"Ich begehre keinen freien Willen"[I desire no free will] G.E. Lessing's Peculiar View on Human Freedom

2019 ◽  
Vol 52 (3) ◽  
pp. 337-360
Author(s):  
Johannes Schmidt
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Human Freedom

scholarly journals Finite in Infinity

2012 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 97-109
Author(s):  
Hannah Laurens
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Human Nature ◽  
Human Freedom ◽  
Close Connection ◽  
Metaphysical Theory

One of the main themes in Spinoza’s Ethics is the issue of human freedom: What does it consist in and how may it be attained? Spinoza’s ethical views crucially depend on his metaphysical theory, and this close connection provides the answer to several central questions concerning Spinoza’s conception of human freedom. Firstly, how can we accommodate human freedom within Spinoza’s necessitarianism—in the context of which Spinoza rejects the notion of a free will? Secondly, how can humans, as merely finite beings, genuinely attain freedom? Can Spinoza defend his claim that we may even attain blessedness? I will argue that these questions are answered by appeal to a twofold in human nature. According to Spinoza, we are finite in infinity.

Descartes and Leibniz on Human Free-Will and the Ability to Do Otherwise

2006 ◽  
Vol 36 (3) ◽  
pp. 387-414 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cecilia Wee
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Sufficient Reason ◽  
Human Freedom ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Principle Of Sufficient Reason ◽  
The Face ◽  
Best Possible World ◽  
Ability To Do Otherwise

Both Descartes and Leibniz are on record as maintaining that acting freely requires that the agent ‘could have done otherwise.’ However, it is not clear how they could maintain this, given their other metaphysical commitments. In Leibniz's case, the arguments connected with this are well-rehearsed: it is argued, for example, that Leibnizian doctrines such as the Principle of Sufficient Reason and the thesis that God must will the best possible world preclude that the human could ever do other than she did. The question of whether Descartes can maintain that the agent is able to do otherwise in the face of his wider metaphysical commitments has received comparatively little attention. However, Chappell has recently noted that Descartes's thesis that God is the ‘total cause’ of everything seems to preclude the possibility of human freedom (where this includes the ability to do otherwise).

scholarly journals Nota crítica sobre el libre albedrío en De Libero Arbitrio, Liber II de San Agustín. Critical Note on Free Will In De Libero Arbitrio, Liber II of Saint Augustine

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guadalupe Márquez Domínguez
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Saint Augustine ◽  
The Body ◽  
Human Freedom ◽  
Critical Note ◽  
Trace Back

El problema de la libertad es un tema de actualidad y forma parte de nuestras preguntas fundamentales como seres humanos. Los filósofos medievales le han dado respuesta y lo que encontraremos aquí será un recorrido por las definiciones de libre albedrío y libertas, para partir luego a debatir y analizar tres argumentos en San Agustín que nos llevarán a la respuesta de la defensa de la libertad tanto divina como humana. ¿Cómo tener la certeza de que en la omnipotencia de Dios cabe la libertad del hombre, o que el hombre es libre a pesar de la omnisciencia de Dios? Este trabajo hace a un lado estas aparentes contradicciones y busca dar reflexión sobre el pensamiento agustiniano y propuestas ante la libertad del hombre y la voluntad Divina. The problem of free will is a topic of interest for today and still integrates the body of big questions we do as humans. Medieval philosophers tackled this problem too, giving a particular answer: such is the case of the notions of free will and liberty (libertas), that I trace back in Saint Augustine analysing three arguments that involve a defense of free will, both human and divine. How can we have certitude of God’s omnipotence interacting with human freedom? Are humans free in spite of God knowing things regardless of time? These lines reflect the apparent conceptual qualms of this contradictions and seek what the Augustinian response to human and divine free will proposes. 

scholarly journals Francisco Suárez’s Encounter with Calvin Over Human Freedom

Perichoresis ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (6) ◽  
pp. 103-118
Author(s):  
Victor M. Salas
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Human Freedom ◽  
Self Determination ◽  
John Calvin

AbstractThis essay explores Francisco Suárez’s account of the nature of human free will. To that end, Suárez’s engagement with John Calvin is considered so as to place the Jesuit’s account into greater relief. The conclusion of this study will reveal that, for Suárez, the human will’s freedom of self–determination is both caused by God and consists in its own indifference regarding the power to act and the power not to act.

