scholarly journals The Collective Strategies of Key Stakeholders in Sponge City Construction: A Tripartite Game Analysis of Governments, Developers, and Consumers

Water ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 1087 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yan Chen ◽  
Hongmei Chen
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Early Stage ◽  
Equilibrium Points ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Reasonable Assumption ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Stable Equilibrium Point ◽  
Short Supply ◽  
Sponge City ◽  
Key Stakeholders

In the early stage of sponge city promotion, both developers and consumers lack initiative, and the governments can take incentive measures to encourage both groups to actively participate in the construction of sponge city. This paper makes a comparative analysis of the interest composition and obstacles faced by the three key stakeholders: governments, developers, and consumers, and establishes an asymmetric evolutionary game model of governments, developers, and consumers. The dynamic system of the game model is constructed by replicated dynamic equation, and the evolution direction of different stages is obtained by solving the stable equilibrium point of the system. Based on the reasonable assumption of the parameter value, the numerical simulation is carried out for the situation of oversupply, short supply, and balance of supply and demand. The results show that the better evolutionary equilibrium points are (incentive, development, purchase) and (no incentive, development, purchase). The basic factors influencing the decision-making direction of the stakeholder are direct cost, direct benefit, opportunity cost, and opportunity benefit. In a fixed scenario, the decision-making direction is unchanged, and the parameters can change the evolution speed of the whole system, which can reduce the loss or accelerate the promotion. Moreover, some suggestions are put forward for the governments, developers, and consumers in the construction of sponge city.

scholarly journals An Evolutionary Game Analysis of Internet Public Opinion Events at Universities: A Case from China

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Hongying Wen ◽  
Kairong Liang ◽  
Yiquan Li
Keyword(s):  
Public Opinion ◽  
University Students ◽  
Stable Equilibrium ◽  
Equilibrium Points ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Stable Equilibrium Point ◽  
University Administration ◽  
Negative Effects ◽  
Internet Medium ◽  
The University

Internet public opinion events at universities in China occurred frequently, creating painful repercussions for reputation and stability of colleges and universities. To better cope with the problem, this paper explores an evolutionary mechanism of the university Internet public opinion events. Firstly, we discuss the interactions and behavior of three key participants: an Internet medium, university students as a whole, and administration. Secondly, we construct a tripartite evolutionary game model consisting of an Internet medium, student group, and university administration and then analyze and obtain the differential dynamic equations and equilibrium points. Subsequently, the evolutionary stable equilibrium is further analyzed. Finally, we employ numerical studies to examine how the tripartite behavior choices affect evolutionary paths and evolutionary equilibrium strategies. Results are derived as follows: under certain conditions, there exists an asymptotically stable equilibrium point for the tripartite evolutionary game. On the one hand, appropriate penalties and rewards should be provided to foster objectives and fair behaviors of the network medium. On the other hand, university students should be educated and guided to deal rationally with negative effects of Internet public opinion events. Moreover, online real-name authentication is an important and necessary measure. Finally, the university administration should release truthful, timely, and comprehensive information of Internet public opinion events to mitigate potential negative impacts.

scholarly journals Analysis of Smooth Implementation of Industry Poverty Alleviation considering Government Supervision

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Haifeng Yao ◽  
Jiangyue Fu
Keyword(s):  
Equilibrium Point ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Poverty Alleviation ◽  
Equilibrium Points ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Parameter Design ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Government Supervision ◽  
Proposed Model ◽  
The Government

