scholarly journals Optimal Pricing and Greening Strategy in a Competitive Green Supply Chain: Impact of Government Subsidy and Tax Policy

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (16) ◽  
pp. 9178
Author(s):  
Abhijit Barman ◽  
Rubi Das ◽  
Pijus Kanti De ◽  
Shib Sankar Sana
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Tax Policy ◽  
Market Competition ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Chain Model ◽  
Government Subsidy ◽  
Green Products ◽  
Role Of Government ◽  
Government Interference ◽  
The Government

With the expanding awareness of worldwide governments to ecological issues, the idea of protecting the environment has been initiated into the supply chain. The role of government in green supply chain management has become especially significant. This paper proposes a green supply chain model with a duopoly structure, in which two manufacturers separately produce green and non-green items sold through a common retailer. The government looks for social advantages and decides subsidies for the green item and taxes for non-green items. Using a centralized and decentralized model, two cases of government interference and no government interference are analyzed with customer green preference. This study focuses on exploring the pricing strategy, greening strategy and comparing the optimal decisions in all the cases to maximize the overall profitability of the supply chain. Numerical results and sensitivity analysis illustrate how the government subsidy on green products and tax policy in non-green products can influence the profitability of supply chain members. The research finding can give valuable experiences to channel members of the supply chain to settle optimum choices with and without government interference by enhancing the green and non-green item market competition. Among the competitive duopoly structure, the centralized model makes more profit and leads to manufactured eco-friendly items.

Analysis on the Optimal Subsidy Strategy of Government in Green Supply Chain

2011 ◽  
Vol 224 ◽  
pp. 147-151 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chang Fei Jin ◽  
Xin Wang ◽  
Li Jun Mei
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Rapid Development ◽  
The Other ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Chain Model ◽  
Government Subsidy ◽  
Optimal Production ◽  
Supply Chain Model ◽  
The Government

In order to study the role that the government played in the green supply chain, we constructed a supply chain model by two kinds of manufacturers, consumers and government environmental fund, on this basis, the optimal government subsidies and products' optimal production and price were obtained by game theory and utility function. Then, according to the results of numerical example we draw the conclusion that if the government adopts optimal subsidies policy, social welfare will be substantially increase, and the demand for green products will rise too, on the other side, the prices will be bring down. It is shown that with the guidance of the government subsidy mechanism, the green supply chain will be on the track that is conducive to the rapid development of environmental protection.

Financial Subsidies and their Effects on Environment-Friendly Products Supply in Green Supply Chain

2013 ◽  
Vol 712-715 ◽  
pp. 3038-3043
Author(s):  
Fang Miao Hou
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
High Tech ◽  
Green Products ◽  
Production Scale ◽  
Environment Friendly ◽  
Price Competitiveness ◽  
Positive Effects ◽  
The Government

The supply of environment-friendly products is an integral part of the green supply chain. Due to such reasons as lack of high-tech and lack of price competitiveness in contrast to traditional products, the manufacturers will not have incentive to produce and supply green products, so the Government should grant financial subsidies to producers which will compensate the profits entitled to them. Through the analysis based on game theory, the article concludes that there is disadvantage in constant subsidy and the variable subsidies will have more positive effects on the supply of environment-friendly products since the subsidy amount varies with the production scale.

scholarly journals Green Supply Chain Decisions Considering Consumers’ Low-Carbon Awareness under Different Government Subsidies

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (6) ◽  
pp. 2281 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chang Su ◽  
Xiaojing Liu ◽  
Wenyi Du
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Power Structures ◽  
Green Products ◽  
Government Subsidies ◽  
Emission Level ◽  
The Government

