scholarly journals Evolutionary Game Analysis of Firms’ Technological Strategic Choices: A Perspective of the Behavioral Biases

Complexity ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Yingqing Zhang ◽  
Ruguo Fan ◽  
Ming Luo ◽  
Mingman Chen ◽  
Jiaqin Sun
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Intellectual Property ◽  
Loss Aversion ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Spillover Effect ◽  
Intellectual Property Protection ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Probability Weighting ◽  
Strategic Choices ◽  
Behavioral Biases

To reveal the mechanisms of firms’ technological strategic choices between innovation and imitation, an evolutionary game model is proposed from the perspective of the behavioral biases. First, behavioral biases such as reference point dependence, loss aversion, and probability weighting can be defined and modeled based on the prospect theory. Second, according to the firm theory, a Cournot or Stackelberg game modeled with a technology spillover effect and intellectual property protection is applied to portray the interaction between firms. Third, an improved evolutionary game model is provided by incorporating behavioral biases into the framework of the decision-making process. Finally, the simulation analysis of some important factors, such as intellectual property protection, patent fees, innovation risks, decision-making attitudes, and consumers’ price preference on firms’ technological strategic choices, is presented. The corresponding results show that (1) innovation risk is an important factor affecting the technological strategic choices of firms, (2) increasing the intellectual property protection and the patent fee for technology transfer can effectively control the spillover effect of technology, (3) there is a partial U-shaped relationship between the consumers’ price preference and innovation, and (4) the behavioral biases such as reference point dependence, loss aversion, and probability weighting will change the perception of payoff and risk and will eventually induce firms to adopt the innovation strategy.

scholarly journals Research on the Collaborative Application of BIM in EPC Projects: The Perspective of Cooperation between Owners and General Contractors

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Chengshuang Sun ◽  
Min Wang ◽  
Fengyong Zhai
Keyword(s):  
Numerical Simulation ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Dynamic Method ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Final Decision ◽  
Game Model ◽  
General Contractors ◽  
Punishment Mechanism ◽  
Reducing Costs ◽  
Collaborative Application

As an effective way to reduce costs and increase efficiency of EPC projects, BIM technology has drawn a lot of attention in numerous countries. Existing studies have failed to reveal the BIM decision-making mechanisms of owners and general contractors in EPC projects in a dynamic method. This study investigates the underlying logic of the collaboration application of BIM by analyzing the dynamic behaviors of owners and general contractors based on evolutionary game model. The results show that the most effective suggestions to promote the BIM collaboration application in EPC projects are “increasing the proportion of BIM application initially strategies,” “increasing incremental revenue of BIM collaborative application,” “reducing costs of BIM collaboration application,” “avoiding excessive hitchhiking,” and “establishing reasonable reward and punishment mechanism.” On the basis of numerical simulation to illustrate the influence of the different initial strategies and parameters on the final decision in different situations, five solutions were proposed for the effective BIM collaboration application between owners and general contractors. This article can facilitate researchers pondering the dynamics of collaboration among stakeholders in projects, and it can also facilitate participants picking up proper strategies for improved collaboration.

scholarly journals Effective Boundary of Innovation Subsidy: Searching by Stochastic Evolutionary Game Model

Symmetry ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (9) ◽  
pp. 1531 ◽  
Author(s):  
Junqiang Li ◽  
Jingyi Yi ◽  
Yingmei Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Random Disturbance ◽  
Strategic Choices ◽  
The Public ◽  
Effective Boundary ◽  
Reasonable Range ◽  
Value Range ◽  
Cooperation Strategy ◽  
Multiple Variables

Relationship between innovation subsidies and corporate strategic choices has been extensively studied. Public innovation subsidies are by no means a certain value, existing in the form of an effective range instead. This means that the public innovation subsidies existing within the reasonable range can achieve the same incentive effect. So, what is the reasonable range or the effective boundaries of public innovation subsidies to promote enterprises that adopt cooperation strategies? There is no definite answer. Based on classical game theory, a stochastic evolutionary game model is proposed in this paper, which takes into account the influence of random disturbance on the strategy evolution process. An effective boundary of public innovation subsidy is provided as the main contribution based on a mature game scenario. A set of experimental data is subsequently selected as the sample for numerical simulation and result verification. The results showed that the probability of noncooperation within the effective value range will successfully converge to zero, which also means that the agents will adopt a collaborative cooperation strategy. The regulation effect of the combination of multiple variables is also discussed.

