scholarly journals A Fair and Secure Reverse Auction for Government Procurement

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (20) ◽  
pp. 8567
Author(s):  
Chia-Chen Lin ◽  
Ya-Fen Chang ◽  
Chin-Chen Chang ◽  
Yao-Zhu Zheng
Keyword(s):  
Elliptic Curve ◽  
Government Procurement ◽  
Online Auction ◽  
Reverse Auction ◽  
Sealed Bid ◽  
Electronic Auction ◽  
Internet Companies

With the development of e-commerce, the electronic auction is attracting the attention of many people. Many Internet companies, such as eBay and Yahoo!, have launched online auction systems. Many researchers have studied the security problems of electronic auction systems, but few of them are multi-attribute-based. In 2014, Shi proposed a provable secure, sealed-bid, and multi-attribute auction protocol based on the semi-honest model. We evaluated this protocol and found that it has some design weaknesses and is vulnerable to the illegal operations of buyers, which results in unfairness. In this paper, we improved this protocol by replacing the Paillier’s cryptosystem with the elliptic curve discrete (ECC), and we designed a novel, online, and multi-attribute reverse-auction system using the semi-honest model. In our system, sellers’ identities are not revealed to the buyers, and the buyers cannot conduct illegal operations that may compromise the fairness of the auction.

WELFARE LOSS IN LINEAR PRICE-PREFERENCE PROCUREMENT AUCTIONS

2007 ◽  
Vol 09 (04) ◽  
pp. 719-730
Author(s):  
WINSTON T. H. KOH
Keyword(s):  
Uniform Distribution ◽  
Upper Bound ◽  
Government Procurement ◽  
Welfare Loss ◽  
Procurement Auctions ◽  
Domestic Firms ◽  
Sealed Bid ◽  
Non Linear ◽  
Price Auction

In government procurement auctions, discrimination in favor of one group of participants (e.g. domestic firms, minority bidders) over another group is a common practice. The optimal discriminatory rules for these auctions are typically non-linear and could be administratively complex and costly to implement. In practice, procurement auctions are usually organized as sealed-bid first-price auction with a simple percentage price-preference policy. In this paper, we analyze a model with two bidders that draw their costs from a common uniform distribution, and derive an upper bound to the welfare loss resulting from the use of linear-price preference auctions.

An Analysis of Protectionist First-Price Auctions

1993 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-30
Author(s):  
Winston T. H. Koh
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Firm ◽  
Consumer Surplus ◽  
Government Procurement ◽  
Knowing That ◽  
Sealed Bid ◽  
Government Project ◽  
Price Auction ◽  
Second Price Auction ◽  
The Government ◽  
Sealed Bid Auctions

The paper considers the following problem: One local firm and one foreign firm, each risk-neutral, bid to supply a government project, each knowing its cost, and knowing that the rival's cost is independently uniform on [0,1]. The government wishes to maximise the local surplus, defined as the sum of consumer surplus and the local firm's profit. The paper analyses the equilibrium bid strategies for the protectionist first-price auction, and shows that the protectionist first-price auction generates a larger local surplus compared with the protectionist second-price auction when rule-of-thumb discrimination is practised. The result provides another reason for the prevalence of sealed-bid auctions in government procurement.

Sealed-Bid Reverse Auction Pricing Mechanisms for Federated Satellite Systems

2017 ◽  
Vol 20 (5) ◽  
pp. 432-446 ◽  
Author(s):  
Udrivolf Pica ◽  
Alessandro Golkar
Keyword(s):  
Reverse Auction ◽  
Satellite Systems ◽  
Sealed Bid ◽  
Auction Pricing
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