scholarly journals Possible Reliance: Protecting Legally Innocent Johnson Claimants

2020 ◽  
pp. 425
Author(s):  
Keagan Potts
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Death Penalty ◽  
Subject Matter ◽  
Burden Of Proof ◽  
Federal Courts ◽  
Courts Of Appeals ◽  
Habeas Corpus ◽  
Career Criminal ◽  
Criminal Conduct

The writ of habeas corpus presents the last chance for innocent defendants to obtain relief from invalid convictions and sentences. The writ constitutes a limited exception to the finality of judgments. Given the role finality plays in conserving judicial resources and deterring criminal conduct, exceptions created by habeas must be principally circumscribed. Since the Supreme Court’s invalidation of the Armed Career Criminal Act’s residual clause in Johnson v. United States, the federal courts of appeals have attempted to develop a test that protects the writ from abuse by Johnson claimants. This Note first contributes a new understanding of the resulting circuit split. Currently, circuits construe the split to be about a Johnson petitioner’s burden of proof at the jurisdictional stage. However, circuits actually disagree on the standard a petitioner must meet to establish the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. This Note identifies two standards. The sole-reliance standard requires petitioners to show that the sentencing court relied solely on the residual clause, while the possible-reliance standard requires petitioners to show that the court may have relied on the residual clause. Both standards must be shown by a preponderance of the evidence. This Note then deploys this reconceptualization of the circuit split to advance new arguments in favor of imposing the possible-reliance standard at the jurisdictional stage. The possible-reliance standard protects the innocent, preserves the finality of judgments, and conforms with Supreme Court habeas jurisprudence and congressional intent expressed in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act.

State-Created Liberty Interest in Prisons: What the Court Giveth, The Court also Taketh Away

1996 ◽  
Vol 76 (3) ◽  
pp. 348-372
Author(s):  
ROLANDO V. DEL CARMEN ◽  
KATHERINE BENNETT ◽  
JEFFREY D. DAILEY
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Due Process ◽  
United States Supreme Court ◽  
Supreme Court Decision ◽  
Federal Courts ◽  
Court Decision ◽  
Courts Of Appeals ◽  
United States Supreme ◽  
State Law

The concept of state-created liberty interest has been a part of postconviction jurisprudence for more than 2 decades. When agencies limit their actions through state law, agency rules, or self-imposed regulations, those limitations must be observed; invoking due process where none otherwise constitutionally exists. The article looks at a 1995 United States Supreme Court decision that has had a significant impact on this concept. Sandin v. Conner rejects the “language used” approach to determine whether a state-created liberty interest exists, in favor of the “nature of the deprivation.” This article examines the evolution of state-created liberty interest, what the Court said in Sandin v. Conner, how federal courts of appeals have thus far interpreted Sandin, the problems it has created, and the unresolved issues that have yet to be addressed. It concludes that although due process in prisons is far from dead, Sandin has certainly diminished it.

scholarly journals What Is "New"?: Defining "New Judgement" After Magwood

2019 ◽  
pp. 1669
Author(s):  
Patrick Cothern
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Death Penalty ◽  
The United States ◽  
The State ◽  
Habeas Corpus ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
History Of

Habeas corpus petitioners must navigate the procedural barriers of the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) before courts consider their petitions on the merits. Among the barriers imposed is a general prohibition on “second or successive” habeas petitions, meaning a petitioner who previously filed a habeas petition may not bring another, with limited exceptions. One such exception, recognized by the Supreme Court in Magwood v. Patterson, allows for a second habeas petition after the petitioner obtains a “new judgment.” Magwood and AEDPA, however, left the term “new judgment” undefined. This Note summarizes the history of habeas corpus in the United States, the passage of AEDPA, and the Magwood decision. It contends that the interpretation of “new judgment” adopted by some circuits is impermissibly restrictive of the implied right to petition for habeas relief. Thus, it proposes a simplified interpretation: any judicial change to the original judgment renders a “new judgment,” achieving a better balance between the interests of the petitioner and the state.