This study examined how to arrange the generation and pricing of supply chain members in the case of consumer green preference with different government subsidies. The green supply chain comprises a manufacturer and a retailer; the government subsidizes manufacturers who produce green products and consumers who buy green products. The study built a green supply chain pricing decision model with different forms of subsidy under various power structures. By backward induction and sensitivity analysis, this study analyzed optimal strategies of green supply chain under various modes, and we discuss how the government subsidy coefficient affects the optimal decision of a green supply chain. The results show that, firstly, whether the government subsidizes the manufacturers or the consumers, the wholesale price offered by the manufacturer is directly proportional to the subsidy coefficient under the two power structures. Secondly, when the government subsidizes the manufacturer, the carbon-emission level and the retail price are inversely proportional to the subsidy coefficient under the manufacturer leader; the carbon-emission level and the retail price are all directly proportional to the subsidy coefficient under the retailer leader. Finally, when the government subsidizes the consumers, the carbon-emission level and the retail price are directly proportional to the subsidy coefficient under the two power structures.

scholarly journals How Different Government Subsidy Objects Impact on Green Supply Chain Decision considering Consumer Group Complexity

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Qingfeng Meng ◽  
Mengwan Li ◽  
Zhen Li ◽  
Jing Zhu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Green Product ◽  
Green Products ◽  
Consumer Group ◽  
Environmental Preferences ◽  
Government Subsidies ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Impact

This paper fully considers the complexity characteristics of the consumer group, such as the heterogeneity of consumer environmental preferences and consumption levels and constructs a two-stage price decision model of green supply chain composed of the manufacturer and retailers. Under the four different scenarios, no government subsidies, government subsidies are given to the manufacturer, government subsidies are given to the green product retailer, and government subsidies are given to green product consumers, the impact of government subsidies on green supply chain member price decisions is analyzed, and the validity of the model is verified by an example. The results show that compared with the no government subsidies, government subsidies to the manufacturer will reduce the wholesale and sales prices of green products, and subsidies to the green product retailer will lead to higher wholesale prices and lower sales prices of green products, and subsidies to green product consumers will increase the wholesale and sales prices of green products. No matter which object is subsidized by the government, the wholesale price of general products will not change and the sales price will decrease. Government subsidies will facilitate the sales of green products, thereby expanding the market share of green products.

scholarly journals Optimal Decisions of a Green Supply Chain under the Joint Action of Fairness Preference and Subsidy to the Manufacturer

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zi-yuan Zhang ◽  
Duan-xiang Fu ◽  
Qing Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Government Subsidy ◽  
Market Expansion ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
Preference Behavior ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Impact

Government subsidy promotes the development of green supply chain, and the influence of decision-makers’ behavioral preferences becomes increasingly prominent in green supply chain management. In order to further enrich the research content of green supply chain, we first use Stackelberg game theory to construct game models by taking the product green degree, wholesale price and retail price as the decision variables, then we work out the equilibrium strategies of the manufacturer and the retailer under four decision scenarios, and reveal the impact differences between the two parties’ fairness preference behaviors. Our research mainly has the following findings: Firstly, the government subsidy to the manufacturer can benefit these two parties and can have certain impact on the optimal decisions only by working with the green product market expansion efficiency. Secondly, these two parties’ fairness preference behaviors can cause serious damage to the other party’s profit and the overall profit of green supply chain, and increase the rate of their own profit in the overall profit of green supply chain, but the difference is that the retailer’s fairness preference behavior can cause a greater decline in product green degree and wholesale price, and when certain conditions are met, its own profit may rise compared to its fairness neutral, while the manufacturer’s fairness preference behavior can cause a greater damage to the overall profit of green supply chainand make its own profit always be lower than its fairness neutral. Thirdly, the government subsidy to the manufacturer and the fairness preference behaviors of both parties can cause a stack effect on the optimal solutions, which means that the subsidy government provides for the manufacturer can aggravate the negative influence caused by these two parties’ fairness preference behaviors.

scholarly journals Decisions of the Dual-Channel Supply Chain under Double Policy Considering Remanufacturing

2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 465 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dingzhong Feng ◽  
Lei Ma ◽  
Yangke Ding ◽  
Guanghua Wu ◽  
Ye Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Tax Policy ◽  
Carbon Tax ◽  
Profit Sharing ◽  
Optimal Decision ◽  
Chain Model ◽  
Subsidy Policy ◽  
Green Consumers ◽  
The Government

