THE IMPACT OF THE INTERNATIONAL FACTOR OF CONFLICT IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

2018 ◽  
Vol 28 (6) ◽  
pp. 1879-1886
Author(s):  
Hatidza Berisha

The events that took place in Bosnia and Herzegovina (B&H) after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the unification of Germany, as well as the attitudes of the international factor towards the Bosnian crisis, should be considered in the process of disintegration of the former Yugoslavia, and secession of its republics. Due to the impossibility of a peaceful agreement on the resolution of state status and the organization of the state by political factors in B&H, it was necessary for the international community to intervene in resolving the state's status and relations in it.The aim of the paper is to analyze the impact of an international factor on developments in B&H right before the outbreak of the conflict, as well as during the course of the 1992-1995 period. years. The impact of the international factor has been viewed through the role of Europe (the European Community, since 1993 - the European Union and West European countries) on the one hand and the United States of America on the other, as the main and determining factors of the international community in resolving the Bosnian issue. The United Nations Organization (OUN) remained in the other plan in this process, while the role of the Soviet Union was not significant, because the Soviet Union was solving its own growing problems that arose at the end of the Cold War by the breakup of the Warsaw Pact, and later after the collapse of the state.

Politeja ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (6(75)) ◽  
pp. 51-74
Author(s):  
Józef Fiszer

The study is devoted to Poland’s accession to NATO and the European Union (EU) and describes Germany’s stance on Poland’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations after 1989, which, despite various assessments, was not explicit and enthusiastic. However, it evolved gradually and was determined by a difficult internal situation after the reunification of Germany and its new geopolitics and geoeconomics. For Germany that reunified on 3 October 1990, an issue of greater importance than Polish accession to NATO and the EU was the presence of Soviet troops on the territory of the former GDR and normalization of relations with neighbors, particularly with France, Poland, the Soviet Union, and the United States. Both France and the United Kingdom, as well as the Soviet Union, and to a lesser extent, the United States initially were afraid of a reunified Germany and opposed Polish membership in Euro-Atlantic structures. At the time, hopes and fears were rife about the future of Europe. A common question was being asked in Paris, London, Moscow, Washington, and Warsaw – would reunified Germany remain a European state, or would Europe become German? Should Germany stay in NATO or leave after the reunification? There were questions also about Moscow’s policy towards reunified Germany and its position on Poland’s accession to Euro-Atlantic structures. Unfortunately, for a long time, it was negative. Today, thirty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the reunification of Germany, we can see that the black scenarios that were outlined in 1989-1990 did not actually come true. Despite the fears, those events opened the way for Poland to “return to Europe” and to gain membership in Euro-Atlantic structures, i.e., NATO and the European Union (EU). The path was not at all simple and it was not easy for Poland to make it through. In the study the author analyses subjective and objective difficulties related to Poland's accession to NATO and the EU and describes the evolution and role of Germany in this process.


2018 ◽  
pp. 93-107
Author(s):  
Bogdan Koszel

Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russia has become Germany’s main Central European partner. The economic interests and hopes of gigantic contracts to modernize the Russian economy have played a colossal role in German policy. The Government of Chancellor Angela Merkel aspired to shape the Eastern policy of the European Union, and it was highly favorable towards the strategy of Russian modernization to be implemented with the participation of Western partners, as proposed by President Medvedev in 2009. However, this project never went beyond the stage of preliminary agreements, and both sides are increasingly disappointed with its progress. Germany continues to aspire to play the role of the leading EU member state involved in the transformation process in Russia, yet this is no longer treated in terms of the ‘Russia first’ attitude without any reservations. Germans are becoming increasingly aware that their efforts are doomed to fail without true Russian efforts aimed at the democratization of both their public life and economic structures.


2017 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 23-31
Author(s):  
Jakub Majkowski

This essay will firstly address the extent of Stalin’s achievements in leading the course for domestic policy of the Soviet Union and its contribution towards maintaining the country’s supremacy in the world, for example the rapid post-war recovery of industry and agriculture, and secondly, the foreign policy including ambiguous relations with Communist governments of countries forming the Eastern Bloc, upkeeping frail alliances and growing antagonism towards western powers, especially the United States of America.   The actions and influence of Stalin’s closest associates in the Communist Party and the effect of Soviet propaganda on the society are also reviewed. This investigation will cover the period from 1945 to 1953. Additionally, other factors such as the impact of post-war worldwide economic situation and attitude of the society of Soviet Union will be discussed.    


Author(s):  
N. Gegelashvili ◽  
◽  
I. Modnikova ◽  

The article analyzes the US policy towards Ukraine dating back from the time before the reunification of Crimea with Russia and up to Donald Trump coming to power. The spectrum of Washington’s interests towards this country being of particular strategic interest to the United States are disclosed. It should be noted that since the disintegration of the Soviet Union Washington’s interest in this country on the whole has not been very much different from its stand on all post-Soviet states whose significance was defined by the U,S depending on their location on the world map as well as on the value of their natural resources. However, after the reunification of Crimea with Russia Washington’s stand on this country underwent significant changes, causing a radical transformation of the U,S attitude in their Ukrainian policy. During the presidency of Barack Obama the American policy towards Ukraine was carried out rather sluggishly being basically declarative in its nature. When President D. Trump took his office Washington’s policy towards Ukraine became increasingly more offensive and was characterized by a rather proactive stance not only because Ukraine became the principal arena of confrontation between the United States and the Russian Federation, but also because it became a part of the US domestic political context. Therefore, an outcome of the “battle” for Ukraine is currently very important for the United States in order to prove to the world its role of the main helmsman in the context of a diminishing US capability of maintaining their global superiority.


