scholarly journals Coordination Mechanism of Dual-Channel Supply Chains Considering Retailer Innovation Inputs

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 813 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wensheng Yang ◽  
Yinyuan Si ◽  
Jinxing Zhang ◽  
Sen Liu ◽  
Andrea Appolloni
Keyword(s):  
Sustainable Development ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Operational Efficiency ◽  
Coordination Mechanism ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Physical Channel ◽  
Retail Prices

In response to the online channels established by manufacturers, physical retailers are starting to offer innovative services, which will intensify conflicts between manufacturers and retailers. Considering that the conflict will affect the operation efficiency and sustainable development of the supply chain, the coordination mechanism of a dual-channel supply chain has been established. In this study, we construct the Stackelberg game model based on consumer utility theory to analyze the complex mechanism of retailers’ innovation input level affecting supply chain operation and design the double coordination mechanism. The results show that: (1) an optimal combination of wholesale prices, retail prices and innovation input levels can optimize the operational efficiency of the supply chain, (2) Noncooperation among channel members affects the retailer’s product pricing, decreases the market share of the physical channel and increases the market demand of manufacturers, (3) The dual coordination mechanism can alleviate channel conflicts, which can improve the operational efficiency of the supply chain. This study provides several insights on the theory of organizational coordination and sustainable development in conflicts of dual-channel supply chains.

scholarly journals Decision and Coordination in a Dual-Channel Three-Layered Green Supply Chain

Symmetry ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (11) ◽  
pp. 549 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zilong Song ◽  
Shiwei He ◽  
Baifeng An
Keyword(s):  
Sustainable Development ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Environmental Performance ◽  
Fresh Produce ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Equilibrium Solutions ◽  
Sustainable Performance ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Social And Environmental Performance

This paper investigated, for the first time, the game and coordination of a dual-channel, three-layered, green fresh produce supply chain, with regard to its economic, social, and environmental performance. Considering that the market demand is dual-channel priced and sensitive to the degree of greenness and the freshness-level, four game models, under different scenarios have been established. These included a centralized scenario, a decentralized scenario, and two contractual scenarios. The equilibrium solutions under the four scenarios were characterized. From the perspective of a sustainable development, the economic, social, and environmental performance of the supply chain was analyzed. To enhance the supply chain performance, two contract mechanisms were designed and the conditions for a multi-win outcome were obtained. Accordingly, many propositions and management implications were provided. The results showed that, (1) compared to the centralized supply chain case, the performance of the decentralized supply chain case is inferior; (2) in addition to increasing the concentration of the supply chain decisions, the two contracts proposed can effectively coordinate the green supply chain and improve its sustainable performance; and (3) the performance of the supply chain is positively driven by the consumers’ sensitivity to greenness degree and the freshness level of fresh produce. This paper fills a research gap and helps the participants of the channel recognize the operational decision principle of a complex green supply chain, in order to achieve a higher and a long-term sustainable-development performance.

scholarly journals Decisions and Coordination in E-Commerce Supply Chain under Logistics Outsourcing and Altruistic Preferences

Mathematics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 253
Author(s):  
Yuyan Wang ◽  
Zhaoqing Yu ◽  
Liang Shen ◽  
Runjie Fan ◽  
Rongyun Tang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Consumer Preferences ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Altruistic Behavior ◽  
Fixed Cost ◽  
Equilibrium Solutions ◽  
Factors Affecting ◽  
Dual Channel

Considering the peculiarities of logistics in the electronic commerce (e-commerce) supply chain (ESC) and e-commerce platform’s altruistic preferences, a model including an e-commerce platform, third-party logistics service provider, and manufacturer is constructed. Based on this, three decision models are proposed and equilibrium solutions are obtained by the Stackelberg game. Then, an “altruistic preference joint fixed-cost” contract is proposed to maximize system efficiency. Finally, numerical analysis is used to validate the findings of the paper. The article not only analyzes and compares the optimal decisions under different ESC models, but also explores the intrinsic factors affecting the decisions. This paper finds that the conclusions of dual-channel supply chains or traditional supply chains do not necessarily apply to ESC, and that the effect of altruistic behavior under ESC is influenced by consumer preferences. Moreover, there is a multiparty win–win state for ESC, and this state can be achieved through the “altruistic preference joint fixed-cost” contract. Therefore, the findings of this paper contribute to the development of an e-commerce market and the cooperation of ESC members.

scholarly journals Who Drives Green Innovation? A Game Theoretical Analysis of a Closed-Loop Supply Chain under Different Power Structures

2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (7) ◽  
pp. 2274 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dooho Lee
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Innovation Strategy ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Green Innovation ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Innovation Strategies ◽  
Market Leadership

