scholarly journals RegTech and Predictive Lawmaking: Closing the RegLag Between Prospective Regulated Activity and Regulation

2021 ◽  
pp. 127
Author(s):  
John Bagby ◽  
Nizan Packin
Keyword(s):  
Regulatory Agency ◽  
Resource Constraints ◽  
Response Regulator ◽  
Optimal Level ◽  
Regulatory Agencies ◽  
Political Resistance ◽  
Significant Delay ◽  
Counter Measures ◽  
Blockchain Technology ◽  
Political Conditions

Regulation chronically suffers significant delay starting at the detectable initiation of a “regulable activity” and culminating at effective regulatory response. Regulator reaction is impeded by various obstacles: (i) confusion in optimal level, form and choice of regulatory agency, (ii) political resistance to creating new regulatory agencies, (iii) lack of statutory authorization to address particular novel problems, (iv) jurisdictional competition among regulators, (v) Congressional disinclination to regulate given political conditions, and (vi) a lack of expertise, both substantive and procedural, to deploy successful counter-measures. Delay is rooted in several stubborn institutions, including libertarian ideals permeating both the U.S. legal system and the polity, constitutional constraints on exercise of governmental powers, chronic resource constraints including underfunding, and agency technical incapacities. Therefore, regulatory prospecting to identify regulable activity often lags the suspicion of future regulable activity or its first discernable appearance. This Article develops the regulatory lag theory (RegLag), argues that regulatory technologies (RegTech), including those from the blockchain technology space, can help narrow the RegLag gap, and proposes programs to improve regulatory agency clairvoyance to more aggressively adapt to changing regulable activities, such as by using promising anticipatory approaches.

scholarly journals STHM: A Secured and Trusted Healthcare Monitoring Architecture Using SDN and Blockchain

Electronics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (15) ◽  
pp. 1787
Author(s):  
Ezedin Barka ◽  
Sofiane Dahmane ◽  
Chaker Abdelaziz Kerrache ◽  
Mohamad Khayat ◽  
Farag Sallabi
Keyword(s):  
Monitoring System ◽  
Trust Management ◽  
Software Defined Networking ◽  
The Elderly ◽  
Optimal Level ◽  
Security And Privacy ◽  
Patient Privacy ◽  
Security Technologies ◽  
Blockchain Technology ◽  
Healthcare Monitoring

Healthcare professionals and scholars have emphasized the need for IoT-based remote health monitoring services to track the health of the elderly. Such systems produce a large amount of data, necessitating the security and privacy of that data. On the other hand, Software Defined Networking (SDN) integration could be seen as a good solution to guarantee both flexibility and efficiency of the network which is even more important in the case of healthcare monitoring. Furthermore, Blockchain has recently been proposed as a game-changing tool that can be integrated into the Internet of Things (IoT) to have the optimal level of security and privacy. However, incorporating Blockchain into IoT networks, which rely heavily on patients’ health sensors, is extremely difficult. In this paper, a secure Healthcare Monitoring System (HMS) is proposed with a focus on trust management issues. The architecture seeks to protect multiple healthcare monitoring system components and preserves patient privacy by developing a security interface where separate security modules can be integrated to run side by side to ensure reliable HMS. The security framework architecture we propose takes advantage of the blockchain technology as a secure and timely information back-end. STHM is a proposal that uses Software-Defined Networking (SDN) as the communication medium that allows users to access SDN’s different functional and security technologies and services. Simulation results show that the use of Blockchain for the SDN-based healthcare monitoring can ensure the desired flexibility and security for a very lightweight additional overhead.

scholarly journals Diffusion and adaptation of the regulatory agency model in Brazil

2019 ◽  
Vol 53 (6) ◽  
pp. 1116-1137
Author(s):  
Michelle Moretzsohn Holperin
Keyword(s):  
Regulatory Agency ◽  
Film Industry ◽  
Field Research ◽  
Regulatory Agencies ◽  
Agency Model ◽  
Political Actors ◽  
Short Period ◽  
Strategic Role ◽  
Institutional Legacies

Abstract This article examines the diffusion of independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) in Brazil, demonstrating how important domestic factors interplayed with traditional mechanisms of diffusion lead to an expressive process of agencification. Although top-down, bottom-up and horizontal mechanisms played an important role in the Brazilian agencification process, they fail to explain the creation of IRAs in unexpected sectors or the frequent modifications that occurred at subnational levels in a short period of time. To understand how local political actors adapted the regulatory agency model to the Brazilian institutional legacies, field research was conducted, based on bibliographical, documental, and interviews with key political actors. The specificities of Brazilian federalism and the strategic role of the film industry, bureaucrats and politicians in (re)interpreting the agency model helped to boost the diffusion of IRAs in Brazil.

scholarly journals A Novel Blockchain Framework for Industrial IoT Edge Computing