Human freedom and the brain

2009 ◽  
Vol 21 (S2) ◽  
pp. 1-6
Author(s):  
Hans Helmut Kornhuber
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Moral Virtue ◽  
Individual Learning ◽  
Human Freedom ◽  
Abstract Thinking ◽  
Freedom Of Will ◽  
Genes And Environment ◽  
Good Will ◽  
The Individual ◽  
The Brain

Abstract:Freedom of will does exist, it is self-leadership of man based on reason and ethos. Evidence comes from truth. Determinism cannot be proved since if you try, you mean to prove a truth; but there is no truth without freedom. By contrast for freedom there are many pieces of evidence e.g. science, arts, technology.Freedom utilizes creative abstract thinking with phantasy. Freedom is graded, limited, based on nature, but not developed without good will. We perceive reliably freedom by self-consciousness and in other persons as long as we are sober. Freedom needs intelligence, but is more, it is a creative and moral virtue.The basis for freedom is phylogenesis and culture, in the individual learning and experimenting. Factors in the becoming of freedom are not only genes and environment but also self-discipline. But the creativity of free will is dangerous. Man therefore needs morale. Drives and feelings become humanized, cultural interests are developed. There is a humane nobility from long good will.

The Recovery of Free Agency in the Theology of St. Augustine

1987 ◽  
Vol 80 (1) ◽  
pp. 101-126 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Wetzel
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Jesus Christ ◽  
The State ◽  
Human Freedom ◽  
Human Being ◽  
Free Agency ◽  
Theological Discourse ◽  
The Law

In The Spirit and the Letter Augustine claims that grace not only avoids abrogating human freedom it actually establishes free will. His claim raises some intriguing questions. What sort of freedom is it that can be established only by the influence of another agent—in this case, God—and what sort of bondage is it that is overcome by grace? If we remain exclusively within Augustine's theological discourse, the answers come straightforwardly and by now have a ring of familiarity. The freedom in question is the state of loving God over and above his worldly and time-bound creations, fulfilling (with divine assistance) the demands of the Law, and finding one's happiness in reconciliation with the eternal through the mediation of Jesus Christ. Bondage is conversely the blindness and perversity of keeping one's attention fixed on creation apart from its relation to its Creator and of courting the satisfaction of only those desires which are framed independently of God's claims on every human being. Freedom is loving well or having a bona voluntas; bondage is loving aimlessly, unreflectively, and hence destructively.

Misery and freedom: reply to Walls

2004 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 217-224 ◽  
Author(s):  
THOMAS TALBOTT
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Human Freedom ◽  
Fundamental Point

In this brief reply to Walls's challenging critique, I try to do two things: first, clarify the most fundamental point on which I think Walls and I disagree, and second, argue that, as surprising as it may first appear, Walls's free-will theodicy of hell requires that God interfere with human freedom in inappropriate ways.

scholarly journals Political differences in free will belief are driven by differences in moralization

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jim Albert Charlton Everett ◽  
Cory J Clark ◽  
Peter Meindl ◽  
Jamie B Luguri ◽  
Brian D. Earp ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Personality Traits ◽  
Political Ideology ◽  
Meta Analysis ◽  
Motivated Reasoning ◽  
Human Freedom ◽  
Political Conservatism ◽  
Personal Accountability ◽  
Political Differences ◽  
The Relationship

