scholarly journals How Different Government Subsidy Objects Impact on Green Supply Chain Decision considering Consumer Group Complexity

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Qingfeng Meng ◽  
Mengwan Li ◽  
Zhen Li ◽  
Jing Zhu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Green Product ◽  
Green Products ◽  
Consumer Group ◽  
Environmental Preferences ◽  
Government Subsidies ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Impact

This paper fully considers the complexity characteristics of the consumer group, such as the heterogeneity of consumer environmental preferences and consumption levels and constructs a two-stage price decision model of green supply chain composed of the manufacturer and retailers. Under the four different scenarios, no government subsidies, government subsidies are given to the manufacturer, government subsidies are given to the green product retailer, and government subsidies are given to green product consumers, the impact of government subsidies on green supply chain member price decisions is analyzed, and the validity of the model is verified by an example. The results show that compared with the no government subsidies, government subsidies to the manufacturer will reduce the wholesale and sales prices of green products, and subsidies to the green product retailer will lead to higher wholesale prices and lower sales prices of green products, and subsidies to green product consumers will increase the wholesale and sales prices of green products. No matter which object is subsidized by the government, the wholesale price of general products will not change and the sales price will decrease. Government subsidies will facilitate the sales of green products, thereby expanding the market share of green products.

scholarly journals Green Supply Chain Decisions Considering Consumers’ Low-Carbon Awareness under Different Government Subsidies

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (6) ◽  
pp. 2281 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chang Su ◽  
Xiaojing Liu ◽  
Wenyi Du
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Power Structures ◽  
Green Products ◽  
Government Subsidies ◽  
Emission Level ◽  
The Government

This study examined how to arrange the generation and pricing of supply chain members in the case of consumer green preference with different government subsidies. The green supply chain comprises a manufacturer and a retailer; the government subsidizes manufacturers who produce green products and consumers who buy green products. The study built a green supply chain pricing decision model with different forms of subsidy under various power structures. By backward induction and sensitivity analysis, this study analyzed optimal strategies of green supply chain under various modes, and we discuss how the government subsidy coefficient affects the optimal decision of a green supply chain. The results show that, firstly, whether the government subsidizes the manufacturers or the consumers, the wholesale price offered by the manufacturer is directly proportional to the subsidy coefficient under the two power structures. Secondly, when the government subsidizes the manufacturer, the carbon-emission level and the retail price are inversely proportional to the subsidy coefficient under the manufacturer leader; the carbon-emission level and the retail price are all directly proportional to the subsidy coefficient under the retailer leader. Finally, when the government subsidizes the consumers, the carbon-emission level and the retail price are directly proportional to the subsidy coefficient under the two power structures.

scholarly journals Optimal Decisions of a Green Supply Chain under the Joint Action of Fairness Preference and Subsidy to the Manufacturer

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zi-yuan Zhang ◽  
Duan-xiang Fu ◽  
Qing Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Government Subsidy ◽  
Market Expansion ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
Preference Behavior ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Impact

Government subsidy promotes the development of green supply chain, and the influence of decision-makers’ behavioral preferences becomes increasingly prominent in green supply chain management. In order to further enrich the research content of green supply chain, we first use Stackelberg game theory to construct game models by taking the product green degree, wholesale price and retail price as the decision variables, then we work out the equilibrium strategies of the manufacturer and the retailer under four decision scenarios, and reveal the impact differences between the two parties’ fairness preference behaviors. Our research mainly has the following findings: Firstly, the government subsidy to the manufacturer can benefit these two parties and can have certain impact on the optimal decisions only by working with the green product market expansion efficiency. Secondly, these two parties’ fairness preference behaviors can cause serious damage to the other party’s profit and the overall profit of green supply chain, and increase the rate of their own profit in the overall profit of green supply chain, but the difference is that the retailer’s fairness preference behavior can cause a greater decline in product green degree and wholesale price, and when certain conditions are met, its own profit may rise compared to its fairness neutral, while the manufacturer’s fairness preference behavior can cause a greater damage to the overall profit of green supply chainand make its own profit always be lower than its fairness neutral. Thirdly, the government subsidy to the manufacturer and the fairness preference behaviors of both parties can cause a stack effect on the optimal solutions, which means that the subsidy government provides for the manufacturer can aggravate the negative influence caused by these two parties’ fairness preference behaviors.

scholarly journals Dynamic Adjustment Mechanism and Differential Game Model Construction of Mask Emergency Supply Chain Cooperation Based on COVID-19 Outbreak

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 1115
Author(s):  
Shufan Zhu ◽  
Kefan Xie ◽  
Ping Gui
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Differential Game ◽  
Production Technology ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Transfer Payment ◽  
Dynamic Adjustment ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Government Subsidies ◽  
Technology Investment ◽  
The Impact

