The Development and Fragmentation of Kuwait's al-Jama'a al-Salafiyya: Purity over Pragmatism

2020 ◽  
Vol 74 (1) ◽  
pp. 9-29
Author(s):  
Zoltan Pall

This article argues that the pragmatism displayed by Salafi politicians after the 2011 Arab uprisings might not apply to the larger networks of the movement. Such pragmatism contributed to organizational dysfunction in Kuwait's largest Salafi group, al-Jama'a al-Salafiyya. The ideological foundations of the group stood at odds with its extensive institutional structures, impeding it from functioning effectively. To explain this, the article draws on a comparison with the Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait, whose ideology and disciplinary practices facilitated the establishment of tight-knit, highly efficient organizations.

2015 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 379-397 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jennifer Wilmot

Prior to the 2011 Arab uprisings, Islamist parties in most Arab states had been systematically prevented from exercising any meaningful authority in government. Following President Hosni Mubarak's ousting from power in 2011, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (MB) established a political party – the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) – and formally entered mainstream politics, providing a rare opportunity to examine the role of an Islamist party in the context of democratic transition. Contrary to concerns that the MB might use Egypt's political opening to install an undemocratic regime, the movement instead committed itself to electoral politics and consistently adhered to the framework for political transition. An analysis of the MB's political trajectory during the 2011–13 timeframe reveals that the movement endeavoured to protect Egypt's democratic transition against the encroachment of the military and the judiciary. Despite the FJP's efforts, sustained interference by non-elected institutions brought Egypt's democratic experiment to a premature end. This course of events confirms that an Islamist movement is capable of fully committing to politics, but also indicates that political commitment alone is insufficient to ensure a successful transition to democratic governance.


2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Hossein Aghaie Joobani ◽  
Umut Can Adısönmez

Throughout its Republican history, Turkey has attempted to formulate a “non-interventionist” foreign policy toward its neighbouring countries. Since the onset of the Arab Uprisings, however, the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) has abjured the traditional policy of “non-military engagement”, adopting instead an assertive and security-oriented foreign policy that has paved the way for the securitization of the Syrian conflict in terms of its Kurdish component and of wider geopolitical aspects. This article aims to explore why and in what ways this abrupt shift toward securitization has occurred while discussing its broader implications on Turkish domestic politics as well. Using the Copenhagen School’s securitization theory, the article will unpack and analyse the internal and external dimensions of threat construction and otherization processes underlying Ankara’s securitization policy toward Syria to make the case for the obsolescence of Turkey’s traditional non-interventionist policy, which, we argue, results from an ontological insecurity approach toward the Syrian conflict. The article finds that Turkey’s securitization policy (i.e. interventionist approach) was chiefly driven by the fear of Kurdish autonomy and the growing Russo-Assad-Iranian alliance in Syria; and by the grand ambition of bringing the Muslim Brotherhood into power in Syria and consolidating Turkey’s agential importance in Western security architecture under the aegis of the US.  


Author(s):  
Marina Calculli ◽  
Matteo Legrenzi

This chapter examines the Middle East’s security dilemmas by reconsidering the balance of power and threats in light of the Arab Spring. Although external actors are still important, as is regime security, in this balance, an important feature of the current scene is the ‘securitization of identities’ whereby rival regimes mobilize different identities to preserve and consolidate their positions against the destabilizing effects of change. The chapter also explores the emergence of a region-based rivalry between monarchies and republics and how they were affected by the Arab uprisings; the strategic competition between Sunni and Shia Islam; and the impact of the ‘Shia crescent’ from 2003 to the aftermath of the 2011 uprisings. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the ways that competition among rival Sunni regimes in the aftermath of the 2011 uprisings has been ideologically shaped in terms of support for/opposition to the Muslim Brotherhood.


Islamology ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 87
Author(s):  
Sara Tonsy

The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in Egypt has been known for being one of the most resilient Islamist organizations worldwide during most of the twentieth century, and until 2013. The Arab uprisings that swept over the Arab region resulted in the resurrection of the MB’s discourse changed drastically over the period of the organization’s existence and even further during the few years from 2011 until today. How did the discourse established by the MB develop and transform towards becoming a normalized version of Islam in Egypt? How could this be traced in the recent events the MB witnessed in Egypt, starting in 2011? Applying P. Bourdieu’s concept of symbolic power and O. Roy’s idea about post-Islamism this article will address these questions using field work and relevant literature.


