Reforming the Regulatory Treatment of Sovereign Exposures in Banking Regulation

2020 ◽  
Vol 53 (1) ◽  
pp. 81-122
Author(s):  
André Sterzel
Keyword(s):  
Financial Stability ◽  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
Debt Crisis ◽  
Banking Regulation ◽  
Jel Classification ◽  
Bank Capital ◽  
Exposure Limits ◽  
Government Bonds ◽  
Balance Sheets ◽  
Bank Balance Sheets

Abstract The European sovereign debt crisis has shown the tight linkage between sovereign and bank balance sheets. In the aftermath of the crisis, several reforms have been discussed in order to mitigate the sovereign-bank nexus. These reforms include the abolishment of preferential government bond treatment in banking regulation. This paper gives a detailed overview of literature and data which are closely related to the existing preferential sovereign bond treatment in bank regulation and highlights the need for reforms especially in the euro area. Against this background, the following three regulatory reforms are described and discussed: (i) positive risk weights for government bonds in bank capital regulation, (ii) sovereign exposure limits, and (iii) haircuts for government bonds in bank liquidity regulation. The discussion focusses on the effects of these reforms for bank behaviour and financial stability. JEL Classification: H63, H12, G11, G18

scholarly journals Financial and Banking Regulation and Supervision within the EU

2013 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 17-37
Author(s):  
Constanze Lehleiter
Keyword(s):  
Financial Stability ◽  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
Debt Crisis ◽  
Banking Regulation ◽  
Capital Requirements ◽  
Green Paper ◽  
Shadow Banking ◽  
The European Union ◽  
European Banking ◽  
The Eu

AbstractThe European Union (EU) has faced not only the international financial crisis, but also the European banking and the sovereign debt crisis. A lack of efficient regulations and supervision were a serious cause of recent developments. As a reaction, the EU finally implemented a framework covering both micro- and macro-prudential policies. Measures such as the new capital requirements, the deposit guarantee schemes, the green paper on shadow banking and, most importantly, the new approach for a macro-prudential supervision are headed towards crisis prevention. However, the challenge is to define regulations enhancing financial stability, which, at the same time, do not prevent institutions from generating reasonable financial risks and do not reduce growth. In that regard, the presented measures still have deficits which have to be faced. Furthermore, coordination between various authorities and the European Commission remains another challenge.

scholarly journals Law Meets Economics in the German Federal Constitutional Court: Outright Monetary Transactions on Trial

2014 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 281-320 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carsten Gerner-Beuerle ◽  
Esin Küçük ◽  
Edmund Schuster
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Financial Stability ◽  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
Debt Crisis ◽  
Active Role ◽  
Secondary Market ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Member States ◽  
Government Bonds ◽  
Federal Constitutional

The Eurozone banking and sovereign debt crisis has brought the fragility of the European monetary union into sharp focus and exposed the lack of effective instruments at the European level to maintain financial stability. As a response to the crisis, the Member States and the institutions of the Union adopted in short succession several financial assistance measures that have given rise to much political and legal controversy. The European Central Bank (ECB) played an active role in the institutions' efforts to contain the crisis and prevent the disintegration of the Eurozone by deploying a number of so-called non-standard or unconventional monetary policy measures, namely its Securities Markets Programme, Long-Term Refinancing Operations, and in September 2012 the Outright Monetary Transactions Programme (OMT Programme). The OMT Decision envisages unlimited purchases by the ECB of specific types of sovereign bonds issued by Member States participating in an EFSF/ESM macroeconomic adjustment or precautionary program in the secondary market. Without the program having been activated, i.e. without the ECB actually implementing the decision and without any purchases of government bonds, yields on bonds of the affected Eurozone countries decreased markedly after the announcement of the OMT Decision. The OMT Programme has accordingly been credited with having been instrumental in restoring financial stability and preventing a breakup of the Euro area and with being one of the most effective announcements any central bank has ever made.

Greek Debt Restructuring Case

2021 ◽  
Vol 195 ◽  
pp. 227-238
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Financial Stability ◽  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
Debt Crisis ◽  
Secondary Market ◽  
Federal Republic Of Germany ◽  
Debt Restructuring ◽  
Content Type ◽  
State Immunity ◽  
Basic Law

227State immunity — Jurisdictional immunity — Exceptions — Acta jure gestionis — Acta jure imperii — Once a trader always a trader — State of emergency — Law-making — Legislature regulating legal relations initially established by acta jure gestionis qualifying as acta jure imperiiEconomics, trade and finance — European Monetary Union — Hellenic Republic — Public debt — Bonds — Greek sovereign debt crisis — Sovereign debt restructuring — Collective Action Clauses — Secondary market — Bond exchange — Financial stabilityRelationship of international law and municipal law — Compatibility with Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany — General principle of international law — Article 25 of German Basic Law — Right to a lawful judge — The law of Germany