United States Supreme Court Rules on Expert Testimony

PEDIATRICS ◽  
1995 ◽  
Vol 95 (6) ◽  
pp. 934-936 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gary N. McAbee
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Expert Testimony ◽  
Scientific Evidence ◽  
United States Supreme Court ◽  
The United States ◽  
Federal Courts ◽  
State Courts ◽  
Expert Witnesses ◽  
Us Supreme Court

Many medical and legal commentators have expressed concern about the validity of scientific evidence that is proffered by expert witnesses at depositions and in courts of law.1,2 The sparse research that is available on the testimony of medical expert witnesses suggests that it is frequently flawed and erroneous.3 On June 28, 1993, the United States (US) Supreme Court ruled on the proper standard for admissibility of scientific evidence in the courtroom.4 Although the ruling establishes guidelines that are binding only in federal courts, it is expected that many state courts will follow the Court's ruling. This commentary reviews the Court's guidelines for admissibility of expert testimony, and expresses concern about their applicability in future cases involving scientific testimony.

scholarly journals U.S. Supreme Court Denies Certiorari in Habeas Case Brought by Guantánamo Bay Detainee Challenging His Continuing Detention

2019 ◽  
Vol 113 (4) ◽  
pp. 849-855
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
The United States ◽  
September 11 ◽  
Habeas Corpus ◽  
Past Time ◽  
Guantanamo Bay ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
September 11 Attacks ◽  
The U.S

On June 10, 2019, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in a case in which the D.C. Circuit held that the United States could continue to detain an individual at Guantánamo Bay until the cessation of the hostilities that justified his initial detention, notwithstanding the extraordinary length of the hostilities to date. The case, Al-Alwi v. Trump, arises from petitioner Moath Hamza Ahmed Al-Alwi's petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the legality of his continued detention at the United States Naval Base at Guantánamo Bay. The Supreme Court's denial of certiorari was accompanied by a statement by Justice Breyer observing that “it is past time to confront the difficult question” of how long a detention grounded in the U.S. response to the September 11 attacks can be justified.

United States Courts

1966 ◽  
Vol 60 (2) ◽  
pp. 400-411
Author(s):  
John R. Stevenson
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Subject Matter ◽  
District Court ◽  
Habeas Corpus ◽  
International Treaties ◽  
The Subject

Wacker V. Bisson. 348 P. 2d 602. U.S. Ct. App., 5th Cir., June 23,1965. The appellant, J. Samuel Wacker, awaiting extradition to Canada, brings this off-beat declaratory judgment action attacking the validity of an unappealable extradition order. Since Wacker is in custody, he might just as well have cast the action in the form of an application for habeas corpus. Wacker, however, has twice tried that approach without success. In the complaint and on appeal, the plaintiff advances on all fronts, attacking the constitutionality of numerous international treaties anil conventions, challenging the extradition statute (as written and as applied), and making other contentions based on all possible, and some impossible, reasons for the invalidity of the extradition. Wacker names as defendant the Consul General of Canada, the demanding state. The District Court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the person of the defendant. We reverse and remand, taking the view that the District Court has jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §2201 ff., to review collaterally the validity of the extradition proceeding.

scholarly journals An Argument for the Admissibility of Execution Impact Evidence in Pennsylvania

2005 ◽  
Vol 67 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Paige H. Forster
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Death Penalty ◽  
United States Supreme Court ◽  
The United States ◽  
United States Supreme ◽  
Capital Trials ◽  
Eighth Amendment ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Penalty Phase

In 1991, the United States Supreme Court made a significant change to sentencing proceedings during capital trials. The Court ruled in Payne v. Tennessee that the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit “victim impact evidence,” testimony about the character of the murder victim and the impact of the death on the victim’s family. The Payne decision permits highly emotional testimony from family members to enter into the penalty phase of a death penalty trial.

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