2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 149-165
Author(s):  
Marwan M. Kraidy

Abstract In the 2000s, Turkish-Arab relations warmed up, and the rising popularity of Turkish television dramas in the Arab world was part of an overall ‘zero-problem with neighbors’ realignment initiated by Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development party (AKP). However, Turkey’s involvement in the Arab uprisings complicated this rapprochement. The Turkish government, given their doctrinal proximity, supported the Muslim Brotherhood governments that were elected in Tunisia and Egypt, and then entered the fray of the Syrian uprising against the regime of Bashar al-Assad. After the Egyptian military deposed the elected president and Muslim Brotherhood leader Muhammad Morsi in a June 2013 coup, Egypt-Turkish relations deteriorated, as manifest in the Egyptian media industry boycott of Turkish television dramas. In this paper, by examining Arabic-language, mostly Egyptian primary sources, I analyze the geopolitical, economic and media dimensions of the Egyptian boycott of Turkish productions from Egypt’s perspective, and cast a new light on state-media relations in the Arab world and the interaction between media industries and shifting geopolitics.


Author(s):  
Frederic Wehrey ◽  
Anouar Boukhars

The countries of the Maghreb—Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya—have witnessed a broad spectrum of transformations and challenges since the Arab uprisings of 2011. Among these has been a dramatic shift in state-society relations; economic challenges; fragmentation, mobilization, and contestation from varying population segments; and an opening of social and political space to Islamists. While much scholarly attention has been focused on Islamists linked to the Muslim Brotherhood and to jihadists like al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, the broader movement of the literalist and austere variant of Islam known as Salafism remains understudied. This volume aims to correct this gap by situating Salafism, in all of its expressions, within the national contexts of the Maghreb.


Subject Mapping the Muslim Brotherhood. Significance Doha’s support, whether tacit or active, for Islamist groups in the Middle East, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood, alienated it from some Arab neighbours. The recent boycott by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Egypt is party driven by their own problems with local Brotherhood affiliates that were linked to the broader political reform movement during the 2011 Arab uprisings. Impacts Brotherhood affiliates will be significant military players in conflict-torn Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Yemen. In parliamentary systems, cooperation with secular opposition will be increasingly important to countering international terrorism charges. The Muslim Brotherhood’s transnational links will become more personal and less institutional.


2014 ◽  
Vol 4 ◽  
Author(s):  
David H. Warren

This article aims to explore emerging trends for the Sunni religious elite and the Islamic legal tradition in the new context of the Arab Uprisings by focusing on Yusuf al-Qaradawi, arguably the most prominent of these ʿulamāʾ alive today. The article will follow al-Qaradawi’s articulation, transmission and reconstruction of the Islamic legal tradition in his own discourse as he has attempted to negotiate the politically fraught contexts of the Arab Uprisings while also maintaining his horizontal commitments to a diverse base of supporters be they the wider Arab Muslim public, the Muslim Brotherhood or indeed the Qatari royal family. The article will focus on al-Qaradawi’s highly publicised interventions and fatwas in relation to Egypt, Libya, Bahrain, and Syria from the perspective of Islamic studies, and also draw on personal interviews with al-Qaradawi, his personal staff, as well as supplementary media. In so doing, the article will elucidate al-Qaradawi and his colleagues’ attempts, ranging from the highly creative to the markedly conservative, to respond to unfolding events through the legal tradition and play an increasingly active role in the public sphere while their own status simultaneously becomes ever more vulnerable and unstable. 


2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 83-103
Author(s):  
Mai Mogib Mosad

This paper maps the basic opposition groups that influenced the Egyptian political system in the last years of Hosni Mubarak’s rule. It approaches the nature of the relationship between the system and the opposition through use of the concept of “semi-opposition.” An examination and evaluation of the opposition groups shows the extent to which the regime—in order to appear that it was opening the public sphere to the opposition—had channels of communication with the Muslim Brotherhood. The paper also shows the system’s relations with other groups, such as “Kifaya” and “April 6”; it then explains the reasons behind the success of the Muslim Brotherhood at seizing power after the ousting of President Mubarak.


Author(s):  
Kira D. Jumet

This chapter outlines the individual grievances arising from political, economic, social, and religious conditions under the government of Mohamed Morsi that became the foundations of opposition to his rule. It focuses on democracy in Egypt, the 2012 presidential elections, and the expectations and promises put forth by Morsi. The chapter also covers popular perceptions of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Freedom and Justice Party, grievances surrounding electricity and gas, security and sexual harassment, Morsi’s speeches and representation of Egypt on the international stage, and Morsi’s political appointments. The chapter relies on interview data and fieldwork conducted in Egypt during the year of Morsi’s presidency.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document