Vigorous implementation of industrial poverty alleviation is the fundamental path and core power of poverty alleviation in impoverished areas. Enterprises and poor farmers are the main participants in industry poverty alleviation. Government supervision measures regulate their behaviors. This study investigates how to smoothly implement industry poverty alleviation projects considering government supervision. A game model is proposed based on the evolutionary game theory. It analyses the game processes between enterprises and poor farmers with and without government supervision based on the proposed model. It is shown that poverty alleviation projects will fail without government supervision given that the equilibrium point (0, 0) is the ultimate convergent point of the system but will possibly succeed with government supervision since the equilibrium points (0, 0) and (1, 1) are the ultimate convergent point of the system, where equilibrium point (1, 1) is our desired results. Different supervision modes have different effects on the game process. This study considers three supervision modes, namely, only reward mode, only penalty mode, and reward and penalty mode, and investigates the parameter design for the reward and penalty mode. The obtained results are helpful for the government to develop appropriate policies for the smooth implementation of industry poverty alleviation projects.

scholarly journals Research on the Collaborative Application of BIM in EPC Projects: The Perspective of Cooperation between Owners and General Contractors

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Chengshuang Sun ◽  
Min Wang ◽  
Fengyong Zhai
Keyword(s):  
Numerical Simulation ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Dynamic Method ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Final Decision ◽  
Game Model ◽  
General Contractors ◽  
Punishment Mechanism ◽  
Reducing Costs ◽  
Collaborative Application

As an effective way to reduce costs and increase efficiency of EPC projects, BIM technology has drawn a lot of attention in numerous countries. Existing studies have failed to reveal the BIM decision-making mechanisms of owners and general contractors in EPC projects in a dynamic method. This study investigates the underlying logic of the collaboration application of BIM by analyzing the dynamic behaviors of owners and general contractors based on evolutionary game model. The results show that the most effective suggestions to promote the BIM collaboration application in EPC projects are “increasing the proportion of BIM application initially strategies,” “increasing incremental revenue of BIM collaborative application,” “reducing costs of BIM collaboration application,” “avoiding excessive hitchhiking,” and “establishing reasonable reward and punishment mechanism.” On the basis of numerical simulation to illustrate the influence of the different initial strategies and parameters on the final decision in different situations, five solutions were proposed for the effective BIM collaboration application between owners and general contractors. This article can facilitate researchers pondering the dynamics of collaboration among stakeholders in projects, and it can also facilitate participants picking up proper strategies for improved collaboration.

scholarly journals The Decision-Making Analysis on End-of-Life Vehicle Recycling and Remanufacturing under Extended Producer Responsibility Policy

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (20) ◽  
pp. 11215
Author(s):  
Syed Abdul Rehman Khan ◽  
Danish Iqbal Godil ◽  
George Thomas ◽  
Muhammad Tanveer ◽  
Hafiz Muhammad Zia-ul-haq ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Expected Profit ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Game Model ◽  
The Third ◽  
Evolutionary Stable Strategies ◽  
Dual Cycle ◽  
The Government

This research develops a dual-cycle ELV recycling and remanufacturing system to better understand and improve the efficiency of the ELV recycling and remanufacturing businesses. For the flawless operation of this system, the researchers employed evolutionary game theory to establish a game model between original vehicle manufacturers (OVMs) and third-party recyclers with the government involved. This research presents evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) that could promote an ELV recycling and remanufacturing system. Results show that OVMs’ expected profit difference between choosing and not choosing authorization is crucial in their ESS. The licensing fee plays a part of OVMs’ expected profit difference. Based on the results, optimal ESS could be achieved when the OVMs’ expected profit difference between choosing authorization and not choosing authorization and the third-party recyclers’ profit when paying the licensing fee are both positive. Then, the two groups’ involvement in dual-cycle ELV recycling and the remanufacturing system can be ensured. This research implicates the government to devise appropriate reward and punishment strategy to encourage OVMs and third-party recyclers to collaborate for efficient recycling and remanufacturing systems. Particularly, the government is suggested to impose strict restrictions on OVMs to carry ELV recycling and provide support to promote recycling quantity standards. Hence, the ELV recycling and remanufacturing system would be strengthened, thus improving waste management which is crucial for both environmental and resource efficiency.

scholarly journals Research on Strategy Control of Taxi Carpooling Detour Route under Uncertain Environment