Considering the preference of green consumers for remanufactured products, a dual-sale-channel supply chain model with government non-intervention, government remanufacturing subsidy policy, and carbon tax policy is constructed, respectively. The difference of the optimal decision between the firm and the government under the two policies is discussed in this paper. Meanwhile, we analyze the influence of green consumers on the government’s optimal decision, based on social welfare maximization. It is found that without government intervention, social welfare is the lowest. The carbon tax policy is better when the proportion of green consumers and the environmental coefficient are extreme or moderate at the same time. Otherwise, the subsidy policy is better. The carbon tax policy is more effective than the subsidy policy in controlling carbon emissions. Profit-sharing contracts should be established by enterprises and governments to achieve win–win results.

The problems facing agricultural sector in Zanzibar and the prospects of Waqf-Muzar’ah-supply chain model

Humanomics ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 189-210 ◽  
Author(s):  
Issa Salim Moh’d ◽  
Mustafa Omar Mohammed ◽  
Buerhan Saiti
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Interest Rates ◽  
Financial Models ◽  
Agricultural Sector ◽  
Chain Model ◽  
Content Type ◽  
High Interest ◽  
Supply Chain Model ◽  
The Government ◽  
Clove Industry

Purpose This paper aims to identify the appropriate model to address the financial challenges in agricultural sector in Zanzibar. Since the middle of 1960, clove production has continually and significantly decreased because of some problems and challenges that include financial ones. The financial intermediaries such as banks, cooperatives and micro-enterprises provide micro-financing to the farmers with high interest rates along with collateral requirements. The numerous programmes, measures and policies adopted by the relevant parties to find out the solutions to the dwindling clove production have failed. Design/methodology/approach The authors will review and examine several existing financial models, identify the issues and challenges of the current financial models and propose an appropriate Islamic financing model. Findings The numerous programmes, measures and policies adopted by the relevant parties to find out the solutions to the dwindling clove production have failed. This study, therefore, proposed a Waqf-Muzara’ah-supply chain model to address the financial challenge. Partnership arrangement is also suggested in the model to mitigate the issues of high interest rates and collateral that constrains the financial ability of the farmers and their agricultural output. Originality/value The contribution of the agricultural sector to the economic development of Zanzibar Islands is considerable. As one of the important agricultural sectors, the clove industry was the economic backbone of the government of Zanzibar. This study is believed to be a pioneering work; hence, it is the first study that investigates empirically the challenges facing the clove industry in Zanzibar.

scholarly journals Optimal Pricing and Green Product Design Strategies in a Sustainable Supply Chain Considering Government Subsidy and Different Channel Power Structures

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (22) ◽  
pp. 12446
Author(s):  
Kelei Xue ◽  
Guohua Sun ◽  
Yuyan Wang ◽  
Shuiye Niu
Keyword(s):  
Sustainable Development ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Product Design ◽  
Green Product ◽  
Government Subsidy ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Design Strategies ◽  
The Government ◽  
Green Product Design

Green product design is a vital measure to support sustainable development in a circular economy era. This paper studies the multi-product pricing and green product design strategies under different supply chain structures and government subsidy strategies. Considering different channel leadership, we establish the centralized (C), manufacturer-led (MS), and retailer-led (RS) supply chain models, respectively. By applying a game-theoretical approach, corresponding equilibrium pricing, green product design, and government subsidy decisions under different supply chain structures are obtained. Through comparison and numerical analysis, we find that: (1) the different subsidy strategies of the government have an important impact on green product development. When the government provides a uniform subsidy strategy, a RS supply chain can bring greener product, more market demands, more profit, and more social welfare; (2) when the government provides a differentiated subsidy strategy, MS and RS supply chain structures can bring greener product and more market demand than the centralized supply chain. They can also bring the same social welfare and the same product to the green design level. However, the MS supply chain structure can bring more profit for the firm; (3) the consumers’ green awareness positively impacts the design and development of green product. Therefore, it is beneficial for the firm to adopt reasonable measures to boost the environmental awareness of consumers in order to realize the sustainable development of our society.

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