Impact of socio-psychological factors on investment decisions: The mediating role of behavioral biases

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sadia Jabeen ◽  
Syed Zulfiqar Ali Shah ◽  
Naheed Sultana ◽  
Altamash Khan
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Social Interaction ◽  
Loss Aversion ◽  
Investment Decision ◽  
Equation Modeling ◽  
Behavioral Biases ◽  
Mediating Role ◽  
Investment Decision Making ◽  
The Relationship

Unlike previous studies that examine the effect of behavioral biases on investor decision-making, this study explores the root causes of behavioral biases and examines the mediating role of behavioral biases in the relationship between different types of emotions and investment decision-making. The cognitive theory of depression, attentional control theory, and prospect theory together provide the foundation and anticipate that stress, depression, anxiety, and social interaction are the major sources of cognitive mistakes that,in turn, affect investment decision-making. Model testing relies upon the data collected from 252stock investors trading in different stock exchanges of Pakistan; in order to test the hypothesized relationship, structural equation modeling has been used. Depression is a major source of loss aversion bias. Anxiety is a strong source of herding. Stress is a major source of representative bias.Social interaction is a root cause of overconfidence. Loss aversion bias, herding, and overconfidence fully mediate the relationship between depression, anxiety, social interaction, and investor decision; however, anxiety has the strongest impact on investor decision via herding bias, while stress has both insignificant direct and indirect effect on investment decision-making. Keywords: Sources of biases, self-efficacy, behavioral pattern, investment decision.

scholarly journals The Decision-Making Analysis on End-of-Life Vehicle Recycling and Remanufacturing under Extended Producer Responsibility Policy

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (20) ◽  
pp. 11215
Author(s):  
Syed Abdul Rehman Khan ◽  
Danish Iqbal Godil ◽  
George Thomas ◽  
Muhammad Tanveer ◽  
Hafiz Muhammad Zia-ul-haq ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Expected Profit ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Game Model ◽  
The Third ◽  
Evolutionary Stable Strategies ◽  
Dual Cycle ◽  
The Government

This research develops a dual-cycle ELV recycling and remanufacturing system to better understand and improve the efficiency of the ELV recycling and remanufacturing businesses. For the flawless operation of this system, the researchers employed evolutionary game theory to establish a game model between original vehicle manufacturers (OVMs) and third-party recyclers with the government involved. This research presents evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) that could promote an ELV recycling and remanufacturing system. Results show that OVMs’ expected profit difference between choosing and not choosing authorization is crucial in their ESS. The licensing fee plays a part of OVMs’ expected profit difference. Based on the results, optimal ESS could be achieved when the OVMs’ expected profit difference between choosing authorization and not choosing authorization and the third-party recyclers’ profit when paying the licensing fee are both positive. Then, the two groups’ involvement in dual-cycle ELV recycling and the remanufacturing system can be ensured. This research implicates the government to devise appropriate reward and punishment strategy to encourage OVMs and third-party recyclers to collaborate for efficient recycling and remanufacturing systems. Particularly, the government is suggested to impose strict restrictions on OVMs to carry ELV recycling and provide support to promote recycling quantity standards. Hence, the ELV recycling and remanufacturing system would be strengthened, thus improving waste management which is crucial for both environmental and resource efficiency.

Perilaku Investor Dalam Transaksi Saham di Pasar Modal

2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 195-215
Author(s):  
Fahira Dhea Azzahra ◽  
Isni   Andrian ◽  
Kemas M. Husni Thamrin
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Loss Aversion ◽  
Structural Equation ◽  
Cognitive Biases ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Self Control ◽  
Primary Data ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Behavioral Biases ◽  
Availability Bias

This study aims to analyzing the behavior of Palembang investors through cognitive biases and emotional biases that impacting investor’s decision making on stock transaction in the capital market. This decision making proxied by cognitive biases, there are overconfidence bias, represtentativeness bias, anchoring and adjustment bias, availability bias, illusion of control bias, and conservatism bias, also proxied by emotional biases there are self-control bias, optimism bias, loss aversion bias, dan status quo bias. The population of the study are investors whom became partners of securities, those listed in Indonesian Stock Exchange and the securities which stand only in Palembang region. There are 50 investors as sample of this study with purposive sampling as sampling method. The type data of this study is qualitative and the resources of data in this study is primary data with distributing questionnaire. Analyzing method in this study using multivariate analysis Structural Equation Model (SEM) and the result of this study shows that availability bias, conservatism bias, and loss aversion bias have significance effect to Palembang investor’s decision making in 2020. For future research could be able to take other samples from another big cities, as well as conducted research on the relationship between behavioral biases and financing or behavioral biases and health that including demographics and etc. 

scholarly journals Research on Strategy Control of Taxi Carpooling Detour Route under Uncertain Environment