Endogenous money

2019 ◽  
pp. 124-148
Author(s):  
Kazimierz Łaski
Keyword(s):  
Economic Recession ◽  
Limited Resource ◽  
Financial Assets ◽  
Lender Of Last Resort ◽  
Government Bonds ◽  
Balance Sheets ◽  
Money Economy ◽  
Production And Distribution ◽  
Endogenous Money ◽  
Bank Balance Sheets

The capitalist economy is a money economy. But how is money created and destroyed? Is it exogenous, a limited resource like gold, or is it endogenous, emerging from processes of production and distribution? How is credit generated and what is the relationship between credit and savings? One form of endogeneity arises from bank balance sheets and the theory of the monetary circuit. This reveals the credit relations between households and firms. However, banks also need a central bank as a lender of last resort. In recent years, central banks have deployed quantitative easing to deal with economic recession. The other form of endogeneity arises from the “verticalist” and the “horizontalist” analyses of the market for base money, whose demand and supply is brought into equilibrium by the money rate of interest. Government bonds are used in portfolios as risk-free financial assets.

scholarly journals Bank Networks and Systemic Risk: Evidence from the National Banking Acts

2019 ◽  
Vol 109 (9) ◽  
pp. 3125-3161 ◽  
Author(s):  
Haelim Anderson ◽  
Mark Paddrik ◽  
Jessie Jiaxu Wang
Keyword(s):  
Network Model ◽  
Network Structure ◽  
Systemic Risk ◽  
Financial Stability ◽  
Balance Sheets ◽  
Unique Data ◽  
Financial Center ◽  
Bank Balance Sheets ◽  
The City ◽  
Systemically Important Banks

The National Banking Acts (NBAs) of 1863–1864 established rules governing the amounts and locations of interbank deposits, thereby reshaping the bank networks. Using unique data on bank balance sheets and detailed interbank deposits in 1862 and 1867 in Pennsylvania, we study how the NBAs changed the network structure and quantify the effect on financial stability in an interbank network model. We find that the NBAs induced a concentration of interbank deposits at both the city and bank levels, creating systemically important banks. Although the concentration facilitated diversification, contagion would have become more likely when financial center banks faced large shocks. (JEL E44, G01, G21, G28, L14, N21)

Towards a full harmonization of the European banking regulation: Dilemmas in a legal discourse between regulation and enforcement

2019 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 190-216
Author(s):  
Matteo De Poli ◽  
Pierre de Gioia Carabellese
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
Banking Sector ◽  
Debt Crisis ◽  
Banking Regulation ◽  
Main Theme ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Single Supervisory Mechanism ◽  
Legal Literature ◽  
European Banking

With the birth of the Single Supervisory Mechanism came the emergence of a new regime of supervision of the banking industry in the Eurozone. The allocation of enforcement powers between the European Central Bank and the National Competent Authorities is the corollary of the unified supervision, which reverberates from the Single Supervisory Mechanism, and it is ultimately the main theme of this contribution. More specifically, the architecture of the enforcement, principally shaped by the SSM and its principles and rules, is assessed and analysed in this paper against the background of the general theory of enforcement, as developed in the legal literature. The enforcement discourse in the European Union banking sector is debated alongside its interaction with the related aspects of the regulation and supervision and the way these three notions have been integrated and codified in the European Union after the 2011 sovereign debt crisis.

Regulatory response to the financial crisis in Europe: recent developments (2010-2013)

2015 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-50 ◽  
Author(s):  
Santiago Carbó-Valverde ◽  
Harald A. Benink ◽  
Tom Berglund ◽  
Clas Wihlborg
Keyword(s):  
Financial Crisis ◽  
Financial Stability ◽  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
Financial Regulation ◽  
Ad Hoc ◽  
Debt Crisis ◽  
Banking Union ◽  
Content Type ◽  
European Banking Union ◽  
Wide Range

Purpose – The purpose of this paper by the European Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee (ESFRC) is to provide an account of the financial crisis in Europe during the period 2010-2013 and an analysis of how the relevant authorities reacted to the crisis. Design/methodology/approach – These actions included measures taken by central banks, governments or fiscal authorities, and by regulatory or supervisory bodies. In a previous study covering the regulatory developments during the financial crisis up until 2009, issues such as the implementation of Basel III rules in Europe and the (mostly ad hoc and unilateral) resolution mechanisms set in most European countries to fight the crisis were covered. This study focuses on developments since 2010 with a focus on the concerns and actions that emerged with the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area. In particular, the transition from the European Financial Stability Facility to the European Stability Mechanism is assessed. The focus after 2012 has progressively turned to the challenges of the European banking union. Findings – These issues are jointly covered, along with some updates on the views of the ESFRC on recent advances in other areas, such as solvency regulation. All in all, the authors find that the weaknesses of the global financial system remain to be addressed, and they believe that the banking union is one of the main tools and opportunities for an improved and efficient crisis management in Europe. Originality/value – The paper aims at contributing to the study of financial regulation after the banking crisis. The experience of the euro zone in this context is assessed in this article from a wide range of perspectives.

