The Independence of the European Central Bank

2019 ◽  
Vol 52 (1) ◽  
pp. 35-68
Author(s):  
Ulrike Neyer
Keyword(s):  
Public Sector ◽  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
Debt Crisis ◽  
Jel Classification ◽  
Democratic Deficit ◽  
Sovereign Debt Crisis ◽  
Single Supervisory Mechanism ◽  
The Public ◽  
European Central ◽  
New Instruments

Abstract The ECB is formally independent of instructions from any government. During and after the financial crisis and the acute sovereign debt crisis in the euro area, the ECB has used new instruments and has taken on new tasks and responsibilities. This has led to discussions about the independence of the ECB. Against this background, this paper discusses two questions. First, do the new instruments and tasks imply that the independence of the ECB is under threat? Second, is the use of the instruments and the taking on of the new tasks and responsibilities by an independent institution justified in a democracy or is there a relevant democratic deficit? With respect to these two questions the result of this paper is that especially the Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP) and the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) have to be judged critically. Zusammenfassung Die EZB ist formal unabhängig von Weisungen der Regierungen. Während und nach der Finanzkrise und der akuten Staatsschuldenkrise im Euroraum hat die EZB neue Instrumente eingesetzt und neue Aufgaben und Verantwortlichkeiten übernommen, die zu Diskussionen über die Unabhängigkeit der EZB geführt haben. Vor diesem Hintergrund diskutiert diese Arbeit zwei Fragen. Erstens, stellen die neuen Instrumente und Aufgaben der EZB eine Gefahr für ihre Unabhängigkeit dar? Zweitens, ist der Einsatz der neuen Instrumente und die Übernahme der neuen Aufgaben von einer unabhängigen Institu­tion in einer Demokratie zu rechtfertigen, oder besteht ein relevantes Demokratiedefizit? Bezüglich dieser beiden Fragen kommt die Arbeit zu dem Ergebnis, dass insbesondere das Programm zum Ankauf von Anleihen des öffentlichen Sektors (Public Sector Purchase Programme, PSPP) und die von der EZB übernommene Bankenaufsicht (Single Supervisory Mechanism, SSM) kritisch zu beurteilen sind. JEL Classification: E42; E52; E58

scholarly journals Sovereign debt crisis of the Eurozone countries

2016 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 357 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sławomir Miklaszewicz
Keyword(s):  
Euro Area ◽  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
Final Section ◽  
Debt Crisis ◽  
Sovereign Debt Crisis ◽  
Negative Consequences ◽  
The Public ◽  
Euro Zone ◽  
European Central ◽  
Coordination Process

The aim of the publication is to examine the fiscal position of the euro area countries and fiscal policy architecture in Europe after the outbreak of the financial and economic crisis started in 2008. The first part of the publication consists of the analyses of the budgetary situation of euro area countries and complications with the increasing costs of servicing the public debt in the European market affected by the financial liquidity crisis. In the second section the most important changes in the framework of budgetary policies coordination process in the euro zone are presented. The final section describes the role and activities of the European Central Bank in minimising the negative consequences of the debt crisis in the euro zone.

Part II Bank Resolution, 9 European Bank Resolution Regime

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Olivares-Caminal Rodrigo ◽  
Douglas John ◽  
Guynn Randall ◽  
Kornberg Alan ◽  
Paterson Sarah ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Financial Institutions ◽  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
Debt Crisis ◽  
Sovereign Debt Crisis ◽  
Technical Standards ◽  
Single Supervisory Mechanism ◽  
Single Resolution Mechanism ◽  
Bank Resolution ◽  
European Banking ◽  
New Framework

This chapter considers the response to the European banking and sovereign debt crisis, which resulted in the introduction of the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD). It also considers the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and a Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) which will be implemented to facilitate the supervision and resolution of certain financial institutions in the Eurozone. The chapter looks at the consequences of these reform measures and explains the salient features of the new framework of supervisory and resolution intervention. It also looks separately at the EBA technical standards and guidance where necessary to assist the interpretation of the provisions in the directive.

