scholarly journals The System Dynamics (SD) Analysis of the Government and Power Producers’ Evolutionary Game Strategies Based on Carbon Trading (CT) Mechanism: A Case of China

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 1150 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xin-gang Zhao ◽  
Yu-zhuo Zhang
Keyword(s):  
System Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Carbon Trading ◽  
The Government

scholarly journals Evolutionary Game Simulation on Government Incentive Strategies of Prefabricated Construction: A System Dynamics Approach

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Baoquan Cheng ◽  
Yuhu Wei ◽  
Wei Zhang ◽  
Xintao Zhou ◽  
Huihua Chen ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
System Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Environmental Benefits ◽  
Construction Technology ◽  
Stable Strategy ◽  
Incentive Strategies ◽  
Game Simulation ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Stability ◽  
Rational Range

Prefabricated construction is a state-of-the-art construction technology of both socio-economic and environmental benefits, but sometimes, it is not welcome due to its high cost. Governments play an important role in deeply promoting prefabricated construction, but its effects are not clear. This paper developed a system dynamics model for investigating and simulating the impacts of government incentive strategies on prefabricated construction by considering the evolutionary game process between the government and contractors. Data of Shanghai, China, is collected for demonstration and validation of the developed simulation model. Results show that (1) the evolutionary stable strategy does not exist in static game process; (2) the rate of adopting prefabricated construction is affected by the level of penalties and subsidies; (3) dynamic incentive strategies can better improve the stability of the evolutionary game process; and (4) the rational range of incentive rate can be obtained. Findings of this study facilitate governments to formulate and improve the incentive strategies of prefabricated construction, thus boosting the development of construction industrialization.

scholarly journals System Dynamics Analysis of Evolutionary Game Strategies between the Government and Investors Based on New Energy Power Construction Public-Private-Partnership (PPP) Project

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (7) ◽  
pp. 2533 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lei Gao ◽  
Zhen-Yu Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Social Capital ◽  
System Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Public Private Partnership ◽  
Behavioral Strategies ◽  
Private Partnership ◽  
System Evolution ◽  
Power Construction ◽  
New Energy ◽  
The Government

The public-private-partnership (PPP) is a new mode for the government and social capital to jointly invest in public infrastructure projects. In particular, PPP projects for new energy power construction have been strongly supported in some countries in recent years, because it can not only reduce financial pressure on the government, but also promote the development of new energy. Current scholars study the economic benefits of PPP projects for new energy power construction from a macro perspective, and they rarely study behavioral strategies of the government and social capital as a game process of project construction from a micro perspective. This paper will fill this gap. This study firstly built an evolutionary game model of the government and investors based on new energy power construction PPP projects. Secondly, taking China’s typical new energy power construction PPP project–waste incineration power generation as an example, the system dynamics (SD) model was proposed to simulate the evolutionary process of game players’ behavioral strategies. Finally, the effects of key factors in the construction of PPP project on the strategies’ stability were studied. The results show that: (1) there is no evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) in the game system between the government and investors, and system evolution is characterized by periodic behavior. (2) When the government implements dynamic bounty measures, the system evolution process is still a closed loop with periodic motion. However, when the government implements dynamic punishment measures, there is a stable ESS in the hybrid strategy of the game system. (3) The government can increase unit fines when making dynamic strategic adjustments, which will not only promote the active cooperation of investors, but also reduce the probability of government supervision, thereby reducing costs.

scholarly journals Modeling Adoption Behavior of Prefabricated Building with Multiagent Interaction: System Dynamics Analysis Based on Data of Jiangsu Province

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Zhen Li ◽  
Shaowen Zhang ◽  
Qingfeng Meng
Keyword(s):  
System Dynamics ◽  
Market Share ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Quality Factors ◽  
Acceptance Probability ◽  
Construction Enterprise ◽  
Construction Enterprises ◽  
The Government ◽  
Government Construction ◽  
Prefabricated Building