2017 ◽  
Vol 44 (1) ◽  
pp. 76-95
Author(s):  
Michael O. Slobodchikoff

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia was reduced from the role of a global hegemon to that of a regional hegemon. As the regional hegemon, Russia was responsible for creating a regional order that was nested within the global order. However, since the Soviet Union had collapsed, it could not be assumed that Russia would create a regional order that was compatible with the global order. Would Russia create a regional order that was incompatible with the global order, and further, would Russia be a dissatisfied state that would challenge US hegemony? Using network analysis, I discover that Russia created a regional order that was compatible with the global order. In other words, Russia did not directly challenge the global order. More specifically, Russia accepted the global order that existed at the end of the Cold War. Providing that the global order remained static, Russia would not challenge that order. However, US actions following the collapse of the Soviet Union such as the expansion ofnatoand the withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty are interpreted by Russia as a dynamic change in the global order. The Ukrainian crisis further exacerbated the wedge that had developed between the United States and Russia. It has further isolated Russia, destroyed the regional order nested within the global order, and ensured that Russia fully became a dissatisfied state looking to challenge US hegemony. Russia will now turn to China to try to challenge US hegemony.


Author(s):  
Paul J. Heer

This book chronicles and assesses the little-known involvement of US diplomat George F. Kennan—renowned as an expert on the Soviet Union—in US policy toward East Asia, primarily in the early Cold War years. Kennan, with vital assistance from his deputy John Paton Davies, played pivotal roles in effecting the US withdrawal from the Chinese civil war and the redirection of American occupation policy in Japan, and in developing the “defensive perimeter” concept in the western Pacific. His influence, however, faded soon thereafter: he was less successful in warning against US security commitments in Korea and Indochina, and the impact of the Korean War ultimately eclipsed his strategic vision for US policy in East Asia. This was due in large part to Kennan’s inability to reconcile his judgment that the mainland of East Asia was strategically expendable to the United States with his belief that US prestige should not be compromised there. The book examines the subsequent evolution of Kennan’s thinking about East Asian issues—including his role as a prominent critic of US involvement in the Vietnam War—and the legacies of his engagement with the region.


Author(s):  
Jared S. Buss

This chapter discusses the myriad of Ley’s activities during the late 1950s, when his status as a scientific celebrity and rocket expert peaked. It follows his pre-Sputnik and post-Sputnik tactics. Not only did Ley encourage millions of Americans to believe in American “firsts” in 1955 and 1956, but also he encouraged Americans to express resentment, anger, and shock following the launch of Sputnik I in 1957. In newspaper columns that circulated across the United States, Ley expressed fears of missile gaps and cultural lag with the Soviet Union. While historians have analyzed the role of politicians during the Cold War, they have not recognized the role of Ley as America’s rocket expert, who now shared the stage with Wernher von Braun.


Author(s):  
Richard M. Titmuss

This introductory chapter provides an overview of the study of the beliefs, attitudes, and values concerning blood and its possession, inheritance, and use and loss in diverse societies. The study originated and grew over many years of introspection from a series of value questions formulated within the context of attempts to distinguish the ‘social’ from the ‘economic’ in public policies and in those institutions and services with declared ‘welfare’ goals. As such, this book centres on human blood: the scientific, social, economic, and ethical issues involved in its procurement, processing, distribution, use, and benefit in Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union, South Africa, and other countries. Ultimately, it considers the role of altruism in modern society. It attempts to fuse the politics of welfare and the morality of individual wills.


2003 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 33-36
Author(s):  
William I. Hitchcock

Three scholars offer separate responses to the article by Michael Creswell and Marc Trachtenberg. The responses include some common points, but they diverge sharply in other respects. The first two respondents generally agree with the conclusions reached by Creswell and Trachtenberg, but one of them believes that the article goes too far (in its contention that France's anxiety about the Soviet Union eclipsed its concerns about Germany), whereas the other argues that the article does not go far enough in showing how the United States adapted its policy to accommodate French leaders. The second respondent also questions whether Creswell and Trachtenberg have added anything new to the latest “revisionist” works on French-German relations in the first decade of Cold War. The third respondent, unlike the first two, rejects the main thrust of the article by Creswell and Trachtenberg and seeks to defend the traditional view that France was very reluctant to go along with U.S. and British policies on the German question. This respondent also questions whether Creswell and Trachtenberg have focused on the most appropriate sources of evidence.


1994 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 108-136 ◽  
Author(s):  
BAOHUI ZHANG

Recent studies of democratization generally emphasize the role of elites and political pacts in transitions to democracy. They usually give little attention to the institutional conditions for elite's successful pact making. This article argues that although choices by elites are important, pact making does require certain institutional conditions. By examining the democratization experiences of Spain, Brazil, the Soviet Union, and China in 1989, this article argues that only some types of authoritarian regimes have the historical possibility of following a pacted transition. Specifically, the author argues that corporatist regimes have unique advantages in following such a path. On the other hand, the totalitarian institutional legacies of once-entrenched communist regimes left democratic oppositions as broadly based social movements and their leaders with strong populist tendencies. These, the author argues, create structural obstacles to democratization through elite's pactmaking for these regimes.


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