The crisis in Greece and the EU-IMF rescue package: Determinants and pitfalls

2012 ◽  
Vol 62 (1) ◽  
pp. 15-39 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna Visvizi
Keyword(s):  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
Debt Crisis ◽  
Free Market ◽  
Interesting Case ◽  
Sovereign Debt Crisis ◽  
Missed Opportunities ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Government ◽  
Free Market Reforms ◽  
The Eu

The sovereign debt crisis in Greece represents a very interesting case in which the Greek government succeeded in transforming domestic fiscal deficit problem, overspending and fear of free market reforms into a European challenge consistent with justifiable concerns about the sustainability of the euro-project and its likely future. In this paper, the roots of the crisis and the way of addressing it are discussed. In particular the features, drawbacks, missed opportunities and pitfalls of the €110 billion EU/IMF rescue package granted to Greece are examined. It is argued that the government’s focus on taxation rather than on politically costly privatization and cutbacks in the public sector undermined economic activity in the country, decreased the government’s revenue, and spawned disincentives for investment, without generating growth and without improving competitiveness. In brief, rather than contributing to economic recovery, the opposite was achieved as a result of the measures implemented by the government.

scholarly journals The Double Democratic Deficit

2020 ◽  
pp. 75-109
Author(s):  
Bettina De Souza Guilherme
Keyword(s):  
Financial Crisis ◽  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
Debt Crisis ◽  
Maastricht Treaty ◽  
Democratic Deficit ◽  
Paradigm Change ◽  
Democratic Accountability ◽  
Sovereign Debt Crisis ◽  
Underlying Causes ◽  
The Eu

AbstractThis chapter will sketch how the EU has reacted to the financial crisis and in particular to the unfolding sovereign debt crisis, revealing major flaws in EMU’s architecture. It will not only address these design flaws but attempt to evaluate the underlying causes, reasons and motives of the architects and decision takers by comparing the more “federalist” Werner Plan with the more “intergovernmental” blueprint of the EMU of the Maastricht Treaty, connect it with the paradigm change on economic governance discussed by Schulmeister in Chap. 10.1007/978-3-030-54895-7_2 and show the consequences for the crisis and its management in terms of efficiency, equity and democratic accountability.

scholarly journals Some aspects concerning the economics of sovereign debt and possible influences of the COVID-19 pandemic

2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 17-29
Author(s):  
Liviu-Daniel Deceanu ◽  
Gabriela Bodea
Keyword(s):  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
Debt Crisis ◽  
Sovereign Default ◽  
Sovereign Debt Crisis ◽  
Negative Effects ◽  
Economic Agents ◽  
The Public ◽  
Rigorous Approach ◽  
Debt Default ◽  
Do So

In the last 10 years, the sovereign debt crisis and its effects have made certain concepts, reserved until then only to specialists, to become elements of current language – public debt, sovereign debt, default, over-indebtedness, structural deficit, monetary policy, indebtedness ratios, sovereign debt effects, IMF intervention, willingness to pay… The indebtedness and over-indebtedness generated negative effects that affected not only the public finances, but also the economic agents (businesses) and the population, fueled by the lack of vision and responsibility of some governors. After the global economic crisis of 2008 and that of sovereign debt after 2010, a better control of indebtedness was tried, a more rigorous approach was implemented, but the Coronavirus pandemic that manifested itself in 2020 (and continues to do so) brought back to the forefront the problem of sovereign indebtedness and sovereign default.

World Overview

2011 ◽  
Vol 218 ◽  
pp. F13-F21
Author(s):  
Dawn Holland ◽  
Aurélie Delannoy ◽  
Tatiana Fic ◽  
Ian Hurst ◽  
Iana Liadze ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
World Economy ◽  
Debt Crisis ◽  
Sovereign Debt Crisis ◽  
European Central ◽  
Widespread Agreement ◽  
The World ◽  
Heads Of State ◽  
Bail Out

Global economic prospects have deteriorated markedly in recent months. Risks around our central forecast have shifted distinctly to the downside. Much of this is due to the heightened uncertainty surrounding Europe's sovereign debt crisis. There is widespread agreement among policymakers - ranging from the IMF, European Commission and European Central Bank to individual heads of state both within and outside the Euro Area - that resolution to the crisis requires urgent, comprehensive and coordinated action. Yet 17 months after the first bail-out programme was introduced in Greece, policymakers have failed to deliver a strategy that promises a credible prospect of growth and an end to rising debt profiles. Solvency concerns in three relatively small peripheral countries (Greece, Ireland and Portugal), combined with weakening growth across the continent, raise the dangerous spectre of illiquidity beginning to affect solvency in the larger core economies with high debt ratios - notably Italy. Left unchecked, the consequences would be severe for the world economy.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document