2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 ◽  
pp. 1-11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wei Zhang ◽  
Ruichun He ◽  
Qiang Xiao ◽  
Changxi Ma
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Prospect Theory ◽  
Travel Time ◽  
Traffic Congestion ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Success Probability ◽  
Route Choice ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Stable Strategy ◽  
Uncertain Environment

For the problem of route choice in taxi carpooling detour, considering the uncertainty of traffic and the characteristic of passengers’ noncomplete rationality, an evolutionary game model of taxi carpooling detour route is built, in which prospect theory is introduced and revenue of strategy is replaced by prospect value. The model reflects more really decision-making psychology of passengers. Then the stable strategies of the model are studied, and the influences of detour distance and traffic congestion on detour carpooling success are analyzed, respectively. The results show that when at least one route of which prospect values for two passenger sides are both positive exists, carpooling route can reach an agreement. The route is stable strategy of evolutionary game, and the passengers requiring short travel time tend to select the nondetour route. With the increase of detour distance and traffic congestion rate, the possibility of reaching an agreement decreases gradually; that is, possibility of carpooling failure increases. So taxi carpooling detour is possible under the certain condition, but some measures must be carried out such as constraints of detour distance and mitigation of traffic congestion to improve carpooling success probability. These conclusions have a certain guiding significance to the formulation of taxi carpooling policy.

scholarly journals Evolutionary Game Analysis of Firms’ Technological Strategic Choices: A Perspective of the Behavioral Biases

Complexity ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Yingqing Zhang ◽  
Ruguo Fan ◽  
Ming Luo ◽  
Mingman Chen ◽  
Jiaqin Sun
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Intellectual Property ◽  
Loss Aversion ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Spillover Effect ◽  
Intellectual Property Protection ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Probability Weighting ◽  
Strategic Choices ◽  
Behavioral Biases

To reveal the mechanisms of firms’ technological strategic choices between innovation and imitation, an evolutionary game model is proposed from the perspective of the behavioral biases. First, behavioral biases such as reference point dependence, loss aversion, and probability weighting can be defined and modeled based on the prospect theory. Second, according to the firm theory, a Cournot or Stackelberg game modeled with a technology spillover effect and intellectual property protection is applied to portray the interaction between firms. Third, an improved evolutionary game model is provided by incorporating behavioral biases into the framework of the decision-making process. Finally, the simulation analysis of some important factors, such as intellectual property protection, patent fees, innovation risks, decision-making attitudes, and consumers’ price preference on firms’ technological strategic choices, is presented. The corresponding results show that (1) innovation risk is an important factor affecting the technological strategic choices of firms, (2) increasing the intellectual property protection and the patent fee for technology transfer can effectively control the spillover effect of technology, (3) there is a partial U-shaped relationship between the consumers’ price preference and innovation, and (4) the behavioral biases such as reference point dependence, loss aversion, and probability weighting will change the perception of payoff and risk and will eventually induce firms to adopt the innovation strategy.

scholarly journals Consumer Privacy Protection With the Growth of AI-Empowered Online Shopping Based on the Evolutionary Game Model

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Su Wang ◽  
Zhuo Chen ◽  
Yi Xiao ◽  
Chunyu Lin
Keyword(s):  
Privacy Protection ◽  
Online Shopping ◽  
Personal Information ◽  
Equilibrium Points ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Personal Hygiene ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Privacy Concerns ◽  
Consumer Privacy ◽  
Technical Solutions

