scholarly journals Research on Risk Avoidance and Coordination of Supply Chain Subject Based on Blockchain Technology

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (7) ◽  
pp. 2182 ◽  
Author(s):  
Liu ◽  
Li ◽  
Qi
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Optimal Order ◽  
Order Quantity ◽  
Technology Application ◽  
Blockchain Technology ◽  
Decentralized Decision Making ◽  
Increasing Function ◽  
Weighted Proportion

Based on the influence of block chain technology on information sharing among supply chain participants, mean-CVaR (conditional value at risk) is used to characterize retailers’ risk aversion behavior, while a Stackelberg game is taken to study the optimal decision-making of manufacturers and retailers during decentralized and centralized decision-making processes. Finally, the mean-CVaR-based revenue-sharing contract is used to coordinate the supply chain and profit distribution. The research shows that, under the condition of decentralized decision-making, when the retailer’s optimal order quantity is low, it is an increasing function of the weighted proportion and the risk aversion degree, while, when the retailer’s optimal order quantity is high, it is an increasing function of the weighted proportion, and has nothing to do with the risk aversion degree. The manufacturer’s blockchain technology application degree is a reduction function of the weighted proportion. When the retailer’s order quantity is low, the manufacturer’s blockchain technology application degree is a decreasing function of risk aversion, while, when the retailer’s order quantity is high, the manufacturer’s blockchain technology application is independent of risk aversion. The profit of the supply chain system under centralized decision-making is higher than that of decentralized decision-making. The revenue sharing contract can achieve the coordination of the supply chain to the level of centralized decision-making. Through blockchain technology, transaction costs among members of the supply chain can be reduced, information sharing can be realized, and the benefits of the supply chain can be improved. Finally, the specific numerical simulation is adopted to analyze the weighted proportion, risk aversion and the impact of blockchain technology on the supply chain, and verify the relevant conclusions.

scholarly journals The More Supply Chain Control Power, the Better? A Comparison among Four Kinds of Cooperation Models

2015 ◽  
Vol 2015 ◽  
pp. 1-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Weihua Liu ◽  
Shuqing Wang ◽  
Donglei Zhu
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
The Other ◽  
Order Quantity ◽  
Control Power ◽  
Decentralized Decision Making ◽  
Optimal Value ◽  
Total Profit

This paper introduces the parameter of supply chain control power into existing supply chain coordination models and explores the impacts of control power on the profits of manufacturer, retailer, and the overall supply chain under four modes of decision-making, including the decentralized decision-making dominated by manufacturer, the decentralized decision-making dominated by retailer, centralized decision-making, and Nash negotiation decision-making. Some significant conclusions are obtained. Firstly, supply chain control power does have great impact on the supply chain profits. The profit of the whole supply chain with centralized decision-making is higher than those of the other three modes, while the overall profit of supply chain with decentralized decision-making is superior to the profit when retailer and manufacturer dominate the supply chain together. Secondly, with decentralized decision-making, for manufacturer and retailer, it is beneficial to gain the control powers of the supply chain; however, control power has an optimal value, not the bigger, the better. Thirdly, under certain circumstances, order quantity will increase and the wholesale price will decrease when control power is transferred from manufacturer to retailer. In this case, the total profit of supply chain dominated by retailer will be greater than that dominated by manufacturer.

scholarly journals Optimal Decision of Deferred Payment Supply Chain considering Bilateral Risk-Aversion Degree

2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 ◽  
pp. 1-11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Liu Liang ◽  
Li Futou
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Conditional Value At Risk ◽  
Optimal Order ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Order Quantity ◽  
Initial Capital ◽  
Optimal Order Quantity ◽  
Degree Of Risk

This paper aims to fill up the gap that the previous research has never explored, the deferred payment supply chain with a risk-averse supplier. To this end, the conditional value-at-risk (CVaR) was adopted as a criterion to measure the influence of retailer’s deferred payment on supply chain performance. According to this criterion, the retailer’s optimal order quantity and the supplier’s optimal wholesale price per unit product were investigated under decentralized decision-making. Then, the existence of a unique optimal strategy was discussed for risk-averse supplier and retailer, and the values of risk-averse, initial capital, and wholesale price were calculated in detail. Finally, the theoretical results were testified through a numerical example. It is concluded that retailer’s optimal order quantity is negatively correlated with the wholesale price, initial capital, and degree of risk aversion, so that the retailer can benefit through proper risk aversion; the supplier’s expected profit decreases with the increase in the degree of risk aversion, yet the optimal wholesale price is determined by the degree of risk aversion of supplier and retailer. The research findings shed valuable new light on how to manage a supply chain involving risk-averse supplier and retailer.

