scholarly journals System Dynamics Analysis of Evolutionary Game Strategies between the Government and Investors Based on New Energy Power Construction Public-Private-Partnership (PPP) Project

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (7) ◽  
pp. 2533 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lei Gao ◽  
Zhen-Yu Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Social Capital ◽  
System Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Public Private Partnership ◽  
Behavioral Strategies ◽  
Private Partnership ◽  
System Evolution ◽  
Power Construction ◽  
New Energy ◽  
The Government

The public-private-partnership (PPP) is a new mode for the government and social capital to jointly invest in public infrastructure projects. In particular, PPP projects for new energy power construction have been strongly supported in some countries in recent years, because it can not only reduce financial pressure on the government, but also promote the development of new energy. Current scholars study the economic benefits of PPP projects for new energy power construction from a macro perspective, and they rarely study behavioral strategies of the government and social capital as a game process of project construction from a micro perspective. This paper will fill this gap. This study firstly built an evolutionary game model of the government and investors based on new energy power construction PPP projects. Secondly, taking China’s typical new energy power construction PPP project–waste incineration power generation as an example, the system dynamics (SD) model was proposed to simulate the evolutionary process of game players’ behavioral strategies. Finally, the effects of key factors in the construction of PPP project on the strategies’ stability were studied. The results show that: (1) there is no evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) in the game system between the government and investors, and system evolution is characterized by periodic behavior. (2) When the government implements dynamic bounty measures, the system evolution process is still a closed loop with periodic motion. However, when the government implements dynamic punishment measures, there is a stable ESS in the hybrid strategy of the game system. (3) The government can increase unit fines when making dynamic strategic adjustments, which will not only promote the active cooperation of investors, but also reduce the probability of government supervision, thereby reducing costs.

System Dynamics Modeling for a Public–Private Partnership Program to Promote Bicycle–Metro Integration Based on Evolutionary Game

2021 ◽  
pp. 036119812110124
Author(s):  
Jianming Cai ◽  
Yue Liang
Keyword(s):  
System Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Public Private Partnership ◽  
Dynamics Simulation ◽  
Rail Transit ◽  
Long Distance ◽  
Private Partnership ◽  
Bike Sharing ◽  
Integration Mode ◽  
Partnership Program

A marriage between dockless bike-sharing systems and rail transit presents new opportunities for sustainable transportation in Chinese cities. However, how to promote the bicycle–metro integration mode remains largely unstudied. This paper designs a public–private partnership program to promote bicycle–metro integration. We consider the cooperation between bike-sharing companies and rail transit companies to improve both services and attract long-distance travelers to choose the bicycle–metro integration mode, with government subsidies. To analyze the proportion of each population participating in this public–private partnership program, we establish an evolutionary game model considering bike-sharing companies, rail transit companies, and long-distance travelers, and obtain eight scenarios of equilibriums and corresponding stable conditions. To prove the evolutionary game analysis, we construct a system dynamics simulation model and confirm that the public–private partnership project can be achieved in reality. We discuss key parameters that affect the final stable state through sensitivity analysis. The results demonstrate that by reasonably adjusting the values of parameters, each equilibrium can be changed into an optimal evolutionary stable strategy. This study can provide useful policy implications and operational recommendations for government agencies, bike-sharing companies, and transit authorities to promote bicycle–metro integration.

scholarly journals The Evolutionary Game of Stakeholders’ Coordination Mechanism of New Energy Power Construction PPP Project: A China Case

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 1045 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lei Gao ◽  
Zhen-Yu Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Public Participation ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Process ◽  
Coordination Mechanism ◽  
Strategic Choices ◽  
The Public ◽  
Power Construction ◽  
New Energy ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Impact

