scholarly journals Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom: Exploring a Glut-Theoretic Account

Religions ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (9) ◽  
pp. 770
Author(s):  
Michael DeVito
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Logical Consequence ◽  
Human Freedom ◽  
Divine Foreknowledge ◽  
Ability To Do Otherwise

This essay marks the first steps towards a viable glut-theoretic (contradictory) solution to the longstanding foreknowledge and free will dilemma. Specifically, I offer a solution to the dilemma that accommodates omniscience (foreknowledge) and human freedom (as the ability to do otherwise) in a simple, flat-footed way. This goal is accomplished via viewing the theological fatalist argument not as a problem, but as a sound argument: omniscience and human free will are contradictory and by dropping to a weaker underlying account of logical consequence, we can embrace them in their full-throated, robust (though contradictory) interpretations. That said, the primary aim of this paper is one of exploration: how does a subclassical solution to the foreknowledge and free will dilemma stack up in comparison to the traditional solutions on offer in the literature. This essay represents the beginning of such an exploration.

Descartes and Leibniz on Human Free-Will and the Ability to Do Otherwise

2006 ◽  
Vol 36 (3) ◽  
pp. 387-414 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cecilia Wee
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Sufficient Reason ◽  
Human Freedom ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Principle Of Sufficient Reason ◽  
The Face ◽  
Best Possible World ◽  
Ability To Do Otherwise

Both Descartes and Leibniz are on record as maintaining that acting freely requires that the agent ‘could have done otherwise.’ However, it is not clear how they could maintain this, given their other metaphysical commitments. In Leibniz's case, the arguments connected with this are well-rehearsed: it is argued, for example, that Leibnizian doctrines such as the Principle of Sufficient Reason and the thesis that God must will the best possible world preclude that the human could ever do other than she did. The question of whether Descartes can maintain that the agent is able to do otherwise in the face of his wider metaphysical commitments has received comparatively little attention. However, Chappell has recently noted that Descartes's thesis that God is the ‘total cause’ of everything seems to preclude the possibility of human freedom (where this includes the ability to do otherwise).

Providence and Evil: Three Theories

1992 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 91-105 ◽  
Author(s):  
William Hasker
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Human Freedom ◽  
Metaphysical Possibility ◽  
Philosophical Work ◽  
Divine Foreknowledge ◽  
Middle Knowledge

The last two decades have seen an unprecedented amount of philosophical work on the topics of divine foreknowledge, middle knowledge, and timelessness in relation to human freedom. Most of this effort has been directed at logical and metaphysical aspects of these topics – the compatibility of foreknowledge with free will, the existence of true counterfactuals of freedom and the possibility of middle knowledge, the conceivability and metaphysical possibility of divine timelessness, and so on. Far less attention, in contrast, has been devoted to the broader theological ramifications of these theories. Yet insofar as they are theological theories, they are properly appreciated and indeed fully understood only when placed in the appropriate theological context.

scholarly journals Finite in Infinity

2012 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 97-109
Author(s):  
Hannah Laurens
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Human Nature ◽  
Human Freedom ◽  
Close Connection ◽  
Metaphysical Theory

One of the main themes in Spinoza’s Ethics is the issue of human freedom: What does it consist in and how may it be attained? Spinoza’s ethical views crucially depend on his metaphysical theory, and this close connection provides the answer to several central questions concerning Spinoza’s conception of human freedom. Firstly, how can we accommodate human freedom within Spinoza’s necessitarianism—in the context of which Spinoza rejects the notion of a free will? Secondly, how can humans, as merely finite beings, genuinely attain freedom? Can Spinoza defend his claim that we may even attain blessedness? I will argue that these questions are answered by appeal to a twofold in human nature. According to Spinoza, we are finite in infinity.

scholarly journals Edwards on the Incompatibility of Divine Foreknowledge and Human Free Will

Sententiae ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 39 (2) ◽  
pp. 29-45
Author(s):  
Oleh Bondar ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
20Th Century ◽  
Jonathan Edwards ◽  
Divine Foreknowledge ◽  
The Past ◽  
Freedom Of The Will ◽  
The Will ◽  
Theological Fatalism ◽  
Nelson Pike ◽  
Necessity Of The Past

In the book “Freedom of the Will”, Jonathan Edwards (1703-1758) put forward a strong ar-gument for theological fatalism. This argument, I suppose, can be considered as the universal basis for discussion between Fatalists and Anti-Fatalists in the 20th century, especially in the context of the most powerful argument for fatalism, introduced by Nelson Pike. The argument of Edwards rests upon the following principles: (a) if something has been the case in the past, it has been the case necessarily (Necessity of the past); (b) if God knows something (say A), it is not the case that ~A is possible (Infallibility of God`s knowledge). Hence, Edwards infers that if God had foreknowledge that A, then A is necessary, and it is not the case that someone could voluntarily choose ~A. The article argues that (i) the Edwards` inference Kgp → □p rests upon the modal fallacy; (ii) the inference „God had a knowledge that p will happen, therefore „God had a knowledge that p will happen” is the proposition about the past, and hence, the necessarily true proposition“ is ambiguous; thus, it is not the case that this proposition necessarily entails the impossibility of ~p; (iii) it is not the case that p, being known by God, turns out to be necessary. Thus, we can avoid the inference of Edwards that if Kgp is a fact of the past, then we cannot freely choose ~p. It has also been shown that the main provisions of the argument of Edwards remain significant in the context of contemporary debates about free will and foreknowledge (Theories of soft facts, Anti-Ockhamism, theories of temporal modal asymmetry, „Timeless solution”). Additionally, I introduce a new challenge for fatalism – argument from Brouwerian axiom.

On divine foreknowledge and human freedom: A reply

1980 ◽  
Vol 37 (4) ◽  
pp. 429-430 ◽  
Author(s):  
William L. Rowe
Keyword(s):  
Human Freedom ◽  
Divine Foreknowledge
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