2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 ◽  
pp. 1-11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wei Zhang ◽  
Ruichun He ◽  
Qiang Xiao ◽  
Changxi Ma
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Prospect Theory ◽  
Travel Time ◽  
Traffic Congestion ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Success Probability ◽  
Route Choice ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Stable Strategy ◽  
Uncertain Environment

For the problem of route choice in taxi carpooling detour, considering the uncertainty of traffic and the characteristic of passengers’ noncomplete rationality, an evolutionary game model of taxi carpooling detour route is built, in which prospect theory is introduced and revenue of strategy is replaced by prospect value. The model reflects more really decision-making psychology of passengers. Then the stable strategies of the model are studied, and the influences of detour distance and traffic congestion on detour carpooling success are analyzed, respectively. The results show that when at least one route of which prospect values for two passenger sides are both positive exists, carpooling route can reach an agreement. The route is stable strategy of evolutionary game, and the passengers requiring short travel time tend to select the nondetour route. With the increase of detour distance and traffic congestion rate, the possibility of reaching an agreement decreases gradually; that is, possibility of carpooling failure increases. So taxi carpooling detour is possible under the certain condition, but some measures must be carried out such as constraints of detour distance and mitigation of traffic congestion to improve carpooling success probability. These conclusions have a certain guiding significance to the formulation of taxi carpooling policy.

scholarly journals FDI and Intellectual Property Protection in China: A Game Theory Perspective

2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (6) ◽  
pp. 133-138
Author(s):  
Dong-Mei Lee ◽  
Lee-Yuan Wang ◽  
Yue Wang ◽  
Dai-Jiao Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Intellectual Property ◽  
Host Country ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Spillover Effect ◽  
Transnational Corporations ◽  
Intellectual Property Protection ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
Development Institutions ◽  
The Relationship

The large-scale spread of R&D activities by MNCs to investment host countries is a new phenomenon of globalization in the past ten years. For the host country, especially a developing host country such as China, how to promote the spillover effect of TNC research and development institutions on the host country and curb its crowding-out effect is a new topic. This paper analyzes the R&D strategy adopted by transnational corporations in China. We explain the relationship between the strength of intellectual property protection in China and the choice of the organization form of R&D activities by transnational corporations with game theory and proves the relationship between the two with data. Finally, policy implications are proposed for the trend of sole proprietorship of R&D activities of transnational corporations.

scholarly journals An Evolutionary Game Model on Public Participation in Public-Private Partnerships

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Danrong Song ◽  
Yan Sun ◽  
Yu Fan
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Public Participation ◽  
General Public ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Public Utility ◽  
Public Private Partnerships ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Private Investor ◽  
Cooperative Behaviors ◽  
The Government

Effective participation of the general public in public-private partnerships (PPPs) can coordinate the multidemands of stakeholders and improve the scientificity of decision-making on infrastructure and public utility projects. However, excessive public participation may aggravate the complexity of PPPs and delay the progress of developing PPP projects. Accordingly, the appropriate participation of the general public is essential in the implementation of PPPs. This study examines the boundary conditions and the effective thresholds of public participation in adjusting the cooperative behaviors of both the government and the private investor in PPPs through an analysis of the evolution paths and dynamic balances of the strategy choices between the two parties. The results indicate that public participation in PPPs has the particularity of adjusting the partnership between the two parties. The results also suggest that public participation is not always effective and there are differences in the degree of public participation in the various strategy behaviors in which the government and the private investor choose to cooperate.

Evolutionary strategies of consumer federation and manufacturer under recall mechanism

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Chuanxu Wang ◽  
Changqun Song ◽  
Lang Xu
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Pricing Strategy ◽  
Evolutionary Strategies ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Pricing Strategies ◽  
Product Price ◽  
Penalty Coefficient ◽  
High Penalty ◽  
The Cost

Based on an unqualified product recalling process in a supply chain, this paper establishes an evolutionary game model between consumer federation and manufacturer, as well as analyzes the effects of manufacturer’s pricing strategy and consumer federation’s supervision on the decision-making and dynamic tendency. Under this structure, the manufacturers’ pricing strategies on recalls mechanism have two scenarios: the high penalty and low penalty from consumer federation. Results shows that, when the consumer federation adopts high penalty measures, there will be an ESS for consumer federation that can both minimize the cost and protect consumers’ rights. Further, the probability of manufacturer adopting “recall” strategy is positively correlated with the change in the product price, and both the probability of consumer federation adopting “regulate” strategy and manufacturer adopting “recall” strategy are positively correlated with the penalty coefficient.

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