The government, investors, and the public have formed a dynamic multi-game relationship on the Public-Private-Partnership (PPP) project, but few studies include them in a system to study their win–win solutions. Firstly, we constructed a tripartite game model of the government, investors, and the public based on evolutionary game theory. Secondly, the evolutionary process of tripartite strategy behaviors was studied with the system dynamics (SD) model. Finally, the impact of changes in key factors on behavior strategies was studied through sensitivity analysis. The results show the following: (1) In the outsourcing of new energy and power construction PPP projects, the three parties will eventually reach the equilibrium state of {government supervision, public participation, investors effort}, the three parties achieve a win–win situation and the project benefits are the highest at this time, and the public participation will play an important role in promoting the smooth outsourcing of PPP projects. (2) The strategic choices of the government, investors, and the public are sensitive to changes in the corresponding exogenous variables. (3) The security factor plays a crucial role in the choice of public strategy. The public’s choice is not only affected by its own income and cost, but also by the amount of compensation promised by the government and the estimated damage caused by the investor.

scholarly journals The Evolutionary Game of Trust in Public-Private Partnership Project Networks

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Xiangtian Nie ◽  
Kai Feng ◽  
Guoxiang Zhao ◽  
Tianyu Fan ◽  
Shengnan Wang
Keyword(s):  
Private Sector ◽  
Management Practice ◽  
Equilibrium Points ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Stable State ◽  
Trust Model ◽  
Public Private Partnership ◽  
Private Partnership ◽  
Project Networks ◽  
The Government

In public-private partnership (PPP) projects, the government plays a role as both regulator and participant. Trust between the government and the private sector is important as it may affect project performance and even cause the problem of a breach of contract, which may lead to project failure. Little is known, however, about the formation and evolution mechanisms of trust in this context. This study analyses the complex evolution of trust in PPP project networks. An evolutionary game of trust model between government and the private sector is established and analysed, the strategic equilibrium points are obtained by solving the replication dynamic equation, and the Jacobian matrix and differential equation stability theory are introduced to analyse the stability of the equilibrium points. The results reveal the relationships among the stable state of trust, the initial state of trust, and the payment matrix, indicating that the payment matrix can effectively shape the evolution process and stable state of trust to influence performance. This study provides a novel contribution in solving the complex trust problem in PPP project networks and it provides a new analytical tool for PPP project management practice.

scholarly journals Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Supervision Behavior for Public-Private Partnership Projects with Public Participation

2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 ◽  
pp. 1-8 ◽  
Author(s):  
Congdong Li ◽  
Xiaoli Li ◽  
Yu Wang
Keyword(s):  
Private Sector ◽  
Public Participation ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Public Private Partnership ◽  
Private Partnership ◽  
The Public ◽  
Private Behavior ◽  
Government Supervision ◽  
Participation Level ◽  
The Government

The public can directly or indirectly participate in the PPP (public-private partnership) projects and then has an impact on the project profit and public or private behavior. To explore the influence of the public participation of the PPP projects supervision behavior, this paper analyzes the mutual evolutionary regularity of the private sector and government supervision department and the influence of public participation level on public and private behavior based on evolutionary game theory. The results show that the supervision strategy is not chosen when the supervision cost of government supervision department is greater than the supervision benefit; it can make private sector consciously provide the high-quality public products/services with the improvement of public participation level. Therefore, the government should reduce the cost of public participation and improve the public participation level and influence through the application of the Internet, big data, and other advanced technologies, in order to restrain the behavior of the private sector and improve the supervision efficiency.

scholarly journals Social Capital Participation in Public-Private Partnership Projects in China: Do Government Credit Risks Matter?

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chen Wu ◽  
Wei Li ◽  
Jie Li
Keyword(s):  
Social Capital ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Public Private Partnership ◽  
Role Of Government ◽  
Private Partnership ◽  
Credit Risks ◽  
Sustainable Operation ◽  
Strategic Goals ◽  
Government Credit ◽  
The Government

In China the Public-Private Partnership (PPP) projects are adopted to achieve the strategic goals of governments and to ensure the sustainable operation of local government finances. However, rigorous empirical research on the determinants of social capital’s participation in PPP is sparse. This study investigates the effects of government behaviors on the participation of social capital in the PPP projects by focusing on the role of government credit risks. We construct a dynamic game and adopt an empirical analysis using panel data of Chinese provinces from 2013 to 2018. Our findings reveal a significant inverse relationship between the government credit risk and the social capital participation in PPP. It provides policy-makers and researchers with useful information about using the PPP to promote investment on infrastructures while ensuring a sustainable local fiscal system.

scholarly journals Social Capital Participation in Public-Private Partnership Projects in China: Do Government Credit Risks Matter?