The Independence of the European Central Bank

2019 ◽  
Vol 52 (1) ◽  
pp. 35-68
Author(s):  
Ulrike Neyer
Keyword(s):  
Public Sector ◽  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
Debt Crisis ◽  
Jel Classification ◽  
Democratic Deficit ◽  
Sovereign Debt Crisis ◽  
Single Supervisory Mechanism ◽  
The Public ◽  
European Central ◽  
New Instruments

Abstract The ECB is formally independent of instructions from any government. During and after the financial crisis and the acute sovereign debt crisis in the euro area, the ECB has used new instruments and has taken on new tasks and responsibilities. This has led to discussions about the independence of the ECB. Against this background, this paper discusses two questions. First, do the new instruments and tasks imply that the independence of the ECB is under threat? Second, is the use of the instruments and the taking on of the new tasks and responsibilities by an independent institution justified in a democracy or is there a relevant democratic deficit? With respect to these two questions the result of this paper is that especially the Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP) and the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) have to be judged critically. Zusammenfassung Die EZB ist formal unabhängig von Weisungen der Regierungen. Während und nach der Finanzkrise und der akuten Staatsschuldenkrise im Euroraum hat die EZB neue Instrumente eingesetzt und neue Aufgaben und Verantwortlichkeiten übernommen, die zu Diskussionen über die Unabhängigkeit der EZB geführt haben. Vor diesem Hintergrund diskutiert diese Arbeit zwei Fragen. Erstens, stellen die neuen Instrumente und Aufgaben der EZB eine Gefahr für ihre Unabhängigkeit dar? Zweitens, ist der Einsatz der neuen Instrumente und die Übernahme der neuen Aufgaben von einer unabhängigen Institu­tion in einer Demokratie zu rechtfertigen, oder besteht ein relevantes Demokratiedefizit? Bezüglich dieser beiden Fragen kommt die Arbeit zu dem Ergebnis, dass insbesondere das Programm zum Ankauf von Anleihen des öffentlichen Sektors (Public Sector Purchase Programme, PSPP) und die von der EZB übernommene Bankenaufsicht (Single Supervisory Mechanism, SSM) kritisch zu beurteilen sind. JEL Classification: E42; E52; E58

Paper Money

2013 ◽  
Vol 103 (2) ◽  
pp. 563-584 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher A Sims
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Fiscal Policy ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
Price Level ◽  
Balance Sheets ◽  
Policy Interactions ◽  
Paper Money ◽  
Bank Balance Sheets

Drastic changes in central bank operations and monetary institutions in recent years have made previously standard approaches to explaining the determination of the price level obsolete. Recent expansions of central bank balance sheets and of the levels of richcountry sovereign debt, as well as the evolving political economy of the European Monetary Union, have made it clear that fiscal policy and monetary policy are intertwined. Our thinking and teaching about inflation, monetary policy, and fiscal policy should be based on models that recognize fiscal-monetary policy interactions. (JEL E31, E52, E58, E62, H63)

scholarly journals The eurozone target-system from the perspective of Portugal

2018 ◽  
Vol 68 (3) ◽  
pp. 353-376 ◽  
Author(s):  
Raquel R. da Costa ◽  
Sérgio Lagoa
Keyword(s):  
Financial Stability ◽  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
Fixed Effects ◽  
Debt Crisis ◽  
Country Risk ◽  
Target System ◽  
Explanatory Variables ◽  
Treasury Bond ◽  
European Banking ◽  
High Level

Payment systems make a significant contribution to the flow of transactions and financial stability. In this paper, we start by applying the principles of the gravity model to explain the TARGET flows of banking transactions between Portugal and other eurozone countries. The main explanatory variables tested are a composite indicator of economic and financial activities, distance, membership of the Eurozone (EZ), and country risk measured by treasury bond yields. The results indicate that Portugal has a high level of integration in the European banking market as distance is not statistically significant, and that the membership of the EZ facilitates the financing of the economy. The economic size of the partner country becomes non-significant after controlling for country fixed effects. The increase in the Portuguese country risk during the European sovereign debt crisis led to a marked decline in external financing, indicating that this is an important channel of transmission of crises.

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