As awareness of environmental protection increases worldwide, enterprises have been building their supply chains in ways that conserve natural resources and minimize the creation of pollutants. One of the practical ways to make supply chains more sustainable is for enterprises to utilize green innovation strategies and to increase resource reuse. In this work, we focus on a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) consisting of a manufacturer, a retailer, and a collector. In the investigated CLSC, the manufacturer and the retailer drive the green innovation strategy either individually or simultaneously to boost market demand. In the reverse flow of the CLSC, the collector is responsible for collecting consumers’ used products and transferring them to the manufacturer for remanufacturing. By combining two types of the market leadership and three types of green innovation strategies, we establish six different Stackelberg game models and solve them analytically. Through an extensive comparative analysis, we show who should have market leadership and who should drive the green innovation strategy in the CLSC. Various numerical examples are also given to support our major findings. One of our key findings suggests that the supply chain members must participate in green innovation activities at the same time to achieve a win-win scenario in the CLSC.

scholarly journals Warranty Decision Model and Remanufacturing Coordination Mechanism in Closed-Loop Supply Chain: View from a Consumer Behavior Perspective

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (12) ◽  
pp. 4738 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaodong Zhu ◽  
Lingfei Yu ◽  
Ji Zhang ◽  
Chenliang Li ◽  
Yizhao Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Decision Model ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Coordination Mechanism ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Chain System ◽  
Warranty Service

The remanufacturing warranty strategy has become an effective mechanism for reducing consumer risk and stimulating market demand in closed-loop supply chain management. Based on the characteristics of consumers’ behavior of purchase decisions, this paper studies the warranty decision model of remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain under the Stackelberg game model. The present study discussed and compared the decision variables, including remanufacturing product pricing, extended warranty service pricing, warranty period and supply chain system profit. The research shows that consumers’ decision-making significantly affirms the dual marginalization effect of the supply chain system while significantly affecting the supply chain warranty decision; the improved revenue sharing contract and the two charge contracts respectively coordinates the manufacturer-led and retail-oriented closed-loop supply chain system, which effectively implements the Pareto improvement of the closed-loop supply chain system with warranty services. In the present study, the model is verified and analyzed by numerical simulation.

scholarly journals Pricing decision of a dual-channel supply chain with different payment, corporate social responsibility and service level

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Baogui Xin ◽  
Le Zhang ◽  
Lei Xie
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Interest Rate ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Service Level ◽  
Optimal Decision ◽  
Payment Methods ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Pricing Decision ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain

Strategies such as price, CSR, and service have an important impact on enterprises and supply chains. This paper proposes a two-echelon dual-channel supply chain composed of a manufacturer and a retailer. Considering the product pricing, CSR level, and service level in the supply chain, this paper employs the Stackelberg game to depict supply chain participants' optimal decisions and analyze the influence of explanatory variables on the optimal decision with retailer's payment methods. The results state that market share, service level, CSR, and financing interest rate significantly impact the pricing decision of all participants in the supply chain. In addition, strategies of CSR level and service level are also affected by the discount rate of advance payment, financing interest rate, return on investment, and opportunity cost rate. This paper incorporates CSR and service level into the objective function, considers a variety of retailers' payment methods, enriches the supply chain's pricing model, and is of great value to scientific decision-making of enterprises and sustainable development of supply chains.

Coordination Contracts of Dual-Channel Supply Chain Considering Advertising Cooperation

2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-89
Author(s):  
Xue-Mei Zhang ◽  
Ying-Ying Li ◽  
Zhi Liu ◽  
Qian-Wen Li
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Marketing Channel ◽  
Coordination Mechanism ◽  
Optimal Decision ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Chain System ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain ◽  
The Impact

To study the impact of advertising cooperation on the decisions of dual-channel supply chain, a dual-channel supply chain system consisting of a single manufacturer and a single retailer is considered. The manufacturer can sell products to customers either through a direct marketing channel or through a traditional retail channel. This paper analyses the level of advertising investment and supply chain profits of centralized and decentralized dual-channel supply chains based on a Stackelberg game. Then, the decision models of dual-channel supply chain under different contracts are constructed, and how manufacturers can optimize the profits of both sides through an effective coordination mechanism is analyzed. The research results show that the improved advertising costs and revenue sharing contract can perfectly coordinate the dual-channel supply chain system. Numerical experiments illustrate the impacts of parameters on the optimal decision results.

scholarly journals Optimal Decisions for Carbon Emission Reduction through Technological Innovation in a Hybrid-Channel Supply Chain with Consumers’ Channel Preferences

2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chong Xin ◽  
Yunzhu Zhou ◽  
Xiaochen Zhu ◽  
Lin Li ◽  
Xin Chen
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Technological Innovation ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Carbon Emission Reduction ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Channel Preferences