Incorporating the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the mask supply chain into our framework and taking mask output as a state variable, our study introduces the differential game to study the long-term dynamic cooperation of a two-echelon supply chain composed of the supplier and the manufacturer under government subsidies. The study elaborates that government subsidies can provide more effective incentives for supply chain members to cooperate in the production of masks compared with the situation of no government subsidies. A relatively low wholesale price can effectively increase the profits of supply chain members and the supply chain system. The joint contract of two-way cost-sharing contract and transfer payment contract can promote production technology investment efforts of the supply chain members, the optimum trajectory of mask production, and total profit to reach the best state as the centralized decision scenario within a certain range. Meanwhile, it is determined that the profits of supply chain members in the joint contract can be Pareto improvement compared with decentralized decision scenario. With the increase of production technology investment cost coefficients and output self-decay rate, mask outputs have shown a downward trend in the joint contract decision model. On the contrary, mask outputs would rise with growing sensitivity of mask output to production technology investment effort and increasing sensitivity of mask demand to mask output.

scholarly journals Research on the Dynamics Game Model in a Green Supply Chain: Government Subsidy Strategies under the Retailer’s Selling Effort Level

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xigang Yuan ◽  
Xiaoqing Zhang ◽  
Dalin Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Government Subsidy ◽  
Principal Agent Theory ◽  
Effort Level ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Selling Effort

Based on dynamic game theory and the principal-agent theory, this paper examined different government subsidy strategies in green supply chain management. Assuming that the retailer’s level of selling effort involved asymmetric information, this study analyzed the impact of different government subsidy strategies on the wholesale price, the product greenness level, retail price, the level of selling effort, the manufacturer’s profit, and the retailer’s profit. The results showed that (1) the government’s subsidy strategy can effectively not only improve the product greenness level but also increase the profits of an enterprise in a green supply chain, which helps the retailer to enhance their selling effort; (2) regardless of whether the retailer’s level of selling effort was high or low, as the government’s subsidy coefficient increased, the wholesale price continued to decrease, and the product greenness level and retailer’s selling effort level also increased.

Financial Subsidies and their Effects on Environment-Friendly Products Supply in Green Supply Chain

2013 ◽  
Vol 712-715 ◽  
pp. 3038-3043
Author(s):  
Fang Miao Hou
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
High Tech ◽  
Green Products ◽  
Production Scale ◽  
Environment Friendly ◽  
Price Competitiveness ◽  
Positive Effects ◽  
The Government

The supply of environment-friendly products is an integral part of the green supply chain. Due to such reasons as lack of high-tech and lack of price competitiveness in contrast to traditional products, the manufacturers will not have incentive to produce and supply green products, so the Government should grant financial subsidies to producers which will compensate the profits entitled to them. Through the analysis based on game theory, the article concludes that there is disadvantage in constant subsidy and the variable subsidies will have more positive effects on the supply of environment-friendly products since the subsidy amount varies with the production scale.

scholarly journals Research on Pricing and Coordination Strategy of a Sustainable Green Supply Chain with a Capital-Constrained Retailer

Complexity ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 ◽  
pp. 1-12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Liming Zhao ◽  
Ling Li ◽  
Yao Song ◽  
Cong Li ◽  
Yujie Wu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Green Supply Chain Management ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Green Products ◽  
Consumer Awareness ◽  
Coordination Strategy ◽  
Capital Constraints ◽  
Green Supply Chains ◽  
The Impact

With the gradual deepening of environmental problems and the increase in consumer awareness of environmental protection, many enterprises have already begun to pay attention to green supply chain management. However, the price of green products is higher than that of nongreen products, which is an enormous challenge for many small- or medium-sized enterprises. To study the pricing and coordination of green supply chains under capital constraints, a model consisting of a manufacturer and a capital-constrained retailer is established; the manufacturer invests in green products and provides a deferred payment contract. Setting the situation without capital constraints as a benchmark, this study explores the impact of the retailer’s capital constraints on the manufacturer’s product greenness design; an interesting result shows that deferred payment can help encourage the retailer to order more products and improve the profit of the manufacturer and the efficiency of the entire supply chain as well as the product’s greenness level simultaneously. However, the profit of the retailer will be hurt by the deferred payment contract. Therefore, to guarantee the profit of the entire channel and to make the two agents obtain a win-win outcome, a new two-way revenue-sharing contract is designed to coordinate the green supply chain.

scholarly journals The Impact of Government Subsidies on the Low-Carbon Supply Chain Based on Carbon Emission Reduction Level

2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (14) ◽  
pp. 7603
Author(s):  
Biao Li ◽  
Yong Geng ◽  
Xiqiang Xia ◽  
Dan Qiao
Keyword(s):  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Carbon Emission Reduction ◽  
Government Subsidies ◽  
Carbon Supply ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Impact