In recent years, the development of prefabricated building (PB) mode in China has gradually attracted the attention of stakeholders. It is of great significance to explore the adoption behavior of PB mode by Chinese construction enterprises. Using the method of combining evolutionary game theory with system dynamics and considering the multiagent interaction of the government, construction enterprises, and consumers, as well as the influence of multiple factors, this paper constructs a model of construction enterprises' adoption behavior of PB mode. The purpose is to clarify the mechanism of Chinese construction enterprises' adoption behavior of PB mode and the evolution law of market share. The research results show the following. Firstly, government subsidy plays an important role in promoting the maturity of PB market, but it plays a relatively small role in the more mature and stable market. Secondly, the higher the initial acceptance probability of the construction enterprise, the greater the peak of the PB market share and the greater the volatility, but it has no differential impact on the balance of the PB market in the later stage. Thirdly, price factors and quality factors, respectively, have an important impact on the increase of the PB market share in the early and late stages of the formation of the PB market, but the delivery waiting time factor has no significant impact on the PB market share.

System Dynamics Modeling for a Public–Private Partnership Program to Promote Bicycle–Metro Integration Based on Evolutionary Game

2021 ◽  
pp. 036119812110124
Author(s):  
Jianming Cai ◽  
Yue Liang
Keyword(s):  
System Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Public Private Partnership ◽  
Dynamics Simulation ◽  
Rail Transit ◽  
Long Distance ◽  
Private Partnership ◽  
Bike Sharing ◽  
Integration Mode ◽  
Partnership Program

A marriage between dockless bike-sharing systems and rail transit presents new opportunities for sustainable transportation in Chinese cities. However, how to promote the bicycle–metro integration mode remains largely unstudied. This paper designs a public–private partnership program to promote bicycle–metro integration. We consider the cooperation between bike-sharing companies and rail transit companies to improve both services and attract long-distance travelers to choose the bicycle–metro integration mode, with government subsidies. To analyze the proportion of each population participating in this public–private partnership program, we establish an evolutionary game model considering bike-sharing companies, rail transit companies, and long-distance travelers, and obtain eight scenarios of equilibriums and corresponding stable conditions. To prove the evolutionary game analysis, we construct a system dynamics simulation model and confirm that the public–private partnership project can be achieved in reality. We discuss key parameters that affect the final stable state through sensitivity analysis. The results demonstrate that by reasonably adjusting the values of parameters, each equilibrium can be changed into an optimal evolutionary stable strategy. This study can provide useful policy implications and operational recommendations for government agencies, bike-sharing companies, and transit authorities to promote bicycle–metro integration.

scholarly journals System Dynamics Model for the Evolutionary Behaviour of Government Enterprises and Consumers in China’s New Energy Vehicle Market

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 1578 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hongxia Sun ◽  
Yao Wan ◽  
Huirong Lv
Keyword(s):  
System Dynamics ◽  
Motor Vehicle ◽  
Replicator Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Practical Significance ◽  
Subsidy Policy ◽  
New Energy ◽  
New Energy Vehicle ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Vehicle Market

Exhaust pollution and energy crises are worsening worldwide. China has become the largest motor vehicle producer; thus, promoting the use of new energy vehicles (NEVs) in China has important practical significance. In this paper, considering the limited rationality of governments, NEV enterprises and consumers, we study the subsidy policy of the China NEV market using the evolutionary game and system dynamics (SD) methods. First, a tripartite evolutionary game model is developed and the replicator dynamics equations and Jacobian matrix are obtained. A SD simulation of the model was conducted to further clarify the impact of the initial market proportion and three variables used in the model. The results show that the initial market proportion affects the evolution speed but does not affect the evolution result when the three group players all choose a mixed strategy. For governments, they should not hastily cancel price subsidies provided to consumers; rather, they should dynamically adjust the rate of the subsidy decrease and increase the consumers’ extra cost for purchasing fuel vehicles (FVs). NEV enterprises should appropriately increase their investments in the research and development (R&D) of NEVs.