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chen Wu ◽  
Wei Li ◽  
Jie Li
Keyword(s):  
Social Capital ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Public Private Partnership ◽  
Role Of Government ◽  
Private Partnership ◽  
Credit Risks ◽  
Sustainable Operation ◽  
Strategic Goals ◽  
Government Credit ◽  
The Government

In China the Public-Private Partnership (PPP) projects are adopted to achieve the strategic goals of governments and to ensure the sustainable operation of local government finances. However, rigorous empirical research on the determinants of social capital’s participation in PPP is sparse. This study investigates the effects of government behaviors on the participation of social capital in the PPP projects by focusing on the role of government credit risks. We construct a dynamic game and adopt an empirical analysis using panel data of Chinese provinces from 2013 to 2018. Our findings reveal a significant inverse relationship between the government credit risk and the social capital participation in PPP. It provides policy-makers and researchers with useful information about using the PPP to promote investment on infrastructures while ensuring a sustainable local fiscal system.

scholarly journals DEFINITION AND ESSENCE ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP (PPP) MODEL

2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (9) ◽  
pp. 43-47
Keyword(s):  
Social Capital ◽  
Financial Burden ◽  
Public Private Partnership ◽  
Risk Allocation ◽  
Private Partnership ◽  
New Normal ◽  
Government Functions ◽  
Important Means ◽  
The Government ◽  
Definition Of

PPP model has become an important means to reduce the financial burden in the new normal, and PPP model in China has a certain difference with the PPP model overseas. Based on the analysis of the characteristics of PPP model, the definition of PPP model according with realistic of China is proposed; the advantages of PPP model are analyzed from helping the transformation of government functions, promoting investment diversification, and reasonable risk allocation etc.; through analysis of partnership concept, the essence of PPP model is put forward, which is the complementary advantages of the government and social capital.

scholarly journals System Dynamics Model for the Evolutionary Behaviour of Government Enterprises and Consumers in China’s New Energy Vehicle Market

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 1578 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hongxia Sun ◽  
Yao Wan ◽  
Huirong Lv
Keyword(s):  
System Dynamics ◽  
Motor Vehicle ◽  
Replicator Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Practical Significance ◽  
Subsidy Policy ◽  
New Energy ◽  
New Energy Vehicle ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Vehicle Market

Exhaust pollution and energy crises are worsening worldwide. China has become the largest motor vehicle producer; thus, promoting the use of new energy vehicles (NEVs) in China has important practical significance. In this paper, considering the limited rationality of governments, NEV enterprises and consumers, we study the subsidy policy of the China NEV market using the evolutionary game and system dynamics (SD) methods. First, a tripartite evolutionary game model is developed and the replicator dynamics equations and Jacobian matrix are obtained. A SD simulation of the model was conducted to further clarify the impact of the initial market proportion and three variables used in the model. The results show that the initial market proportion affects the evolution speed but does not affect the evolution result when the three group players all choose a mixed strategy. For governments, they should not hastily cancel price subsidies provided to consumers; rather, they should dynamically adjust the rate of the subsidy decrease and increase the consumers’ extra cost for purchasing fuel vehicles (FVs). NEV enterprises should appropriately increase their investments in the research and development (R&D) of NEVs.

scholarly journals Public Private Partnership (PPP) in Malaysia

2018 ◽  
Vol 2 (4) ◽  
pp. 9-13
Author(s):  
Mahirah Rafie
Keyword(s):  
Future Study ◽  
Public Private Partnership ◽  
New Method ◽  
Private Partnership ◽  
Implementation Project ◽  
Potential Benefits ◽  
The Government

Public Private Partnership (PPP) is not a new method of development in a country. In Malaysia, concept of PPP had been used almost four decades after Malaysian Incorporated Policy had been introduced by the government. The objectives of this present study is to scrutinize defining the concept of PPP, the evolution of implementation PPP, and also characteristic and criteria of PPP based on Public Private Partnership Guidelines. This paper also examines the potential benefits of PPP implementation in Malaysia based on the previous study. Last but not least, issues and recommendation for future study has been suggested to enhance PPP implementation project.

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