scholarly journals U.S. Supreme Court Denies Certiorari in Habeas Case Brought by Guantánamo Bay Detainee Challenging His Continuing Detention

2019 ◽  
Vol 113 (4) ◽  
pp. 849-855

On June 10, 2019, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in a case in which the D.C. Circuit held that the United States could continue to detain an individual at Guantánamo Bay until the cessation of the hostilities that justified his initial detention, notwithstanding the extraordinary length of the hostilities to date. The case, Al-Alwi v. Trump, arises from petitioner Moath Hamza Ahmed Al-Alwi's petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the legality of his continued detention at the United States Naval Base at Guantánamo Bay. The Supreme Court's denial of certiorari was accompanied by a statement by Justice Breyer observing that “it is past time to confront the difficult question” of how long a detention grounded in the U.S. response to the September 11 attacks can be justified.

10.12737/903 ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 77-81
Author(s):  
Владимир Сафонов ◽  
Vladimir Safonov

The article reveals the problem of applying the principle of the social state in the practice of the U.S. Supreme Court.


2008 ◽  
Vol 102 (3) ◽  
pp. 551-562 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steve Charnovitz

Although “[tjreaties are the law of the land, and a rule of decision in all courts,” the president and the courts may sometimes be powerless to achieve compliance with a U.S. treaty. That was the puzzling outcome of Medellin v. Texas. Even though the Supreme Court declared that the United States has an international obligation to comply with the Avena judgment of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the Court invalidated the president’s memorandum directing Texas and other errant states to comply.


Author(s):  
Linda Greenhouse

When the Framers set the Supreme Court in motion, they had no template for what they were about to create. “The court and the world” demonstrates that other countries were able to use the Supreme Court for inspiration, and many have done so. What they have chosen to take and leave from the Court’s example is instructive. Lifetime tenure is less common outside the United States, with most European courts preferring nine- or ten-year appointments and aiming for unanimity rather than majority. While specific knowledge about the Court is limited, the U.S. Supreme Court still holds a place in the public imagination.


2014 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 123-136
Author(s):  
Izabela Kraśnicka

Abstract The original text of the Constitution of the United States of America, written over 200 years ago, constitutes the supreme source of law in the American legal system. The seven articles and twenty seven amendments dictate understanding of fundamental principles of the federation’s functioning and its citizens’ rights. The paper aims to present the evolution of the U.S. Constitution’s language interpretation as provided by its final interpreter - the Supreme Court of the United States. Example of the Second Amendment will be analyzed to present the change in understanding of the language grammar and, as a consequence, the sense of the right to keep and bear arms in the light of the Supreme Court’s decision in the case of District of Columbia v Heller (554 U.S. 570 (2008)). It will argue for the accuracy of statement of Charles Evans Hughes, former Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court: “We are under a Constitution, but the Constitution is what the judges say it is...”


2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 79-89
Author(s):  
Giustina Luisa Bombini

Over the course of 23 years, United States Senator Susan Collins (R-ME) has been able to successfully walk a unique line of nonpartisanship, never stepping too far to the right, or to the left. However, following her vote to confirm Justice Brett Kavanaugh to the United States Supreme Court in 2017, and her vote to acquit President Trump of his impeachment charges in early 2020, Susan Collins placed herself in an incredibly precarious situation. Pundits and analysts were convinced that this election would turn into a referendum on Susan Collins (Lyall 2020). Meanwhile, her opponent, the current Speaker of the Maine House of Representatives, Sara Gideon, consistently led in the polls and worked off of the momentum gained from the success of the U.S. House Democrats in the 2018 midterms. And yet, Susan Collins stunned the nation by defeating Gideon. This paper evaluates and analyses what possible causes led to this outcome. Ultimately, Collins’ choice to vote against the confirmation of late-Ruth Bader Ginsburg's replacement on the Supreme Court convinced Mainers that Susan Collins could still be trusted, and should be given another chance.


2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (40) ◽  
Author(s):  
Miodrag N. Simović ◽  
Vladimir M. Simović

The paper analyses some relevant issues related to the treatment oflaw enforcement officers in the United States after a person has been taken intocustody or otherwise deprived of liberty, which requires informing that personof his/her constitutional rights. In the landmark decision Miranda v. Arizona(1966), the Supreme Court of the United States set standards for law enforcementofficers to follow when interrogating suspects held in custody.Suspects who are subject to custodial interrogation must be warned of theirright to remain silent; that any statements they make may be used as evidenceagainst them; that they have a right to an attorney; and if they cannot afford anattorney, the State will assign them one prior to any questioning, if they so wish.According to Miranda, unless those rights are not read, any evidence obtainedduring the interrogation may not be used against the defendant.Ever since Miranda was decided, state and federal courts have struggled witha number of issues with regard to its application, including the suspect’s beingin custody, which entitles the suspect to being readMiranda rights, the suspect’swaiving the right to have an attorney present during questioning. Some decisionsby the U.S. Supreme Court have attempted to answer these difficult questions.


2019 ◽  
pp. 1669
Author(s):  
Patrick Cothern

Habeas corpus petitioners must navigate the procedural barriers of the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) before courts consider their petitions on the merits. Among the barriers imposed is a general prohibition on “second or successive” habeas petitions, meaning a petitioner who previously filed a habeas petition may not bring another, with limited exceptions. One such exception, recognized by the Supreme Court in Magwood v. Patterson, allows for a second habeas petition after the petitioner obtains a “new judgment.” Magwood and AEDPA, however, left the term “new judgment” undefined. This Note summarizes the history of habeas corpus in the United States, the passage of AEDPA, and the Magwood decision. It contends that the interpretation of “new judgment” adopted by some circuits is impermissibly restrictive of the implied right to petition for habeas relief. Thus, it proposes a simplified interpretation: any judicial change to the original judgment renders a “new judgment,” achieving a better balance between the interests of the petitioner and the state.


1934 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 274-306 ◽  
Author(s):  
Manley O. Hudson

The recent decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Factor v. Laubenheimer and Haggard has broken new ground with reference to the interpretation of the extradition treaties between the United States and Great Britain, and it seems to deserve special consideration as a contribution to the law of extradition. Factor's extradition was requested by Great Britain on a charge of receiving certain sums of money, aggregating £458,500, known to have been fraudulently obtained. On the complaint of a British consul, Factor was taken into custody in Illinois, and a United States Commissioner in Illinois issued a warrant for his commitment pending surrender. On a return to a writ of habeas corpus, the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois ordered his discharge from custody, but this order was reversed by the Circuit Court of Appeals. Both the District Court and the Circuit Court of Appeals seem to have regarded extradition as possible only if the offense charged was a crime both by the law of Great Britain and by the law of Illinois; the District Court held that receiving money known to have been fraudulently obtained was not a crime by the law of Illinois, but a majority of the Circuit Court of Appeals, relying chiefly on Kelly v. Griffin, took the contrary view. On certiorari, the Supreme Court held that the offense charged was an extraditable crime even if it is not punishable by the law of Illinois, the opinion being written by Justice Stone. Justice Butler was joined in a vigorous dissenting opinion by Justices Brandeis and Roberts.


1988 ◽  
Vol 43 (12) ◽  
pp. 1019-1028 ◽  
Author(s):  
Donald N. Bersoff ◽  
Laurel P. Malson ◽  
Donald B. Verrilli

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