutral supplier and a risk-averse retailer. Different from the downside risk setting, in a conditional value-at-risk (CVaR) framework, we show that the supply chain can be coordinated with the revenue-sharing, buy-back, two-part tariff and quantity flexibility contracts. Furthermore the revenue-sharing contracts are still equivalent to the buy-back contracts when the retail price is fixed. At the same time, it is shown that the risk-averse retailer of the coordinated supply chain can increase its profit by raising its risk-averse degree under mild conditions.

scholarly journals Why and How Does a Supplier Choose Factoring Finance?

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Chunying Tian ◽  
Dongyan Chen ◽  
Zhaobo Chen ◽  
Ding Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Credit Risk ◽  
Trade Credit ◽  
Risk Attitude ◽  
Decision Models ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Financial Benefit ◽  
Risk Neutral

Suppliers offering trade credit to the downstream retailers have to face many problems, such as receivables management, capital occupancy, and buyer’s credit risk. Many of them choose factoring finance to solve those problems simultaneously. This paper develops several supply chain decision models to show the benefits a supplier can obtain from the main functions of factoring and how he should choose between recourse factoring and nonrecourse factoring. In particular, we identify the conditions on which factoring may bring benefits (including financial benefit, guarantee benefit, and receivables management benefit) to the supplier. The supplier’s choice between recourse and nonrecourse factoring relies on his risk attitude. Given that the supplier is risk-neutral and the factoring fees are acceptable, recourse factoring is preferred when the factoring finance ratio is relatively high; otherwise, nonrecourse factoring is preferred. However, if the supplier is risk-averse, his preference for the two factoring schemes under different finance ratios may change when the risk constraints become stricter. If the target profit is lower than a certain level, the supplier’s financial choice will switch from recourse factoring to nonrecourse factoring in the case finance ratio is relatively low; otherwise, his financial choice switches from nonrecourse factoring to recourse factoring in the case finance ratio is relatively high.

Supply Chain Coordination with a Risk-Averse Retailer and a Combined Buy-Back and Revenue Sharing Contract

2019 ◽  
Vol 36 (05) ◽  
pp. 1950028 ◽  
Author(s):  
Han Zhao ◽  
Shiji Song ◽  
Yuli Zhang ◽  
Jatinder N. D. Gupta ◽  
Anna G. Devlin ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Value At Risk ◽  
Numerical Experiments ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Conditional Value At Risk ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Mild Conditions ◽  
Buy Back

This paper investigates the ability of a combined buy-back (BB) and revenue sharing (RS) contract to improve the efficiency of a supply chain involving a risk-neutral supplier and a risk-averse retailer facing stochastic demand. We show that the combined contract can coordinate the supply chain under mild conditions. Further, the effects of risk aversion and contract parameters on the agents’ decision-making are analyzed when the retailer’s risk aversion is modeled by the conditional value-at-risk (CVaR) criterion. In contrast to individual BB and RS contracts, the combined contract is able to mitigate the effect of risk-aversion and allow the supplier to obtain higher expected profit. Moreover, situations exist where the combined contract can coordinate the supply chain when neither the BB nor the RS contract can coordinate it. Numerical experiments conducted further confirm the analytical results derived.

scholarly journals Green Supply Chain Game Model and Contract Design: Risk Neutrality vs. Risk Aversion

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jianhu Cai ◽  
Huazhen Lin ◽  
Xiaoqing Hu ◽  
Minyan Ping
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Risk Tolerance ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Equilibrium Solutions ◽  
Risk Neutral

Abstract This paper incorporates the players’ risk attitudes into a green supply chain (GSC) consisting of a supplier and a retailer. The supplier conducts production and determines the green level and wholesale price as a game leader, the retailer sells green products to consumers and determines the retail price as a follower. Equilibrium solutions are derived, and the influence of risk aversion on the GSC is examined. Our results show that, for the centralized GSC, risk aversion lowers the green level and the retail price; while for the decentralized GSC, risk aversion lowers the wholesale price and the retail price, but it may induce the supplier to increase the green level given a large risk tolerance of the supplier. Meanwhile, the risk-averse decentralized GSC may obtain more expected profit than the risk-neutral decentralized GSC. Furthermore, this paper designs a revenue-and-cost-sharing joint contract to coordinate the risk-neutral GSC, and such a contract can improve the risk-averse GSC under specific conditions.

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