Analysis on the U.S. China Policy Debate -With a Focus on the Perception and Logic Underlying Policy Options toward China-

2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 61-96
Author(s):  
Su-jeong Kang
2021 ◽  
pp. 106591292110297
Author(s):  
Tyler Hughes ◽  
Gregory Koger

Both Congressional parties compete to promote their own reputations while damaging the opposition party’s brand. This behavior affects both policy-making agendas and the party members’ communications with the media and constituents. While there has been ample study of partisan influence on legislative agenda-setting and roll call voting behavior, much less is known about the parties’ efforts to shape the public debate. This paper analyzes two strategic decisions of parties: the timing of collective efforts to influence the public policy debate and the substantive content of these “party messaging” events. These dynamics are analyzed using a unique dataset of 50,195 one-minute speeches delivered on the floor of the U.S. House of Representatives from 1989 to 2016. We find a pattern of strategic matching—both parties are more likely to engage in concurrent messaging efforts, often on the same issue.


2017 ◽  
Vol 54 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 34-52
Author(s):  
Gordon R. Mitchell ◽  
Taylor Hahn ◽  
Satoru Aonuma
Keyword(s):  

2021 ◽  
pp. 2150007
Author(s):  
Timon McPhearson ◽  
Zbigniew Grabowski ◽  
Pablo Herreros-Cantis ◽  
Ahmed Mustafa ◽  
Luis Ortiz ◽  
...  

We examine the uneven social and spatial distributions of COVID-19 and their relationships with indicators of social vulnerability in the U.S. epicenter, New York City (NYC). As of July 17th, 2020, NYC, despite having only 2.5% of the U.S. population, has [Formula: see text]6% of all confirmed cases, and [Formula: see text]16% of all deaths, making it a key learning ground for the social dynamics of the disease. Our analysis focuses on the multiple potential social, economic, and demographic drivers of disproportionate impacts in COVID-19 cases and deaths, as well as population rates of testing. Findings show that immediate impacts of COVID-19 largely fall along lines of race and class. Indicators of poverty, race, disability, language isolation, rent burden, unemployment, lack of health insurance, and housing crowding all significantly drive spatial patterns in prevalence of COVID-19 testing, confirmed cases, death rates, and severity. Income in particular has a consistent negative relationship with rates of death and disease severity. The largest differences in social vulnerability indicators are also driven by populations of people of color, poverty, housing crowding, and rates of disability. Results highlight the need for targeted responses to address injustice of COVID-19 cases and deaths, importance of recovery strategies that account for differential vulnerability, and provide an analytical approach for advancing research to examine potential similar injustice of COVID-19 in other U.S. cities. Significance Statement Communities around the world have variable success in mitigating the social impacts of COVID-19, with many urban areas being hit particularly hard. Analysis of social vulnerability to COVID-19 in the NYC, the U.S. national epicenter, shows strongly disproportionate impacts of the pandemic on low income populations and communities of color. Results highlight the class and racial inequities of the coronavirus pandemic in NYC, and the need to unpack the drivers of social vulnerability. To that aim, we provide a replicable framework for examining patterns of uneven social vulnerability to COVID-19- using publicly available data which can be readily applied in other study regions, especially within the U.S.A. This study is important to inform public and policy debate over strategies for short- and long-term responses that address the injustice of disproportionate impacts of COVID-19. Although similar studies examining social vulnerability and equity dimensions of the COVID-19 outbreak in cities across the U.S. have been conducted (Cordes and Castro 2020, Kim and Bostwick 2002, Gaynor and Wilson 2020; Wang et al. 2020; Choi and Unwin 2020), this study provides a more comprehensive analysis in NYC that extends previous contributions to use the highest resolution spatial units for data aggregation (ZCTAs). We also include mortality and severity rates as key indicators and provide a replicable framework that draws from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s Social Vulnerability indicators for communities in NYC.


