scholarly journals Optimal Decisions and Coordination in a Socially Responsible Supply Chain with Irresponsibility Risk

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (24) ◽  
pp. 7252
Author(s):  
Wang ◽  
Zhong ◽  
Xu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Investment Efficiency ◽  
Socially Responsible ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
Investment Level ◽  
Consumer Responsibility ◽  
Corporate Social

Many companies make some stakeholders pleased but others cannot. To help understand why, it is very important to study the coexistence of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and corporate social irresponsibility (CSI). This paper considers a manufacturer with irresponsibility risk in a centralized and decentralized socially responsible supply chain, and uses a Stackelberg game to investigate the optimal policies on price and CSR investment level. This paper also examines the influence of consumer responsibility awareness and CSR investment efficiency on the decision behaviors of the manufacturer and retailer. Moreover, we developed a new mechanism to coordinate the decentralized supply chain system, which consists of the retailer participating in CSR and revenue sharing. Our results indicate that the manufacturer’s and retailer’s optimal decisions may not be significantly influenced by consumer responsibility awareness, but the effect of CSR investment efficiency is significant. Our results also show that if the degree of retailer participation and the proportion of revenue sharing are of moderate size, then not only can the contract mechanism coordinate the decentralized socially responsible supply chain, but it can ensure that a win–win situation can be achieved by the supply chain members.

Coordination of a Socially Responsible Two-Stage Supply Chain Under Random Demand

2019 ◽  
Vol 36 (05) ◽  
pp. 1950029
Author(s):  
Xia Zhao ◽  
Ning Li ◽  
Liang Song
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Expected Profit ◽  
Order Quantity ◽  
Random Demand ◽  
Coordination Problem ◽  
Socially Responsible ◽  
Numerical Examples ◽  
Corporate Social

This paper investigates the coordination problem of a supply chain (SC) composed of a manufacturer and a retailer both exhibiting corporate social responsibility (CSR) under generic random demand. Under a centralized decision, the unimodality of the expected profit is proven, and the expected profit of the SC is shown to be larger than that of the SC without CSR. Under a decentralized decision dominated by the manufacturer, the manufacturer determines the wholesale price and its CSR investment, and then the retailer decides the order quantity and its CSR investment. After showing that the revenue-sharing (RS) contract is not able to coordinate the SC, a modified RS (MRS) contract is proposed to coordinate the SC. At last, the numerical examples in which random demands follow normal distribution and uniform distribution are used to illustrate the validity of the theoretical analysis and the coordination effectiveness of the MRS contract.

scholarly journals Contracting Fashion Products Supply Chains When Demand Is Dependent on Price and Sales Effort

2015 ◽  
Vol 2015 ◽  
pp. 1-7 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ying Wei ◽  
Liyang Xiong
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Two Stage ◽  
Effort Level ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
Fashion Products ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract ◽  
Investment Level

This paper investigates optimal decisions in a two-stage fashion product supply chain under two specified contracts: revenue-sharing contract and wholesale price contract, where demand is dependent on retailing price and sales effort level. Optimal decisions and related profits are analyzed and further compared among the cases where the effort investment fee is determined and undertaken either by the retailer or the manufacturer. Results reveal that if the retailer determines the effort investment level, she would be better off under the wholesale price contract and would invest more effort. However, if the manufacturer determines the effort level, he prefers to the revenue-sharing contract most likely if both parties agree on consignment.

scholarly journals Reverse Revenue Sharing Contract versus Two-Part Tariff Contract under a Closed-Loop Supply Chain System

2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 ◽  
pp. 1-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zunya Shi ◽  
Nengmin Wang ◽  
Tao Jia ◽  
Haoxun Chen
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Integrated System ◽  
Closed Loop System ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract ◽  
Economic Improvement

The importance of remanufacturing has been recognized in research and practice. The integrated system, combining the forward and reverse activities of supply chains, is called closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) system. By coordination in the CLSC system, players will get economic improvement. This paper studies different coordination performances of two types of contracts, two-part tariff (TTC) and reverse revenue sharing contract (RRSC), in a closed-loop system. Through mathematical analysis based on Stackelberg Game Theory, we find that it is easy for manufacturer to improve more profits and retailer’s collection effects by adjusting the ratio of transfer collection price through RRSC, and we also give the function to calculate the best ratio of transfer collection price, which may be a valuable reference for the decision maker in practice. Besides, our results also suggest that although the profits of the coordinated CLSC system are always higher than the contradictory scenario, the RRSC is more favorable to the manufacturer than to the retailer, as results show that the manufacturer will share more profits from the system through RRSC. Therefore, RRSC has attracted the manufacturers more to closing the supply chain for economic consideration.

scholarly journals Research on Closed-Loop Supply Chain Decision-Making in Different Cooperation Modes with Government’s Reward-Penalty Mechanism

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (11) ◽  
pp. 6425
Author(s):  
Quanxi Li ◽  
Haowei Zhang ◽  
Kailing Liu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Recycling Rate ◽  
Transfer Payment ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Asymmetry Of Information ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Impact

In closed-loop supply chains (CLSC), manufacturers, retailers, and recyclers perform their duties. Due to the asymmetry of information among enterprises, it is difficult for them to maximize efficiency and profits. To maximize the efficiency and profit of the CLSC, this study establishes five cooperation models of CLSC under the government‘s reward–penalty mechanism. We make decisions on wholesale prices, retail prices, transfer payment prices, and recovery rates relying on the Stackelberg game method and compare the optimal decisions. This paper analyzes the impact of the government reward-penalty mechanism on optimal decisions and how members in CLSC choose partners. We find that the government’s reward-penalty mechanism can effectively increase the recycling rate of used products and the total profit of the closed-loop supply chain. According to the calculation results of the models, under the government’s reward-penalty mechanism, the cooperation can improve the CLSC’s used products recycling capacity and profitability. In a supply chain, the more members participate in the cooperation, the higher profit the CLSC obtain. However, the cooperation mode of all members may lead to monopoly, which is not approved by government and customers.

