scholarly journals Game Theory: An approach through history and its applications

2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 138
Author(s):  
W. A. V. Souza ◽  
M. C. Malavazi

Game Theory is a mathematical approach to the study of decision making between individuals when each outcome depends on the decisions of others, ie, one should not make an arbitrary decision, but decide based on what they think the decision of their "opponent" will be, knowing that they think the same. Developed by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern in 1944 in the book Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, it had been very contested since its launch, but the works of a genius named John Nash, winner of the Nobel Prize in economics in 1994, ended these contestations. This work shows that the Game Theory was not limited to the field of economics, but expanded to other areas, such as biology, explaining strategies used by species to survive. As results are presented more than ten models based on the principles of Game Theory, among them the Prisoner's Dilemma, Ice Cream Vendors Game, Clean City Law and Warning Song between Bird.

2019 ◽  
pp. 199-230
Author(s):  
Alan Bollard

In Japan conventional bombing had not proved sufficient: it was the atom bomb that ultimately brought surrender. The brilliant Hungarian mathematician John von Neumann had worked on the Manhattan Project and identified Hiroshima as a bombing target. He went on to design computers that helped build bigger bombs. In addition he developed an original mathematical approach to modelling a dynamic economy that helped economists advance their modelling. With the Cold War looming, he and colleague Oskar Morgenstern pioneered the new subject of game theory which the big powers used to model their post-war defence tactics, and led to the classic 1950s strategy of ‘mutually-assured destruction’.


2006 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 95-109 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicola Giocoli

The year 2003 marked the 100th anniversary of the birth of John von Neumann (1903–1957), one of greatest geniuses of the last century. Beyond contributing to fields as diverse as set theory, quantum mechanics, atomic energy, and automatic computing, von Neumann has also had a decisive influence upon modern economics. From the invention of game theory to the axiomatization of expected utility, from the introduction of convex analysis and fixed-point techniques to the development of the balanced growth model, the von Neumann heritage can be clearly traced in several areas of our discipline. The aim of this paper is to clarify the relationship between the two concepts of rationality he devised in his classic 1944 book Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, written with the collaboration of the Austrian economist Oskar Morgenstern (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1953).


1999 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Vanderschraaf

In 1954, Richard Braithwaite chose as the topic of his inaugural lecture at Cambridge The Theory of Games as a Tool for the Moral Philosopher. Braithwaite argued that by using the recently developed mathematical theory of games, philosophers could resolve certain problems in moral philosophy previously considered unsolvable. Formal game theory is a product of the twentieth century. John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern established game theory as an important new branch of social science with the publication of their 1944 treatise Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. However, the basic idea that motivates game theory has much older intellectual roots in the work of philosophers such as Hobbes (1651) and Hume (1740). This basic idea can be expressed in the following way: How agents behave in a given social interaction depends crucially upon their reciprocal expectations. To give an example adapted from Braithwaite’s lecture, if you and I wish to have a telephone conversation, then exactly one of us must call. I should wait for your call precisely when I expect you to call, which you should do when you expect me to wait. Even in an example this simple, issues of fairness can come into play. We both want to coordinate our behavior and have our telephone chat. But each of us may prefer to call, so as to avoid having the other pay for the call. Braithwaite used game theory to model this example, and to propose a method for assigning the roles of caller and receiver equitably. He conjectured that this method could be applied in general to problems of distributive justice.


2015 ◽  
pp. 1849-1872
Author(s):  
Ben Tran

In 1954, the British philosopher Richard Braithwaite gave his inaugural lecture, Theory of Games as a Tool for the Moral Philosopher. Braithwaite predicted game theory would fundamentally change moral philosophy. However, in hindsight, John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern's publication of Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour was the moment modern game theory entered the discipline of ethics. The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the relationship between game theory and business ethics. In other words, this chapter explains how game theory plays a role in business ethics and affects business ethics for emerging economies and covers in detail: 1) the history of game theory; 2) types of/definition(s) of games; 3) business ethics; 4) business; and 5) ethics. The chapter concludes with the role that game theory and business ethics play in emerging economies.