Social distancing due to the COVID-19 pandemic has driven some consumers to online shopping, and concerns about pandemic risks and personal hygiene have increased the demand for e-commerce. Providing personalized recommendations seems quite profitable for e-commerce platforms, and consumers also benefit from personalized content with the advancement of AI technologies. However, this possible win-win situation is marred by the increase in consumers' privacy concerns. Technical solutions have been widely studied to protect consumer privacy, while few analyses have been conducted from the perspective of psychological and behavioral implications. In this paper, an evolutionary game model of privacy protection between e-commerce platforms and consumers is established to determine the mechanisms by which various factors exert influence, and evolutionary stable strategies are obtained from equilibrium points. Then, the strategy selections are simulated with MATLAB 2020 software. Based on the results, the following conclusions are drawn: (1) the application of AI technologies in e-commerce will fundamentally benefit consumers, which makes them actively share personal information with e-commerce platforms with incentives for generous rewards; (2) it is profitable for e-commerce platforms to conduct data mining by improving the ability to use AI technologies and making efforts to reduce technical costs; and (3) regulators should improve the level of supervision instead of imposing a large penalty to enhance consumer trust, which could effectively increase the profits of e-commerce platforms and protect consumers' privacy.

scholarly journals An Evolutionary Game Model on Public Participation in Public-Private Partnerships

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Danrong Song ◽  
Yan Sun ◽  
Yu Fan
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Public Participation ◽  
General Public ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Public Utility ◽  
Public Private Partnerships ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Private Investor ◽  
Cooperative Behaviors ◽  
The Government

Effective participation of the general public in public-private partnerships (PPPs) can coordinate the multidemands of stakeholders and improve the scientificity of decision-making on infrastructure and public utility projects. However, excessive public participation may aggravate the complexity of PPPs and delay the progress of developing PPP projects. Accordingly, the appropriate participation of the general public is essential in the implementation of PPPs. This study examines the boundary conditions and the effective thresholds of public participation in adjusting the cooperative behaviors of both the government and the private investor in PPPs through an analysis of the evolution paths and dynamic balances of the strategy choices between the two parties. The results indicate that public participation in PPPs has the particularity of adjusting the partnership between the two parties. The results also suggest that public participation is not always effective and there are differences in the degree of public participation in the various strategy behaviors in which the government and the private investor choose to cooperate.

Evolutionary strategies of consumer federation and manufacturer under recall mechanism

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Chuanxu Wang ◽  
Changqun Song ◽  
Lang Xu
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Pricing Strategy ◽  
Evolutionary Strategies ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Pricing Strategies ◽  
Product Price ◽  
Penalty Coefficient ◽  
High Penalty ◽  
The Cost

Based on an unqualified product recalling process in a supply chain, this paper establishes an evolutionary game model between consumer federation and manufacturer, as well as analyzes the effects of manufacturer’s pricing strategy and consumer federation’s supervision on the decision-making and dynamic tendency. Under this structure, the manufacturers’ pricing strategies on recalls mechanism have two scenarios: the high penalty and low penalty from consumer federation. Results shows that, when the consumer federation adopts high penalty measures, there will be an ESS for consumer federation that can both minimize the cost and protect consumers’ rights. Further, the probability of manufacturer adopting “recall” strategy is positively correlated with the change in the product price, and both the probability of consumer federation adopting “regulate” strategy and manufacturer adopting “recall” strategy are positively correlated with the penalty coefficient.

scholarly journals Research on the Decision-Making Mechanism of Live Commerce Supply Chain Based on Three-Party Evolutionary Game

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jixiao Wu ◽  
Yinghui Wang
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Social Media ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Simulation Model ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Equilibrium Strategy ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Chain System ◽  
Sales Model

With the diversified development of media forms, livestreaming e-commerce has become a new sales model. Unlike the traditional sales model, this paper constructs a three-party game model composed of manufacturers, social media influencers and consumers based on the livestreaming model. It explores the equilibrium strategy selections of each participant in the supply chain system. In analyzing the evolutionary game stability of each participant, this paper obtains the equilibrium strategy and stability factors by analysis of the income and expenditure matrix. It uses the simulation model to analyze reasons for strategy selections of different game participants in the livestreaming e-commerce model. The results show that the strategies of manufacturers, social media influencers and consumers' selections have different impacts on their decision-making mechanism, and man-ufacturers are more sensitive to consumers' active participation in livestreaming e-commerce.

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