Decision-Making on the Supply Chain of Fresh Agricultural Products with Two-Period Price and Option Contract

2020 ◽  
pp. 2050038
Author(s):  
Bo Yan ◽  
Gaodi Liu ◽  
Xiaohua Wu ◽  
Jiwen Wu
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Agricultural Products ◽  
Optimal Decision ◽  
Optimal Order ◽  
Agricultural Product ◽  
Fixed Cost ◽  
Option Contract ◽  
Decentralized Decision Making

The price risk of fresh agricultural products has been a significant topic in recent years. Taking the two-level fresh agricultural product supply chain as the research object, this paper studies the optimal ordering and coordination of supply chain based on two-period price, wholesale price and option contract. The optimal order decision of the retailer at the single period price and the optimal decision corresponding to the supplier are obtained when the output of the supplier is uncertain under decentralized decision-making. The range of penalty cost parameter that avoids supplier default is also obtained. The effect of two-period price on the optimal order decision and supply chain profits is discussed when the production yield of the supplier is fixed. Cost-sharing contract is introduced to increase the order quantity and achieve coordination because the option contract cannot completely make the supply chain coordination with two-period price. This paper provides a low-cost approach that can be applied in fresh agricultural supply chain to solve financing and order problems.

scholarly journals A Coordinated Revenue-Sharing Model for a Sustainable Closed-Loop Supply Chain

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (9) ◽  
pp. 3198 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hao Zou ◽  
Jin Qin ◽  
Peng Yang ◽  
Bo Dai
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Coordination Mechanism ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract ◽  
Decentralized Decision Making

This study takes a sustainable closed-loop supply chain composed of one manufacturer and two price-competitive retailers as the object and considers the two-way risk aversion characteristics of manufacturers and retailers in examining the coordination mechanism in a closed-loop supply chain. Using game theory, optimal decision-making on wholesale prices, retail prices, and recycling prices are explored under decentralized and centralized decision-making scenarios, and representative expressions are established. By analyzing the effects of the risk aversion coefficient on players’ optimal strategies, we found that the manufacturer’s and retailers’ risk aversion coefficients have different effects on the wholesale price, retail price, and recycling price under decentralized decision-making, while in a centralized decision-making scenario, the effects are the same. The comparison also found that the wholesale price and recovery price under the centralized decision-making scenario are higher than those under decentralized decision-making. To achieve closed-loop supply chain coordination, we propose a revenue-sharing contract that we demonstrate by coordinating price competition with risk aversion and analyze a range of parameters that influence the revenue-sharing contract. The results show that the proposed contract can increase the profits of supply chain members by identifying the optimal revenue-sharing ratio.

Revenue Sharing Contract of Green Supply Chain under Manufacturer Risk-Aversion

2014 ◽  
Vol 697 ◽  
pp. 482-487
Author(s):  
Shi Ying Jiang ◽  
Chun Yan Ma
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Product Price ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract

Background on two stages green supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, considering the degree of risk aversion and product greenness, consumer preferences and other factors, the centralized decision-making game model and manufacturer-leading Stackelberg game model are established.Then two game models are compared. The interaction of product greenness, wholesale price, product price,and risk aversion utility for manufacturers and retailers are also disscussed. Finally, the revenue sharing contract is applied to coordinate the green supply chain . The results show that:(1) In the centralized decision-making model, there is a critical value of the product green degree; (2)In manufacturer-leading Stackelberg game model, the higher the green degree of the product, the higher the manufacturer's wholesale price,and the wholesale price increases as risk aversion degree of manufacturers improves;(3)The revenue sharing contract can coordinate this type of green supply chain under manufacturers risk-averse.

scholarly journals Coordination of Supply Chain with One Supplier and Two Competing Risk-Averse Retailers under an Option Contract

2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 ◽  
pp. 1-11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rui Wang ◽  
Shiji Song ◽  
Cheng Wu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Conditional Value At Risk ◽  
Optimal Order ◽  
Pareto Optimum ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Order Quantity ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Chain System ◽  
Option Contract ◽  
Optimal Order Quantity