scholarly journals A Dynamic Stackelberg Game of Supply Chain for a Corporate Social Responsibility

2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 ◽  
pp. 1-8 ◽  
Author(s):  
Massimiliano Ferrara ◽  
Mehrnoosh Khademi ◽  
Mehdi Salimi ◽  
Somayeh Sharifi
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Social Responsibility ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Social Responsibility ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Equilibrium Point ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Supply Chain Performance ◽  
Information Structures ◽  
Corporate Social

In this paper, we establish a dynamic game to allocate CSR (Corporate Social Responsibility) to the members of a supply chain. We propose a model of a supply chain in a decentralized state which includes a supplier and a manufacturer. For analyzing supply chain performance in decentralized state and the relationships between the members of the supply chain, we formulate a model that crosses through multiperiods with the help of a dynamic discrete Stackelberg game which is made under two different information structures. We obtain an equilibrium point at which both the profits of members and the level of CSR taken up by supply chains are maximized.

Revenue Sharing Contract of Green Supply Chain under Manufacturer Risk-Aversion

2014 ◽  
Vol 697 ◽  
pp. 482-487
Author(s):  
Shi Ying Jiang ◽  
Chun Yan Ma
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Product Price ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract

Background on two stages green supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, considering the degree of risk aversion and product greenness, consumer preferences and other factors, the centralized decision-making game model and manufacturer-leading Stackelberg game model are established.Then two game models are compared. The interaction of product greenness, wholesale price, product price,and risk aversion utility for manufacturers and retailers are also disscussed. Finally, the revenue sharing contract is applied to coordinate the green supply chain . The results show that:(1) In the centralized decision-making model, there is a critical value of the product green degree; (2)In manufacturer-leading Stackelberg game model, the higher the green degree of the product, the higher the manufacturer's wholesale price,and the wholesale price increases as risk aversion degree of manufacturers improves;(3)The revenue sharing contract can coordinate this type of green supply chain under manufacturers risk-averse.

scholarly journals Research on Quality Decisions and Coordination with Reference Effect in Dual-Channel Supply Chain

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (6) ◽  
pp. 2296 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhou Xideng ◽  
Xu Bing ◽  
Xie Fei ◽  
Li Yu
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Service Quality ◽  
Product Quality ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Reference Quality ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain

Although supply quality management has been studied extensively, one important marketing phenomenon, that is, reference effect has been rarely considered in dual-channel supply chain quality management literatures. In fact, the quality reference effect is also an important factor which influences consumer purchasing behavior. We aim to explore the influence of the reference effect on the optimal decisions and performance of a dual-channel supply. Thus, we formulate dynamic models that include the product quality reference effect and the service quality reference effect in a dual-channel supply chain system consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer under the different decision-making scenarios. Utilizing differential game theory, optimal decisions are obtained for the product quality and service quality decision under the different decision-making scenarios. In addition, the optimal decisions and profits are compared, then a service cost-sharing coordinating mechanism is proposed and proven to be effective in the supply chain system. The main results show when the initial reference service quality is low, the consumer service quality reference effect is beneficial to the manufacturer. The spillover effect of service quality is not conducive to the retailer and the manufacturer. When the initial reference product quality is low, both online and offline product quality reference effects are beneficial to the retailer and the manufacturer. The stable (or final) reference quality will not be affected by the initial reference quality. The sum of the two members’ profits under decentralized decision making is less than the total profit of the supply chain under centralized decision making. We design a cost-sharing coordinating mechanism to eliminate the double marginal effect.

Supply Chain Network Equilibrium Model Based on Corporate Social Responsibility with Multicriteria under the Revenue-Sharing Contract

2012 ◽  
Vol 452-453 ◽  
pp. 282-288 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yan Huo
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Social Responsibility ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Social Responsibility ◽  
Equilibrium Model ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Social Utility ◽  
Network Equilibrium ◽  
Supply Chain Network ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract ◽  
Corporate Social

This paper developed a three-level supply chain network equilibrium model with multi products and multicriteria based on corporate social responsibility through integrating the maximization of economic benefits, the maximization of social utility and the minimization of environment pollution under revenue-sharing contract. We analysed competitive behaviour of manufactures and retailers in a no cooperative competitive and described the multicriteria decision-making behaviour using Nash equilibrium theory and the weighted value function. Using product utility functions of brand differentiation and consumer preferences from product price, transaction cost and corporation social responsibility to analyse product choice in a market, and we developed the optimization conditions of each tier and whole network by variational inequality method. At last we illustrated the model with several numerical examples.

scholarly journals Decision Analysis of Advertising and Price for Bilateral Competing Supply Chain

2013 ◽  
Vol 2013 ◽  
pp. 1-7
Author(s):  
Cheng-Tang Zhang ◽  
Shan-Lin Yang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Decision Model ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Decision Models ◽  
Competition Intensity ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Investment Level ◽  
First Mover Advantage ◽  
The Impact

The outcome of centralized equilibrium, prisoner's dilemma equilibrium, and decentralized equilibrium under different decision models has been provided with regards to bilateral competing supply chain system, either side of which is composed of one manufacturer and one retailer. Theoretical analysis indicates a positive correlation between price and one's own advertising investment level and a negative correlation between price and the opponent's advertising investment level. Through analysis of numerical examples, the results reveal a first mover advantage that leads to prisoner's dilemma in the system as well as the impact that price and advertising competition intensity has on the supply chain's choice of decision model.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document