This paper integrates carbon emission reduction via technological innovation with consumer channel preferences in both single- and dual-channel supply chains selling low-carbon products. Linear demand functions which simultaneously reflect the consumers’ channel preferences and low-carbon sensitivity are developed by considering the consumers’ segmentation. On this basis, we present two Stackelberg game models: one for each of the single- and dual-channel supply chains. In the first, the manufacturer sells low-carbon products through a traditional retailer who has a physical store, while in the second the manufacturer opens an online direct channel to compete with the traditional retailer. For the two models developed, the optimal pricing decisions, carbon emission reduction level, and profits are derived and discussed. Numerical examples are given to verify the effectiveness and practicality of the proposed models and solutions. The results show that supply chain members’ profits are affected by system parameters such as the carbon price, consumers’ low-carbon sensitivity, channel preference, etc. Furthermore, although the aforementioned parameters stimulate the manufacturer to reduce carbon emission, this does not always benefit the retailer. Comparison of the two models indicates that dual-channel selling is only the better choice for both the manufacturer and the retailer under certain conditions.

scholarly journals Risk-averse preferences in a dual-channel supply chain with trade credit and demand uncertainty

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chong Zhang ◽  
Yaxian Wang ◽  
Lifan Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Demand Uncertainty ◽  
Trade Credit ◽  
Channel Structure ◽  
Coordination Mechanism ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
The Impact

Though it is an important means for enterprises to increase market demand and boost profits, trade credit can carry risks. Besides, risks also result from uncertain market demand. Decision-makers' attitude towards risk will influence the decisions of enterprises, so it is meaningful to study the impact of risk preference on supply chain performance. This paper explores the effect of risk-averse preferences of the manufacturer or retailer on their delayed payment periods decision and utility when the dual-channel structure is adopted. Customer demands are uncertain and depend on the delayed payment periods that the manufacturer and the retailer may offer to them. Mean-variance model is used to describe the risks due to uncertain demand, and establishes supply chain utility models under four decision-making situations (both are risk-neutral; only the retailer is risk-averse; only the manufacturer is risk-averse; both are risk-averse). According to our study, supply chain members with higher risk aversion are more inclined to prolong delayed payment period. The retailer’s risk aversion is adverse for her utility, but beneficial to the manufacturer’s utility, thus a new coordination mechanism is proposed to achieve coordinate when only the retailer is risk averse. We prove that the contract can effectively improve the utility of the whole supply chain. This paper conduces to enrich the emerging literature on relating risk aversion preferences to trade credit period decision and coordination behavior under dual-channel environment.

scholarly journals Strategic Analysis of the Pricing Mechanisms in an Online Book Supply Chain in the Presence of Reference Price Effects

2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (5) ◽  
pp. 1492-1516
Author(s):  
Wenhua Hou ◽  
Yuwen Zeng
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Discount Rate ◽  
Reference Price ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Lower Boundary ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Reference Points ◽  
Price Effects ◽  
Retail Prices ◽  
Online Book

(1) Background: A binding recommended retail price has been used in several markets in a variety of forms, and the book market is a typical example. Publishers sell books to online retailers at a unit wholesale discount computed on the cover price. Retailers are then allowed to set the retail price. Therefore, if consumers regard the cover prices as reference points, then they may be more likely to purchase books if retail prices are lower than the cover prices. (2) Methods: We develop a Stackelberg game model for a book supply chain to investigates how reference price effects affect retailers and publisher’s pricing strategies. (3) Results: The results show that retailers will sell printed books at a discount only when the publisher’s wholesale discount rate is not high. Further, as the intensity of the reference price effects increases, (a) the lower boundary of the wholesale discount rate rises, (b) publishers’ profits increase and (c) retailers’ profits increase relative to the level of consumers’ e-books acceptance. (4) Conclusions: This result is related to the fact that the online retailer, such as Amazon and JD.com, like to invoke reference price effects in consumers’ minds by highlighting the printed book’s discount rate.

scholarly journals A Dynamic Stackelberg Game of Supply Chain for a Corporate Social Responsibility

2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 ◽  
pp. 1-8 ◽  
Author(s):  
Massimiliano Ferrara ◽  
Mehrnoosh Khademi ◽  
Mehdi Salimi ◽  
Somayeh Sharifi
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Social Responsibility ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Social Responsibility ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Equilibrium Point ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Supply Chain Performance ◽  
Information Structures ◽  
Corporate Social

In this paper, we establish a dynamic game to allocate CSR (Corporate Social Responsibility) to the members of a supply chain. We propose a model of a supply chain in a decentralized state which includes a supplier and a manufacturer. For analyzing supply chain performance in decentralized state and the relationships between the members of the supply chain, we formulate a model that crosses through multiperiods with the help of a dynamic discrete Stackelberg game which is made under two different information structures. We obtain an equilibrium point at which both the profits of members and the level of CSR taken up by supply chains are maximized.

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