Author(s):  
Frank C. Zagare

This chapter addresses the charge made by some behavioral economists (and many strategic analysts) that game theory is of limited utility for understanding interstate conflict behavior. Using one of perfect deterrence theory’s constituent models, a logically consistent game-theoretic explanation for the absence of a superpower conflict during the Cold War era is provided. As well, the chapter discusses a prescription based on an incorrect prediction attributed to John von Neumann, one of the cofounders of game theory. It also examines a logically inconsistent explanation of the long peace offered by Thomas Schelling, the game theorist many consider the most important strategic thinker in the field of security studies. The argument is made that a predictively inaccurate or logically inconsistent game model in no way undermines the utility of game theory as a potentially powerful methodological tool.


2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 307-320
Author(s):  
Alina Czapla

The game theory (GT) is not only a part of mathematics, but also one of the most popular optimization techniques supporting decision making. Its achievements are currently used in many fields. However, this theory has a special place in economics and management. Operating on the market, companies make a number of decisions that resemble a game with moves made by players. It turns out that GT can also be successfully translated into management needs. The aim of the article is to answer the question about the possibilities of using game theory in management. A wide range of applications of this theory has been shown. Limitations related to its use in management were also indicated.


2021 ◽  
Vol 292 ◽  
pp. 01031
Author(s):  
Yuxing Li ◽  
Hao Wu ◽  
Yu Shi ◽  
Hao Li ◽  
Xuefeng Gao ◽  
...  

In order to effectively alleviate the congestion of power exchange stations, the game theory was used to discuss the spatial characteristics of electric vehicle power exchange demand, analyze the decision making and game process of electric vehicle users specifically. Moreover, on the basis of the research, the specific way of setting the price of the exchange station was proposed and the game mathematical model was constructed.


2000 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 237-246 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paulius Gaučas ◽  
Edmundas Kazimieras Zavadskas

The task of decision-making in constructing industry becomes more difficult because of rapid technical upgrowth. According to aims, circumstances and opportunity decisions are determined. Disagreement situation arises at this point. Uprising opportunities and influence of circumstances of aims, they are often contradicting each other. Constructing a building, one must look for decision of more favourable conditions for situation and minimum expenditure, but to guarantee a high reliability, so disagreement situation arises. Exacting requirements of quality logically are bound up with expensive realisation [4]. Decision must be optimum and as much as possible satisfy “goodness” indications of decision. However, “goodness” valuation is indefinite conception and disobeys black-and-white logic [Zadeh]. In this case one can understand decision like a conflict in the game theory, where the information is not always defined. To solve the problem the fuzzy sets theory can be used. Using the game theory, elements can be formulated indefinitely and a new model can be made [3]. Trying to estimate the aims of conflicts, the circumstances that influence the decision are divided into two groups. The first group—circumstances of inherent influence—defines what a decision-maker must attain (for example, to maximise quality) and describes strategy of the first player. The second group—circumstances of outward influence—defines what a decision-maker must estimate as a limitation (for example, to minimise price) and describes strategy of the second player. Dependence between inherent and outward circumstances in this step is formed. There is no clear limit in fuzzy sets theory between dependence (circumstance 1) and independence (circumstance 0) of elements on definite set. Dependence degree of element x on A set, is described by μ A (x) function (1), (2). The valuation in fuzzy sets theory takes place at three levels. At the first level meanings of dependence on inherent circumstances are calculated (1), (2), and matrix is determined (Fig 2). According to formula (3), dependence degree on each alternative is calculated. In the second level meanings of dependence on outward circumstances are calculated according to the formula (1), (2) and the matrix is filled in (Fig 3). At the third level the results of first two levels are summed. Using operator of minimum general matrix of decisions-making is determined (Fig 4), According to the general matrix, the indefinite matrix of decision-making is determined (Fig 5). Minimax principle makes the decision. The received result is optimal, because it satisfies the aim causing the conflict. In the paper, the example of a private house is selected, using the described method. This method may be used to make decisions, when the task is of conflicting character. Competently distributing circumstances of influence or parameters of valuation by two aspects (inherent and outward) it can be explained the mean of conflicting character, and interpretation using the described method can be made.


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