In fourteen studies, we tested whether political conservatives’ stronger free will beliefs aredriven by stronger and broader tendencies to moralize, and thus a greater motivation to assign responsibility. In Study 1 (meta-analysis of five studies, n = 308,499) we show that conservatives have stronger tendencies to moralize than liberals, even for moralization measures containing zero political content (e.g., moral badness ratings of faces and personality traits). In Study 2, show that conservatives report higher free will belief, and this is mediated by the belief that people should be held morally responsible for their bad behaviour (n = 14,707). In Study 3, we show that political conservatism is associated with higher attributions of free will for specific events. Turning to experimental manipulations of our hypothesis, we show that when conservatives and liberals see an action as equally wrong there is no difference in free will attributions (Study 4); that when conservatives see an action as less wrong than liberals, they attribute less free will (Study 5); and that specific perceptions of wrongness mediate the relationship between political ideology and free will attributions (Study 6a and 6b). Finally, we show that political conservatives and liberals even differentially attribute free will for the same action depending on who performed it (Studies 7a-d). Together, our results suggest political differences in free will are largely explicable through motivated reasoning and differing desires to blame, rather than reflecting some genuine disagreement about the metaphysical nature of human freedom. Higher free will beliefs among conservatives may be explained by conservatives’ tendency to moralize, which strengthens motivation to justify blame with stronger belief in free will and personal accountability.

Experience and the Argument Against Human Freedom

Metaphysica ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
David K. Clark
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Agency Theory ◽  
Human Freedom ◽  
Alternative Possibilities ◽  
Necessary Condition ◽  
Current Debate ◽  
A Posteriori ◽  
Libertarian Freedom ◽  
Human Responsibility ◽  
Relevant Notion

AbstractThe heart of this essay, presented in part II, is an attempt to break the longstanding gridlock of the determinism/free-will controversy. Part I sets the table by examining recent attempts to refine and resolve this controversy. For example, Fischer’s groundbreaking case for semi-compatibilism seeks to soften the devastating impact of incompatibilism by arguing that while metaphysical (libertarian) freedom is indeed incompatible with determinism, human responsibility is not. But Fischer’s ingenious application of Frankfort-like examples simply cannot rescue any relevant notion of human responsibility. Rather, Fischer’s resourceful argumentation guides us to a pivotal realization. Kane’s Principle of Alternative Possibilities (the longstanding “could have done otherwise” necessary condition for human freedom aka Fischer’s “Leeway Principle”) is false. Thus, any successful attack against metaphysical freedom must target the “source-hood” thesis – an indeterministic agency theory of metaphysical freedom – the very idea of which is rejected by Hume, Nietzsche, Fischer et al as simply incoherent. But I argue that these philosophers are surely mistaken about the literal incoherence of the source-hood premise. Consequently, the current debate cannot move us beyond the frustration faced so squarely by Kant: we just can’t find a way to advance the case for or against metaphysical freedom. In Part II, I urge that an appeal to the a posteriori data of experience is sufficient to decisively resolve this recalcitrant impasse. This a posteriori evidence I argue, reveals that the thesis of metaphysical freedom is surely false. There is no human freedom; and neither are humans morally responsible for their choices. The supportive case supplied here will seek to rehabilitate Schopenhauer’s proclamation that while “man can do what he wants, he cannot will what he wants.”

Determined to Come Most Freely

2017 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 272-297
Author(s):  
James N. Anderson ◽  
Paul Manata
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Human Freedom ◽  
Recent Scholarship ◽  
To Come ◽  
Opening Up ◽  
Libertarian Free Will ◽  
Rule Out

It is commonly held that Calvinism is committed to theological determinism, and therefore also to compatibilism insofar as Calvinism affirms human freedom and moral responsibility. Recent scholarship has challenged this view, opening up space for a form of Calvinism that allows for libertarian free will. In this article we critically assess two versions of ‘libertarian Calvinism’ recently proposed by Oliver Crisp. We contend that Calvinism (defined along the confessional lines adopted by Crisp) is implicitly committed to theological determinism, and even if it were not so committed, it would still rule out libertarian free will on other grounds.

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