scholarly journals “Where Are We Going?” Dante’s Inferno or Richard Rorty’s “Liberal Ironist”

Religions ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 49
Author(s):  
Dennis Sansom

This paper elucidates the structure of moral action by arguing that Dante’s explanation in the Inferno of why people end up in their respective circles of hell is superior in terms of accounting for the structure of moral reasoning to Richard Rorty’s promotion of the “liberal ironist.” The latter suffers an internal contradiction—it wants a well-lived life without any overriding aims, but such a life is understandable only in light of affirming life-aims. The former convincingly shows that the structure of action reveals the truth of the well-known apothegm—“we reap what we sow.” The main point for Dante is not who is rational (for even the rational can be vicious, as depicted in the Inferno), but whose aims actually fulfill the practical life. This comparison of Dante and Rorty can have larger pedagogical aims, helping students to understand better what Albert William Levi calls “the moral imagination” and deepening their appreciation of how metaphors and paradigms of moral excellence provide, or fail to provide, an overriding unity and purpose to our actions.

Augustinus ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 65 (3) ◽  
pp. 395-420
Author(s):  
Pablo Irízar ◽  

The interplay between grace and merit is a recurrent Augustinian theme that is often discussed in polemical or theoretical works. Only recently has scholarly attention turned to the study of grace and merit in Augustine’s pastoral praxis. As part of this ongoing effort, the present paper offers an analysis of Augustine’s rhetoric of the image in the sermons, with special attention to the effects that the preacher/hearer dialectic produces in the social ‘moral imagination’. It is argued that Augustine’s dialectic preaching on the interplay between grace and freedom results in ambiguity concerning the sphere and boundaries of moral action in the hearer’s ‘moral imagination’. The implication on the social imagination, it is concluded, is a constant fluidity in the foreground of moral agency which either empowers or constraints the boundaries of moral action to the extent that graceand/or merit are emphasized.


2018 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Chastanti Ika ◽  
Indra M Kumalasari

Penyalahgunaan narkotika saat ini telah banyak ditemui di kalangan siswa SMP. Narkotika memberikan dampak buruk bagi tubuh dan kehidupan sosial. Pendidikan karakter merupakan solusi untuk mengajarkan pentingnya pengetahuan moral tentang bahaya narkotika. Pendidikan karakter yang baik harus melibatkan pengetahuan yang baik (moral knowing), perasaan yang baik atau loving good (moral feeling) dan perilaku yang baik (moral action) sehingga terbentuk perwujudan kesatuan perilaku dan sikap hidup peserta didik. Tujuan penelitian ini untuk mengetahui moral knowing siswa tentang narkotika. Penelitian ini merupakan penelitan kualitatif yang dilakukan di SMP Negeri 1 Kualuh Hulu. Hasil penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa rata-rata persentase aspek moral knowing siswa pada moral awareness, knowing moral values, perspective taking, moral reasoning, decision making dan self knowledge masih tergolong rendah (38,00%) menjawab tidak pernah. Hal ini disebabkan karena kurangnya kemampuan guru untuk implementasi pendidikan nilai karakter dan kurangnya peranan pemerintah kabupaten untuk melakukan sosialisasi atau penyuluhan tentang narkotika.Kata kunci : Moral Knowing, Narkotika, Pendidikan Karakter


2020 ◽  
Vol 36 (68) ◽  
pp. 088-106
Author(s):  
Jens Kjeldgaard-Christiansen

This article argues that video gaming allows for player-focused (egocentric) moral experience that can be distinguished from the other-focused (allocentric) moral experience that characterizes literature and film. Specifically, a Deweyan perspective reveals that video games aff ord fi rst-personal rehearsals of moral scenarios that parallel how, in real life, individuals mentally rehearse the diff erent courses of moral action available to them. This functional equivalence is made possible because the aesthetics of video games bear unique affinities to the human moral imagination. However, whereas the moral imagination may be limited in terms of the complexity and vividness of its analog imaginings, the ethically notable video game may draw on the medium’s digital capacities in order to stage elaborate and emotionally compelling ethical rehearsals. The article concludes by applying this perspective to the ethically notable video game Undertale.


2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 487-498
Author(s):  
Christopher M. Reilly ◽  

Embryo adoption, when oriented to the rescue of a dignified human person, is a merciful and morally licit response to an evil consequence of in vitro fertilization and the freezing of embryos. Those who object to embryo adoption not only misconstrue the relevant moral reasoning but exhibit confusion among the object, intention, and circumstances and between two very different potential objects. Because the mercy and charity effected through embryo adoption are at the very heart of moral action, juridical arguments that undermine people’s confidence in these priorities have far-reaching, harmful implications.


2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 141-169
Author(s):  
Markku Roinila ◽  

In his defense of innateness in New Essays on Human Understanding (1704), Leibniz attributes innateness to concepts and principles which do not originate from the senses rather than to the ideas that we are born with. He argues that the innate concepts and principles can be known in two ways: through reason or natural light (necessary truths), and through instincts (other innate truths and principles). In this paper I will show how theoretical and moral reasoning differ from each other in Leibniz, and compare moral reasoning and instincts as sources of knowledge in his practical philosophy. As the practical instincts are closely related to pleasure and passions, which are by nature cognitive, my emphasis will be on the affective character of instinctive moral action and especially deliberation which leads to moral action. I will argue that inclinations arising from moral instinct, which lead us to pleasure while avoiding sorrow, can direct our moral action and sometimes anticipate reasoning when conclusions are not readily available. Acting by will, which is related to moral reasoning, and acting by instincts can lead us to the same moral knowledge independently, but they can also complement each other. To illustrate the two alternative ways to reach moral knowledge, I will discuss the case of happiness, which is the goal of all human moral action for Leibniz.


1999 ◽  
pp. 109-126
Author(s):  
Patricia H. Werhane

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