To improve low-carbon technology, the government has shifted its strategy from subsidizing low-carbon products (LCP) to low-carbon technology. To analyze the impact of government subsidies based on carbon emission reduction levels on different entities in the low-carbon supply chain (LCSC), game theory is used to model the provision of government subsidies to low-carbon enterprises and retailers. The main findings of the paper are that a government subsidy strategy based on carbon emission reduction levels can effectively drive low-carbon enterprises to further reduce the carbon emissions. The government’s choice of subsidy has the same effect on the LCP retail price per unit, the sales volume, and the revenue of low-carbon products per unit. When the government subsidizes the retailer, the low-carbon product wholesale price per unit is the highest. That is, low-carbon enterprises use up part of the government subsidies by increasing the wholesale price of low-carbon products. The retail price of low-carbon products per unit is lower than the retail price of low-carbon products in the context of decentralized decision making, but the sales volume and revenue of low-carbon products are greater in the centralized decision-making. The cost–benefit-sharing contract could enable the decentralized decision model to achieve the same level of profit as the centralized decision model.

scholarly journals Effect of Optimal Subsidy Rate and Strategic Behaviour of Supply Chain Members under Competition on Green Product Retailing

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-23
Author(s):  
Subrata Saha ◽  
Izabela Nielsen ◽  
Shib Sankar Sana
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Vertical Integration ◽  
Government Expenditure ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Quality Level ◽  
Subsidy Rate ◽  
Strategic Behaviour ◽  
Social Welfare Maximization ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Impact

This paper investigates the impact of the subsidy and horizontal strategic cooperation on a green supply chain where two competing manufacturers distribute substitutable green products through exclusive retailers. Models are formulated in three-stage game structures in five different scenarios, where the government organization determines optimal subsidy by pursuing social welfare maximization. Both manufacturers invest in improving green quality levels of products. The study aims to explore the advantage of vertical integration and strategic collusion from the perspective of green supply chain practice in the presence of subsidy. The key contributions from the present study indicate that under competition, members of both supply chains are able to receive higher profits through horizontal collusion, but green quality levels of the product remain suboptimal. If upstream manufacturers cooperate, government subsidy does not necessarily improve product quality level, and the amount of government expenditure increased substantially. By comparing outcomes where members are vertically integrated with scenarios where members make strategic collusion, we found that the former might outperform by later. Cross-price sensitivity appears as a significant parameter affecting supply chain members’ performance and the amount of government expenditure. Cooperation between members at the horizontal level is a more robust strategic measure than vertical integration if consumers are highly price-sensitive.

scholarly journals Optimal Pricing and Greening Strategy in a Competitive Green Supply Chain: Impact of Government Subsidy and Tax Policy

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (16) ◽  
pp. 9178
Author(s):  
Abhijit Barman ◽  
Rubi Das ◽  
Pijus Kanti De ◽  
Shib Sankar Sana
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Tax Policy ◽  
Market Competition ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Chain Model ◽  
Government Subsidy ◽  
Green Products ◽  
Role Of Government ◽  
Government Interference ◽  
The Government

With the expanding awareness of worldwide governments to ecological issues, the idea of protecting the environment has been initiated into the supply chain. The role of government in green supply chain management has become especially significant. This paper proposes a green supply chain model with a duopoly structure, in which two manufacturers separately produce green and non-green items sold through a common retailer. The government looks for social advantages and decides subsidies for the green item and taxes for non-green items. Using a centralized and decentralized model, two cases of government interference and no government interference are analyzed with customer green preference. This study focuses on exploring the pricing strategy, greening strategy and comparing the optimal decisions in all the cases to maximize the overall profitability of the supply chain. Numerical results and sensitivity analysis illustrate how the government subsidy on green products and tax policy in non-green products can influence the profitability of supply chain members. The research finding can give valuable experiences to channel members of the supply chain to settle optimum choices with and without government interference by enhancing the green and non-green item market competition. Among the competitive duopoly structure, the centralized model makes more profit and leads to manufactured eco-friendly items.

scholarly journals Pricing and Safety Investment Decisions in Food Supply Chains with Government Subsidy

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Yanan Yu ◽  
Yong He ◽  
Melissza Salling
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Food Safety ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Market Share ◽  
Food Supply ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Government Subsidies ◽  
The Government ◽  
Safe Food ◽  
Safety Investment

As the demand for safe food has been rapidly increasing these years, more and more stakeholders are dedicated to the safety of the food in the supply chain of this sector. To expand the market share of safe food, governments of some countries also provide subsidies to encourage food processors to invest in better food safety efforts. This paper establishes a three-stage game model between the government and a two-stage food supply chain that consists of one supplier and one processor, where the government subsidizes processors to invest in food safety efforts; furthermore, this paper determines the optimal wholesale price, marginal profit, food safety investment, and government subsidies. This paper analyzes the effects of the government subsidies and risk aversion of the food processor and introduces the mode of order quantity-based payment and demand-based payment; moreover, it also analyzes the impacts of subsidies and different payment methods on demands. The results show that suppliers can increase the market share of products by adopting the demand-based payment, but this method does not always benefit the members of the supply chain. As the processor is more risk-averse, the optimal subsidy is higher, encouraging the processor to invest in more efforts. Finally, the supplier’s profit increases with the processor’s risk aversion indicator.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document