scholarly journals Stackelberg Dynamic Game-Based Resource Allocation in Threat Defense for Internet of Things

Sensors ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (11) ◽  
pp. 4074 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bingjie Liu ◽  
Haitao Xu ◽  
Xianwei Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Resource Allocation ◽  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Internet Of Things ◽  
Rapid Development ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Open Loop ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Equilibrium Solutions ◽  
Iot Devices ◽  
Dynamic Game Model

With the rapid development of the Internet of Things, there are a series of security problems faced by the IoT devices. As the IoT devices are generally devices with limited resources, how to effectively allocate the restricted resources facing the security problems is the key issue at present. In this paper, we study the resource allocation problem in threat defense for the resource-constrained IoT system, and propose a Stackelberg dynamic game model to get the optimal allocated resources for both the defender and attackers. The proposed Stackelberg dynamic game model is composed by one defender and many attackers. Given the objective functions of the defender and attackers, we analyze both the open-loop Nash equilibrium and feedback Nash equilibrium for the defender and attackers. Then both the defender and attackers can control their available resources based on the Nash equilibrium solutions of the dynamic game. Numerical simulation results show that correctness and effeteness of the proposed model.

scholarly journals Would Enterprises Send Food Traceability Information to Consumers?

2014 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 105
Author(s):  
Wu Tianzhen ◽  
Wang Ruimei ◽  
Hu Hongwei ◽  
Song Huan
Keyword(s):  
Food Security ◽  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Literature Review ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Chinese Consumers ◽  
Food Traceability ◽  
Traceability System ◽  
Dynamic Game Model ◽  
Security Incidents

<p>Food security incidents have enhanced Chinese consumers’ concerns about food quality and security. These growing concerns have increased demand for security of food and led to development of Chinese food traceability system. Based on the literature review, this paper built a signaling dynamic game model of information delivery from enterprises to consumers to explore the refining Bayes Nash equilibrium. The analytical results show that “good” enterprise need to send enough food traceability information to get themselves separated from “bad” enterprises, while enterprises which were “not that good” had to send much more information to achieve that trust of consumers.</p>

scholarly journals OPTIMAL TARIFFS ON EXHAUSTIBLE RESOURCES: THE CASE OF QUANTITY-SETTING

2012 ◽  
Vol 14 (04) ◽  
pp. 1240004 ◽  
Author(s):  
KENJI FUJIWARA ◽  
NGO VAN LONG
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Exhaustible Resources ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Exhaustible Resource ◽  
The World ◽  
Dynamic Game Model ◽  
Nash And Stackelberg Equilibria ◽  
Optimal Tariffs

Constructing a dynamic game model of trade of an exhaustible resource, this paper compares feedback Nash and Stackelberg equilibria. We consider two different leadership scenarios: leadership by the importing country, and leadership by the exporting country. We numerically show that as compared to the Nash equilibrium, both countries are better off if the importing country is a leader, but that the follower is worse off if the exporting country is a leader. Consequently, the world welfare is highest under the importing country's leadership and lowest under the exporting country's leadership.

scholarly journals A Game Theoretic Analysis of Cryptocurrency Market for Sustainable Development of Smart Cities

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rajani Singh ◽  
Ashutosh Dhar Dwivedi ◽  
Agnieszka Wiszniewska-Matyszkiel
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Market Share ◽  
Smart Cities ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Stackelberg Equilibrium ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Advertising Effort ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Finite Time Horizon ◽  
Dynamic Game Model

Abstract Cryptocurrency was first began to use in 2009 and features technology such as blockchain that is used in the development of smart cities. Game theory play an important role when designing secure economic system such as Bitcoin. In this paper, we study a dynamic game model of brand advertising in continuous time with the finite time horizon. The total payoff or profit of players or firms is discounted over time and the rate at which the firms attract the customers from its rival, called attraction rate, is taken from the economic theory of contest. As a novelty of our game model, the attraction rate of a firm depends on both: player’s or firm’s advertising effort and the advertising effort of players or firm’s rivalry. We solve the game for Stackelberg equilibrium (with the leader and follower differing by information and/or the sequence of choosing strategies) as well as for Nash equilibrium. Further, we graphically compare the results obtained for the Stackelberg and the Nash equilibrium. Surprisingly, we have obtained that if the revenue per unit of market share is equal for Nash and Stackelberg equilibrium then the results for Nash player 1 overlaps with the leader and the results for Nash player 2 overlaps with follower. Finally, we present the application of our dynamic game model in the cryptocurrency market where two firms compete with each other for the cryptocurrency market share.

scholarly journals A Dynamic Game Model of Collective Choice in Multiagent Systems

2018 ◽  
Vol 63 (3) ◽  
pp. 768-782 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rabih Salhab ◽  
Roland P. Malhame ◽  
Jerome Le Ny
Keyword(s):  
Multiagent Systems ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Collective Choice ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Dynamic Game Model

scholarly journals The Audio Auditor: User-Level Membership Inference in Internet of Things Voice Services

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 (1) ◽  
pp. 209-228
Author(s):  
Yuantian Miao ◽  
Minhui Xue ◽  
Chao Chen ◽  
Lei Pan ◽  
Jun Zhang ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Internet Of Things ◽  
State Of The Art ◽  
Rapid Development ◽  
Black Box ◽  
Problem Space ◽  
Specific Data ◽  
Learning Techniques ◽  
Audio Data ◽  
Iot Devices ◽  
Asr System

AbstractWith the rapid development of deep learning techniques, the popularity of voice services implemented on various Internet of Things (IoT) devices is ever increasing. In this paper, we examine user-level membership inference in the problem space of voice services, by designing an audio auditor to verify whether a specific user had unwillingly contributed audio used to train an automatic speech recognition (ASR) model under strict black-box access. With user representation of the input audio data and their corresponding translated text, our trained auditor is effective in user-level audit. We also observe that the auditor trained on specific data can be generalized well regardless of the ASR model architecture. We validate the auditor on ASR models trained with LSTM, RNNs, and GRU algorithms on two state-of-the-art pipelines, the hybrid ASR system and the end-to-end ASR system. Finally, we conduct a real-world trial of our auditor on iPhone Siri, achieving an overall accuracy exceeding 80%. We hope the methodology developed in this paper and findings can inform privacy advocates to overhaul IoT privacy.

Dynamic game model for finding the equilibrium level of migration flows

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexandr A. Tarasyev ◽  
Gavriil A. Agarkov ◽  
Tatyana V. Tarasyeva ◽  
Jeenat B. Jabbar
Keyword(s):  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Equilibrium Level ◽  
Migration Flows ◽  
Dynamic Game Model
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