Binary Vickrey auction — A robust and efficient multi-unit sealed-bid online auction protocol against buyer multi-identity bidding

2007 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 301-312 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zoltán Hidvégi ◽  
Wenli Wang ◽  
Andrew B. Whinston
Keyword(s):  
Online Auction ◽  
Vickrey Auction ◽  
Sealed Bid

scholarly journals An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects

2004 ◽  
Vol 94 (5) ◽  
pp. 1452-1475 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lawrence M Ausubel
Keyword(s):  
Privacy Preservation ◽  
Winner's Curse ◽  
Multiple Objects ◽  
Vickrey Auction ◽  
Treasury Bills ◽  
Winner’S Curse ◽  
Sealed Bid ◽  
Interdependent Values ◽  
Private Values ◽  
Current Price

When bidders exhibit multi-unit demands, standard auction methods generally yield inefficient outcomes. This article proposes a new ascending-bid auction for homogeneous goods, such as Treasury bills or telecommunications spectrum. The auctioneer announces a price and bidders respond with quantities. Items are awarded at the current price whenever they are “clinched,” and the price is incremented until the market clears. With private values, this (dynamic) auction yields the same outcome as the (sealed-bid) Vickrey auction, but has advantages of simplicity and privacy preservation. With interdependent values, this auction may retain efficiency, whereas the Vickrey auction suffers from a generalized Winner's Curse.

scholarly journals A Fair and Secure Reverse Auction for Government Procurement

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (20) ◽  
pp. 8567
Author(s):  
Chia-Chen Lin ◽  
Ya-Fen Chang ◽  
Chin-Chen Chang ◽  
Yao-Zhu Zheng
Keyword(s):  
Elliptic Curve ◽  
Government Procurement ◽  
Online Auction ◽  
Reverse Auction ◽  
Sealed Bid ◽  
Electronic Auction ◽  
Internet Companies

With the development of e-commerce, the electronic auction is attracting the attention of many people. Many Internet companies, such as eBay and Yahoo!, have launched online auction systems. Many researchers have studied the security problems of electronic auction systems, but few of them are multi-attribute-based. In 2014, Shi proposed a provable secure, sealed-bid, and multi-attribute auction protocol based on the semi-honest model. We evaluated this protocol and found that it has some design weaknesses and is vulnerable to the illegal operations of buyers, which results in unfairness. In this paper, we improved this protocol by replacing the Paillier’s cryptosystem with the elliptic curve discrete (ECC), and we designed a novel, online, and multi-attribute reverse-auction system using the semi-honest model. In our system, sellers’ identities are not revealed to the buyers, and the buyers cannot conduct illegal operations that may compromise the fairness of the auction.

Optimal Auctions with Endogenous Entry

2004 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Lixin Ye
Keyword(s):  
Endogenous Entry ◽  
Free Entry ◽  
Single Object ◽  
Vickrey Auction ◽  
Sealed Bid ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
Expected Revenue ◽  
Private Value ◽  
Equivalent Class ◽  
Auction Model

We consider a single object, independent private value auction model with entry. Potential bidders are ex ante symmetric and randomize about entry. After entry, each bidder incurs a cost, then learns her private value and a set of signals that may lead to updated beliefs about other entrants' valuations. It is shown that the Vickrey auction with free entry maximizes the expected revenue. Furthermore, if the information potentially available to bidders after entry is sufficiently rich, then the Vickrey auction, up to its equivalent class, is also the only optimal sealed-bid auction.

scholarly journals Anonymous Sealed-Bid Auction on Ethereum

Electronics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (19) ◽  
pp. 2340
Author(s):  
Gaurav Sharma ◽  
Denis Verstraeten ◽  
Vishal Saraswat ◽  
Jean-Michel Dricot ◽  
Olivier Markowitch
Keyword(s):  
Formal Model ◽  
Competitive Market ◽  
Online Auction ◽  
Security Model ◽  
Digital Products ◽  
Cryptographic Primitives ◽  
Ring Signature ◽  
Optimal Trading ◽  
Sealed Bid ◽  
Designated Verifier

In a competitive market, online auction systems enable optimal trading of digital products and services. Bidders can participate in existing blockchain-based auctions while protecting the confidentiality of their bids in a decentralized, transparent, secure, and auditable manner. However, in a competitive market, parties would prefer not to disclose their interests to competitors, and to remain anonymous during auctions. In this paper, we firstly analyze the specific requirements for blockchain-based anonymous fair auctions. We present a formal model tailored to study auction systems that facilitate anonymity, as well as a generic protocol for achieving bid confidentiality and bidder anonymity using existing cryptographic primitives such as designated verifier ring signature. We demonstrate that it is secure using the security model we presented. Towards the end, we demonstrate through extensive simulation results on Ethereum blockchain that the proposed protocol is practical and has minimal associated overhead. Furthermore, we discuss the complexity and vulnerabilities that a blockchain environment might introduce during implementation.

scholarly journals Fortified Multi-Party Computation: Taking Advantage of Simple Secure Hardware Modules

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 (4) ◽  
pp. 312-338
Author(s):  
Brandon Broadnax ◽  
Alexander Koch ◽  
Jeremias Mechler ◽  
Tobias Müller ◽  
Jörn Müller-Quade ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Online Auction ◽  
Universal Composability ◽  
Sensitive Data ◽  
Sealed Bid ◽  
Specific Protocol ◽  
Distributed Computations ◽  
Secure Hardware ◽  
Security Guarantees ◽  
To Receive ◽  
Inputs And Outputs

Abstract In practice, there are numerous settings where mutually distrusting parties need to perform distributed computations on their private inputs. For instance, participants in a first-price sealed-bid online auction do not want their bids to be disclosed. This problem can be addressed using secure multi-party computation (MPC), where parties can evaluate a publicly known function on their private inputs by executing a specific protocol that only reveals the correct output, but nothing else about the private inputs. Such distributed computations performed over the Internet are susceptible to remote hacks that may take place during the computation. As a consequence, sensitive data such as private bids may leak. All existing MPC protocols do not provide any protection against the consequences of such remote hacks. We present the first MPC protocols that protect the remotely hacked parties’ inputs and outputs from leaking. More specifically, unless the remote hack takes place before the party received its input or all parties are corrupted, a hacker is unable to learn the parties’ inputs and outputs, and is also unable to modify them. We achieve these strong (privacy) guarantees by utilizing the fact that in practice parties may not be susceptible to remote attacks at every point in time, but only while they are online, i.e. able to receive messages. To this end, we model communication via explicit channels. In particular, we introduce channels with an airgap switch (disconnect-able by the party in control of the switch), and unidirectional data diodes. These channels and their isolation properties, together with very few, similarly simple and plausibly remotely unhackable hardware modules serve as the main ingredient for attaining such strong security guarantees. In order to formalize these strong guarantees, we propose the UC with Fortified Security (UC#) framework, a variant of the Universal Composability (UC) framework.

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