scholarly journals Empirical evolution of credit risk over a decade in IBEX. 35 companies and its relationship with the qualification of its ratings

2020 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 61
Author(s):  
Josep Patau
Keyword(s):  
Credit Risk ◽  
Credit Rating ◽  
Clear Correlation ◽  
Crisis Period ◽  
Rating Agencies ◽  
Credit Rating Agency ◽  
Rating Agency ◽  
Determining Factors ◽  
Commercial Loans ◽  
The One

Object: The present work responds to two objectives. On the one hand, it describes the evolution of the main economic-financial indicators that influence credit risk (insolvency) for a sample of 10 Spanish companies listed on the IBEX 35. This analysis is studied for a comparative period of 10 years, which coincides with a pre-crisis stage (2002-2005) and an economic post-crisis phase (2012-2015). On the other hand, it corroborates the relationship between the analysed insolvency and the rating or credit-risk rating published for these companies by an internationally recognized credit rating agency, Standard & Poor's (S & P).Design / methodology: A sample of 10 companies and a 10-year period including the years 2002-2005 (pre-crisis) and the years 2012-2015 (post-crisis) are chosen, omitting the Spanish economic crisis that occurred in the year 2008. For the study of its evolution, 6 ratios obtained from the scientific literature that relate to credit risk and its effects on investments and company results are calculated. Finally, the correlations of these variables with the ratings of credit risk assessment by the rating agency S & P are measured. Descriptive statistics will assign value and graphics to this ten-year evolution, and with the incorporation of a factorial analysis, the correlation between the ratios and the S & P rating will be determined. The statistical analysis explains this correlation to a greater extent.Contributions / results: The results show a clear increase in the value of the impairment variable due to credit risk ten years later that directly affects the results of the companies, despite these companies having significantly reduced their investments in commercial loans pending collection and drastically reduced the period means of collection of clients. In turn, there is a clear correlation between the insolvency studied and the variables used by the S & P rating agency for the assessment of credit risk.Added value / conclusions: The empirical study concludes that there is a correspondence between insolvency and the rating given by an internationally prestigious rating agency (S & P) for the sample of 10 companies studied. Three variables – customer balance-accounts receivable, investments and the net amount of turnover – are determining factors explaining this correlation, and these three variables are the same ones that decisively influence both the pre-crisis period and the post-crisis period 10 years apart. The rating agencies weigh the insolvency variable in their analyses.

The impact of market sectors and rating agencies on credit ratings: global evidence

2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (5) ◽  
pp. 389-410
Author(s):  
Kerstin Lopatta ◽  
Magdalena Tchikov ◽  
Finn Marten Körner
Keyword(s):  
Credit Risk ◽  
Credit Rating ◽  
Credit Ratings ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Rating Agencies ◽  
Credit Rating Agency ◽  
Rating Agency ◽  
Investment Grade ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Rating Downgrades

Purpose A credit rating, as a single indicator on one consistent scale, is designed as an objective and comparable measure within a credit rating agency (CRA). While research focuses mainly on the comparability of ratings between agencies, this paper additionally questions empirically how CRAs meet their promise of providing a consistent assessment of credit risk for issuers within and between market segments of the same agency. Design/methodology/approach Exhaustive and robust regression analyses are run to assess the impact of market sectors and rating agencies on credit ratings. The examinations consider the rating level, as well as rating downgrades as a further measure of empirical credit risk. Data stems from a large global sample of Bloomberg ratings from 11 market sectors for the period 2010-2018. Findings The analyses show differing effects of sectors and agencies on issuer ratings and downgrade probabilities. Empirical results on credit ratings and rating downgrades can then be attributed to investment grade and non-investment grade ratings. Originality/value The paper contributes to current finance research and practice by examining the credit rating differences between sectors and agencies and providing assistance to investors and other stakeholders, as well as researchers, how issuers’ sector and rating agency affiliations act as relative metrics.

The Effectiveness of Credit Rating Agency Monitoring: Evidence from Asset Securitizations

2015 ◽  
Vol 90 (5) ◽  
pp. 1779-1810 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel Bonsall ◽  
Kevin Koharki ◽  
Monica Neamtiu
Keyword(s):  
Default Risk ◽  
Credit Rating ◽  
Balance Sheet ◽  
Rating Agencies ◽  
Credit Rating Agency ◽  
Rating Accuracy ◽  
Rating Agency ◽  
Debt Issuance ◽  
Current Exposure