Sensors ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (7) ◽  
pp. 2061 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xuesong Xu ◽  
Zhi Zeng ◽  
Shengjie Yang ◽  
Hongyan Shao
Keyword(s):  
Data Storage ◽  
Resource Constraints ◽  
Rapid Development ◽  
Edge Computing ◽  
Consensus Algorithm ◽  
Resource Constrained ◽  
Blockchain Technology ◽  
Industrial Internet ◽  
Industrial Iot ◽  
And Performance

With the rapid development of industrial internet of thing (IIoT), the distributed topology of IIoT and resource constraints of edge computing conduct new challenges to traditional data storage, transmission, and security protection. A distributed trust and allocated ledger of blockchain technology are suitable for the distributed IIoT, which also becomes an effective method for edge computing applications. This paper proposes a resource constrained Layered Lightweight Blockchain Framework (LLBF) and implementation mechanism. The framework consists of a resource constrained layer (RCL) and a resource extended layer (REL) blockchain used in IIoT. We redesign the block structure and size to suit to IIoT edge computing devices. A lightweight consensus algorithm and a dynamic trust right algorithm is developed to improve the throughput of blockchain and reduce the number of transactions validated in new blocks respectively. Through a high throughput management to guarantee the transaction load balance of blockchain. Finally, we conducted kinds of blockchain simulation and performance experiments, the outcome indicated that the method have a good performance in IIoT edge application.

Revisiting regulatory independence: The relationship between the formal and de-facto independence of the Egyptian telecoms regulator

2016 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 66-84 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ahmed Badran
Keyword(s):  
Regulatory Agency ◽  
Regulatory Agencies ◽  
Regulatory Governance ◽  
Documentary Analysis ◽  
Ability To Act ◽  
Official Policy ◽  
Telecommunications Market ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Two Sides ◽  
The Way

Regulatory governance scholars tend to focus on either the formal or de-facto independence of regulatory agencies. Very little attention has been given to linking these two sides together and even less has been said about the relationship between these two aspects. In this paper, the relationship between the formal and de-facto independence of the Egyptian telecoms regulator will be investigated. The aim is to contrast these two aspects of regulatory independence. In addition, the way in which the formal independence is translated by the sector regulator into practice. The paper argues that the formal independence of the Egyptian telecoms regulatory agency is an important but not a sufficient factor to guarantee the de-facto independence of the agency. Empirical data collected from 44 interviews with different stakeholders in the Egyptian telecommunications market is analyzed. Documentary analysis of the telecoms Law and other official policy documents and reports is also considered. The initial findings of the paper show that the telecoms law grants the regulator the ability to act independently from the Ministry and the regulated industry. Nonetheless, this strong legal mandate has not been fully translated into independent practices on the ground in regards to the way the regulatory agency connects with the Ministry of Telecoms and the previous sector incumbent. The paper suggests that the relationship between formal and de-facto independence of telecoms regulators should be carefully considered.

scholarly journals Who feeds information to regulators? Stakeholder diversity in European Union regulatory agency consultations

2019 ◽  
Vol 40 (4) ◽  
pp. 573-598 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan Beyers ◽  
Sarah Arras
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Regulatory Agency ◽  
Regulatory Agencies ◽  
Limited Participation ◽  
Business Interests ◽  
Regulatory Policies ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Public Consultations ◽  
Design Factors

AbstractTo design regulatory policies, agencies depend on information from the industries they are tasked to regulate. Therefore, agencies can organise consultations with the aim of obtaining information from different perspectives. This article focuses on stakeholder diversity in agency public consultations. We ask to what extent is information provided by stakeholders other than the regulated sector, such as other business interests, experts or nonbusiness interests? Stakeholder diversity is relevant as it may prevent agencies to become exposed to one-sided information and capture by specialised interests. Are there consultation design factors that foster consultation diversity? Or, is (a lack of) consultation diversity structurally shaped by the context in which an agency operates? Analysing a wide range of public consultations organised by European Union regulatory agencies indicates that most information agencies receive via consultations comes from regulated interests and that the limited participation of nonregulated interests is highly tenacious.

Modification of the Interpretation Section of Cryoscopic Methods for the Determination of the Freezing Point Value of Milk

1972 ◽  
Vol 55 (3) ◽  
pp. 504-506
Author(s):  
K W Henningson
Keyword(s):  
North American ◽  
Regulatory Agency ◽  
Freezing Point ◽  
Time Limit ◽  
Regulatory Agencies ◽  
Added Water ◽  
Herd Milk

Abstract In 1969 the Interpretation of the freezing point value of milk was added as official first action to the official final action thermistor and Hortvel cryoscopic methods for the determination of the freezing point value of milk. During the ensuing year several State regulatory agencies indicated problems with 2 sections of the Interpretation, specifically, the 48 hr time limit for obtaining authentic , confirmatory samples of herd milk and/or the 0.010 difference permitted between the freezing point values of samples designated presumptive added water and authentic , confirmatory samples of herd milk. A survey of North American regulatory agencies was conducted to evaluate the extent of these problems. Twenty of the 41 regulatory agencies responding to the survey indicated that 48 hr was too short a time limit, 16 agencies indicated that the 48 hr was satisfactory, and 5 agencies declined to express an opinion. Six agencies indicated that the 0.010° difference permitted was too great, 29 agencies indicated the 0.010° difference permitted was satisfactory, 1 agency found the question inappropriate, and 5 agencies declined to express an opinion. No regulatory agency indicated other problems dealing with the Interpretation.