This paper studies an option contract for coordinating a supply chain comprising one risk-neutral supplier and two risk-averse retailers engaged in promotion competition in the selling season. For a given option contract, in decentralized case, each risk-averse retailer decides the optimal order quantity and the promotion policy by maximizing the conditional value-at-risk of profit. Based on the retailers’ decision, the supplier derives the optimal production policy by maximizing expected profit. In centralized case, the optimal decision of the supply chain system is obtained. Based on the decentralized and centralized decision, we find the coordination conditions of the supply chain system, which can optimize the supply chain system profit and make the profits of the supply chain members achieve Pareto optimum. As for the subchain, we also find the coordination conditions, which generalize the results of the supply chain with one supplier and one retailer. Our analysis and numerical experiments show that there exists a unique Nash equilibrium between two retailers, and the optimal order quantity of each retailer increases (decreases) with its own (competitor’s) promotion level.

scholarly journals Financing and pricing strategies of construction supply chain under capital constraint

2021 ◽  
Vol 336 ◽  
pp. 09004
Author(s):  
Yuxin Wen ◽  
Linyi Wu ◽  
Fengmin Yao
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Distribution Model ◽  
Pricing Strategies ◽  
External Financing ◽  
Pricing Decision ◽  
Decentralized Decision Making ◽  
Internal Financing ◽  
Decision Making Model

Affected by factors such as cost, the financial constraints faced by the supply chain are becoming more and more severe. This paper constructs a financing and pricing decision-making model for the construction supply chain under capital constraints, and uses Stackelberg game theory to analyze and obtain the best financing and pricing strategy for the construction supply chain under the internal and external financing modes. The study found that when centralized decision-making is adopted, there is a profit distribution model that makes the profits obtained by construction developers and contractors greater than the profits obtained in decentralized decision-making; the internal financing model of the construction supply chain is better than external financing, and can enable the construction supply chain get higher profits.

scholarly journals Trade Credit with Barter in a Capital-Constrained Supply Chain

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (20) ◽  
pp. 11361
Author(s):  
Yangyang Huang ◽  
Zhenyang Pi ◽  
Weiguo Fang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Trade Credit ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Uncertain Demand ◽  
Equilibrium Strategy ◽  
Optimal Order ◽  
Order Quantity ◽  
Supply Rate ◽  
Optimal Order Quantity ◽  
And Performance

Barter has emerged to alleviate capital pressure, maximize the circulation of goods, and facilitate the disposal of excess inventory. This study considers a two-level supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a capital-constrained retailer with trade credit, in which the retailer exchanges unsold products for needed subsidiary products on a barter platform. The retailer’s optimal order quantity and the manufacturer’s wholesale price are derived, and the influences of barter and other factors on the equilibrium strategy and performance of the supply chain are examined; these results are verified and supplemented by numerical simulation. We find that the retailer can increase profit by bartering when facing highly uncertain demand, that the retailer’s optimal order quantity increases with the supply rate and demand for subsidiary products, and that both manufacturer and retailer benefit from the high supply rate of subsidiary products. However, barter induces the manufacturer to raise the wholesale price to prevent its profit from being harmed. In addition, the manufacturer suffers from the retailer’s initial capital.

Blockchain Technology Application Challenges in Renewable Energy Supply Chain Management

2022 ◽  
Author(s):  
Khalid Almutairi ◽  
Seyyed Jalaladdin Hosseini Dehshiri ◽  
Seyyed Shahabaddin Hosseini Dehshiri ◽  
Ao Xuan Hoa ◽  
Joshuva Arockia Dhanraj ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Renewable Energy ◽  
Supply Chain Management ◽  
Energy Supply ◽  
Chain Management ◽  
Technology Application ◽  
Blockchain Technology

Exploring the Blockchain Technology Application in the Chinese New Retail Business Model

2019 ◽  
pp. 86-102
Author(s):  
Yuhong Li ◽  
Nachiappan Subramanian
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Customer Satisfaction ◽  
Business Model ◽  
Satisfaction Level ◽  
Supply Chain Security ◽  
Technology Application ◽  
Blockchain Technology ◽  
Retail Business ◽  
Business Application ◽  
Potential Risks

While the new retail is revolutionizing retailing in China, the supply chain of the new retail has a few problems or potential risks which will decrease the customer satisfaction level. However, the implementation of one of the cutting-edge technologies—the blockchain—can revolutionize the supply chain of the new retail in China. This qualitative piece uses multiple interviews to find out the specific outcomes blockchain will make for the supply chain of the new retail in China. The major contribution is to fill the gap of the academic literature as well as the business application and such as the new retail in China to increase supply chain security and efficiency with blockchain.

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