1995 ◽  
Vol 151 ◽  
pp. 53-64 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter F. Westaway

This note examines the role of macroeconomic models in the policy design process. It discusses some of the general issues that need to be addressed if macroeconomic models are to make an important contribution to the policy debate. More topically, it illustrates the role that can be played by using policy optimisation techniques on the National Institute UK model to examine some of the macroeconomic policy options currently facing policymakers.


1996 ◽  
Vol 146 ◽  
pp. 643-645 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roxane D. V. Slsmanidis

2020 ◽  
Vol 83 (12) ◽  
pp. 2095-2101
Author(s):  
JIANBIN YU ◽  
NEAL H. HOOKER

ABSTRACT In August 2008, the Food Safety and Inspection Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) launched a new policy that required publication of a list of retail consignees for the meat and poultry products part of class I recalls, those with the greatest potential impact on public health. In this study, two recall effectiveness measures (recovery rate and completion time) and a difference-in-difference method were used to examine the effects of retailer disclosures. When controlling for factors previously determined to impact recall effectiveness, including product type, reasons for recall, the amount of food recalled, plant size, and the way the problem was discovered, no significant impact on recall effectiveness was discerned under the current disclosure policy. Recalls for bacterial contamination had higher recovery rates. Larger recalls had lower recovery rates and longer completion times. Recalls issued by very small plants had lower recovery rates. Compared with other stakeholders, government agency discovery of the problem was associated with lower recovery rates. As the U.S. Food and Drug Administration considers a similar retailer disclosure policy for foods regulated under the Food Safety Modernization Act, such lessons from the USDA experience should inform the policy debate. HIGHLIGHTS


2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (5) ◽  
pp. 1481 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ni Lei ◽  
Lanyun Chen ◽  
Chuanwang Sun ◽  
Yuan Tao

2001 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 191-220 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Baum

Ever since Richard Nixon's 1972 “opening” to China, U.S. presidential election campaigns have been the occasion for the opposition party to strongly challenge the incumbent president's policy of engagement toward China. Once in power, however, successful challengers (Carter, Reagan, Clinton) have softened their criticism and accepted the strategic necessity of cooperation with China. In the first stage of this cycle, the 2000 election appeared to be no exception, as presidential challenger George W. Bush sharply criticized Bill Clinton's notion of a “strategic partnership” with the PRC and proposed instead that the U.S. and China were “strategic competitors.” This paper examines the first six months of the Bush presidency to see if the historic pattern of post-election reversion to the status-quo ante is repeating itself in the Bush Administration. Looking, inter alia, at the individual preferences of key administration policymakers, the administration's enhanced arms sale package to Taiwan, the president's pledge to do “whatever it took” to defend Taiwan, and the mid-summer visit of Secretary of State Colin Powell to Beijing, the paper documents the existence of a sharp division between “soft” realists and “hard” realists within the Bush Administration; and it concludes that while there has been a perceptible shift toward a more adversarial outlook, it is too soon to tell whether this shift will be partly offset by the normal first-term “regression to the mean.”


Author(s):  
Sergey Trush

Biden’s foreign policy team worked out the new concept of its relations with China. The main idea of this concept is more nuanced approach to China’s behavior, reassessing bilateral ties with China to separate the spheres of confrontation, regulated competition and possible cooperation for commonly shared goals. However, this concept and ideology still failed to be applied to practical policy. Biden’s many steps towards China, especially in economic and military realms, are in fact showing the inertia and obvious continuity with Trump’s policies. In political sphere, Biden’s stress for «human rights» issues, so typical for Democratic Party, make the dialogue with China the same unproductive, as it was in the Trump’s era. In economic relations Biden’s administration is not cancelling high trade tariffs on China goods, being oriented on “regulated trade” approach in its ties with PRC. Biden’s administration is more successful and active than Trump in pushing through Congress the legislation for spending on innovation and technological upgrading of the U.S. economy, that is vital to successful competition with China.


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