scholarly journals The origin of regulatory agencies in the United States: A case of institutional change

2018 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 65-81
Author(s):  
Paula Silva de Carvalho
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Institutional Change ◽  
Regulatory Agency ◽  
Change Process ◽  
The United States ◽  
The State ◽  
Regulatory Agencies ◽  
Historical Process ◽  
Relative Prices ◽  
The Creation

This paper seeks to detail the process that culminated in the creation of the first regulatory agencies and analyzes it through the lens of Douglass North’s (1990) theory of institutional change. The first regulatory agency with power to regulate rates emerged in 1873 in the state of Illinois in the United States amid the conflict between farmers and railroads around rail fares. The analysis of this historical process indicates that North’s theory fits well to explaining the institutional change process that gave rise to the regulatory agencies model once the perception on relative prices was the major factor behind its emergence.

scholarly journals Credibility and the design of regulatory agencies in Brazil

2002 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 449-472 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bernardo Mueller ◽  
Carlos Pereira
Keyword(s):  
Optimal Level ◽  
Regulatory Agencies ◽  
Key Variables ◽  
Regulatory Institutions ◽  
The Government ◽  
Different Characteristics ◽  
And Control ◽  
Agency Design ◽  
Statutory Control

ABSTRACT In this paper we model the process of regulatory agency design, focusing on the role of credibility. The government is constrained in the sense that it must create regulatory institutions that allow it to commit to not administratively expropriate investors. The model explains both the preference of the agency head chosen by the government as well as the optimal level of statutory control. We argue that in Brazil this trade-off between credibility and control of the agencies is key to understanding the specific regulatory institutions that have been chosen. Comparative static results are derived to examine how changes in some key variables affect the design of the agencies, providing us with a set of hypotheses for comparing the design of five different agencies created to regulate industries with very different characteristics. Although these agencies were initially created under very similar designs, they are expected to evolve in ways that accord with our theory.

scholarly journals The Commodification of Cryptocurrency

2018 ◽  
pp. 611
Author(s):  
Neil Tiwari
Keyword(s):  
Regulatory Agency ◽  
Financial Institution ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Blockchain Technology ◽  
Sec Regulation ◽  
Initial Coin Offerings

Cryptocurrencies are digital tokens built on blockchain technology. This allows for a product that is fully decentralized, with no need for a third-party intermediary like a government or financial institution. Cryptocurrency creators use initial coin offerings (ICOs) to raise capital to build their tokens. Cryptocurrency ICOs are problematic because they do not fit neatly within either of two traditional categories—securities or commodities. Each of these categories has their own regulatory agency: the SEC for securities and the CFTC for commodities. At first blush, ICOs seem to be a sale of securities subject to regulation by the SEC, but this is far from clear and creates regulatory difficulties. This is because the Howey test, which determines whether an asset is a security or not, does not cleanly apply to nontraditional assets, like tokens. This Note argues for a revised standard that reconciles Howey with cryptocurrencies. This standard would require cryptocurrency creators to show how essential blockchain technology is to their token if they want to fall beyond the scope of the Howey test, and consequently SEC regulation. This standard would still preserve regulatory protections from fraud, which the CFTC provides for investors while loosening regulatory restrictions on the cryptocurrencies that leverage blockchain technology most usefully.

Environmental Concerns: Catastrophic Events and Insurance

2002 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 309-324 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christof Lempp ◽  
Ian Lerche ◽  
Evan Paleologos
Keyword(s):  
Regulatory Agency ◽  
Insurance Premium ◽  
Regulatory Agencies ◽  
Environmental Concerns ◽  
Catastrophic Events ◽  
Catastrophic Event ◽  
Catastrophic Loss ◽  
Loss Event

Two conditions can occur in exploration problems that require that a corporation consider some form of insurance. First is the possibility of a catastrophic event occurring during exploration, for instance spilling oil, thereby involving massive and expensive clean-up costs. A corporation would surely like to take out insurance against this possibility. Second is the possibility that the regulatory agencies may consider a unilateral change in the environmental stringency conditions after the project is under way. In this case the corporation could be involved in further costs, thereby lowering potential profitability of a pre-existing contract. The corporation would surely like to option against the possibility of such an event occurring prior to the chance that the contract terms could be changed. These two forms of insurance are not equivalent. In the catastrophic loss event situation one would like to pay an insurance premium to cover the unknown catastrophic costs should they occur. In the regulatory stringency conditions situation, one usually knows ahead of time precisely how such more stringent conditions, if enacted, would influence the corporate profitability and one would like to have a contingency option operating that would be activated if and only if the regulatory agency does indeed enact the new more stringent regulations.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document