Using system dynamics to evaluate renewable electricity development in Malaysia

Kybernetes ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 24-39 ◽  
Author(s):  
Salman Ahmad ◽  
Razman bin Mat Tahar
Keyword(s):  
System Dynamics ◽  
Fossil Fuels ◽  
Systems Approach ◽  
Capacity Expansion ◽  
Assessment Model ◽  
Flow Diagram ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The Government ◽  
Policy Targets

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to provide an assessment of Malaysia's renewable capacity target. Malaysia relies heavily on fossil fuels for electricity generation. To diversify the fuel-mix, a technology-specific target has been set by the government in 2010. Considering the complexity in generation expansion, there is a dire need for an assessment model that can evaluate policy in a feedback fashion. The study also aims to expand policy evaluation literature in electricity domain by taking a dynamic systems approach. Design/methodology/approach – System dynamics modelling and simulation approach is used in this study. The model variables, selected from literature, are constituted into casual loop diagram. Later, a stock and flow diagram is developed by integrating planning, construction, operation, and decision making sub-models. The dynamic interactions between the sub-sectors are analysed based on the short-, medium- and long-term policy targets. Findings – Annual capacity constructions fail to achieve short-, medium- and long-term targets. However, the difference in operational capacity and medium- and long-term target are small. In terms of technology, solar photovoltaic (PV) attains the highest level of capacity followed by biomass. Research limitations/implications – While financial calculations are crucial for capacity expansion decisions, currently they are not being modelled; this study primarily focuses on system delays and exogenous components only. Practical implications – A useful model that offers regulators and investors insights on system characteristics and policy targets simultaneously. Originality/value – This paper provides a model for evaluating policy for renewable capacity expansion development in a dynamic context, for Malaysia.

scholarly journals Sustainable tourism modeling: Pricing decisions and evolutionarily stable strategies for competitive tour operators

2018 ◽  
Vol 25 (5) ◽  
pp. 779-799 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yong He ◽  
Peng He ◽  
Feifei Xu ◽  
Chunming (Victor) Shi
Keyword(s):  
Sustainable Tourism ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Innovation Strategy ◽  
Cost Advantage ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies ◽  
Environment Friendly ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Green Tourism ◽  
The Government ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable

In this article, we investigate two competitive tour operators (TOs) who choose between traditional tourism strategy (strategy T) and green tourism innovation strategy (strategy G). Our article attempts to address the following important issues using evolutionary game models: when would TOs facing environment-friendly tourists adopt the strategy G? How do TOs set product prices under different strategy combinations? How can the government effectively motivate TOs to pursue green tourism? Our research results show that a green tourism innovation pioneer could monopolize the market under certain conditions. Furthermore, when the environmental preference of tourists is sufficiently low, no TOs would adopt the strategy G; when it is moderate, only the TO with cost advantage (stronger TO) would adopt the strategy G; when it is sufficiently high, both TOs would select the strategy G. Our research also demonstrates that the stronger TO implements the strategy G mostly independent of the rival’s decisions, but the opposite is true for the TO with cost disadvantage (weaker TO). We further investigate potential government subsidies that can motivate TOs to carry out green tourism simultaneously. Our results suggest that to be more effective, the government first offer the green subsidy to highly competitive tourism locations and/or more innovative TOs.

scholarly journals Analysis of Smooth Implementation of Industry Poverty Alleviation considering Government Supervision

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Haifeng Yao ◽  
Jiangyue Fu
Keyword(s):  
Equilibrium Point ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Poverty Alleviation ◽  
Equilibrium Points ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Parameter Design ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Government Supervision ◽  
Proposed Model ◽  
The Government

Vigorous implementation of industrial poverty alleviation is the fundamental path and core power of poverty alleviation in impoverished areas. Enterprises and poor farmers are the main participants in industry poverty alleviation. Government supervision measures regulate their behaviors. This study investigates how to smoothly implement industry poverty alleviation projects considering government supervision. A game model is proposed based on the evolutionary game theory. It analyses the game processes between enterprises and poor farmers with and without government supervision based on the proposed model. It is shown that poverty alleviation projects will fail without government supervision given that the equilibrium point (0, 0) is the ultimate convergent point of the system but will possibly succeed with government supervision since the equilibrium points (0, 0) and (1, 1) are the ultimate convergent point of the system, where equilibrium point (1, 1) is our desired results. Different supervision modes have different effects on the game process. This study considers three supervision modes, namely, only reward mode, only penalty mode, and reward and penalty mode, and investigates the parameter design for the reward and penalty mode. The obtained results are helpful for the government to develop appropriate policies for the smooth implementation of industry poverty alleviation projects.

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