ABSTRACT This study investigates how differences between the rating agencies' initial (at the date of debt issuance) and subsequent (post-issuance) monitoring incentives affect securitizing banks' rating accuracy. We hypothesize that the agencies have stronger incentives to monitor issuers when providing initial versus post-issuance ratings. We document that initial ratings are positively associated with off-balance sheet securitized assets and incrementally associated with on-balance sheet retained securities. However, subsequent ratings fail to capture current exposure to off-balance sheet securitizations. We also find that subsequent ratings reflect default risk less accurately than initial ratings. The subsequent ratings' responsiveness to default risk is worse when a bank has more off-balance sheet securitized assets. Collectively, our findings are consistent with lax post-issuance monitoring. They raise questions about the effectiveness of using ratings as an ongoing contracting mechanism and suggest that conclusions about rating accuracy could differ depending on whether researchers focus on initial versus post-issuance ratings.

A Bayesian inference model for the credit rating scale

2016 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 390-404 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philipp Gmehling ◽  
Pierfrancesco La Mura
Keyword(s):  
Bayesian Inference ◽  
Credit Risk ◽  
Credit Rating ◽  
Rating Scale ◽  
Credit Rating Agencies ◽  
Model Framework ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Rating Agencies ◽  
Credit Rating Agency ◽  
Limited Accuracy

Purpose This paper aims to provide a theoretical explanation of why credit rating agencies typically disclose credit risk of issuers in classes rather than publishing the qualitative ranking those classes are based upon. Thus, its goal is to develop a better understanding of what determines the number and size of rating classes. Design/methodology/approach Investors expect ratings to be sufficiently accurate in estimating credit risk. In a theoretical model framework, it is therefore assumed that credit rating agencies, which observe credit risk with limited accuracy, are careful in not misclassifying an issuer with a lower credit quality to a higher rating class. This situation is analyzed as a Bayesian inference setting for the credit rating agencies. Findings A disclosure in intervals, typically used by credit rating agencies results from their objective of keeping misclassification errors sufficiently low in conjunction with the limited accuracy with which they observe credit risk. The number and size of the rating intervals depend in the model on how much accuracy the credit rating agencies can supply. Originality/value The paper uses Bayesian hypothesis testing to illustrate the link between limited accuracy of a credit rating agency and its disclosure of issuers’ credit risk in intervals. The findings that accuracy and the objective of avoiding misclassification determine the rating scale in this theoretical setting can lead to a better understanding of what influences the interval disclosure of major rating agencies observed in practice.

Evaluating Proposed Remedies for Credit Rating Agency Failures

2014 ◽  
Vol 89 (4) ◽  
pp. 1399-1420 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Jane Jollineau ◽  
Lloyd J. Tanlu ◽  
Amanda Winn
Keyword(s):  
Financial Crisis ◽  
Credit Rating ◽  
Credit Ratings ◽  
Quantitative Model ◽  
Securities And Exchange Commission ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Rating Agencies ◽  
Credit Rating Agency ◽  
Rating Agency

ABSTRACT: Regulators and the financial press have criticized credit rating agencies (CRAs) for exacerbating the financial crisis by providing overly optimistic debt ratings. Allegedly, CRAs departed from their quantitative models in order to please security issuers with higher credit ratings. In response, the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 required the Securities and Exchange Commission to conduct a study on alternative models for compensating CRAs. We conduct an experiment exploring how the credit ratings of M.B.A. students, who assume the role of credit rating analysts, are affected by two proposals for reform: (1) changing who pays the CRAs, and (2) requiring analysts to justify departures from a quantitative model. We find that credit ratings are highest when the borrower pays CRAs for ratings and a justification requirement is not in place. Implementing either proposed reform independently reduces credit ratings, but credit ratings are not further reduced when both reforms are implemented together. Data Availability: Data are available from the authors upon request.

Part II The Financial Crisis of 2007–2011, 6 Market and Regulatory Failure

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mccormick Roger ◽  
Stears Chris
Keyword(s):  
Risk Management ◽  
Financial Crisis ◽  
Credit Risk ◽  
Financial Market ◽  
Credit Rating ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Credit Rating Agencies ◽  
Rating Agencies ◽  
Market Participants ◽  
Regulatory Failure

This chapter first discusses the origins of the financial crisis, highlighting practice of ‘packaging and selling’ credit risk by financial market participants that led up to the crisis. It argues that although, in retrospect, many aspects of that practice look very bad indeed, the idea that banks might originate a credit exposure and then transfer the credit risk attached to it to a third party was, before the financial crisis, considered to be part and parcel of sound risk management. The discussion then turns to credit-rating agencies. Analysis of the financial crisis and ‘what went wrong’ has shown that rating agencies were too generous with their rating of many of the structured products that contributed to the collapse.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document