scholarly journals Can Decentralization Drive Green Innovation? A Game Theoretical Analysis of Manufacturer Encroachment Selection with Consumer Green Awareness

Processes ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (6) ◽  
pp. 990
Author(s):  
Dan Cao ◽  
Jin Li ◽  
Gege Liu ◽  
Ran Mei
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Environmental Damage ◽  
Green Innovation ◽  
Online Sales ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Numerical Studies ◽  
Product Substitutability ◽  
The Impact

With the increase of public environmental awareness and the growth of e-commerce, sustainable development promotes the manufacturer to increasingly participate in green innovation and make full use of the online sales channel to enhance competitiveness. Despite decentralized encroachment being widely adopted in business reality, the current literature has commonly paid more attention to centralized encroachment. To complement related research, a dual-channel green supply chain composed of a manufacturer (its retail subsidiary) and a retailer is investigated. We focus on what encroachment strategy (centralization vs. decentralization) drives the green innovation and analyze the impact of consumer green awareness and product substitutability on the manufacturer’s encroachment strategy, green innovation efforts and supply chain performance. Under each encroachment strategy, we build a Stackelberg game model and derive the equilibrium outcome. Then, we theoretically analyze the effects of consumer green awareness and product substitutability on green innovation and each party’s profitability. Our comparative analysis shows what encroachment strategy drives green innovation and what encroachment strategy benefits both parties and social welfare. Numerical studies are also conducted to support the analytical results. Our key findings reveal that decentralization improves the green innovation and achieves a both-win situation for the manufacturer and the retailer. Besides that, decentralization can reduce the environmental damage and increase social welfare as well.

scholarly journals Pricing Decisions of a Dual-Channel Closed-Loop Supply Chain under Uncertain Demand of Indirect Channel

2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 ◽  
pp. 1-13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jie Gao ◽  
Xiong Wang ◽  
Qiuling Yang ◽  
Qin Zhong
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Uncertain Demand ◽  
Direct Channel ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Decentralized Decision Making ◽  
The Impact

The dual-channel closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) which is composed of one manufacturer and one retailer under uncertain demand of an indirect channel is constructed. In this paper, we establish three pricing models under decentralized decision making, namely, the Nash game between the manufacturer and the retailer, the manufacturer-Stackelberg game, and the retailer-Stackelberg game, to investigate pricing decisions of the CLSC in which the manufacturer uses the direct channel and indirect channel to sell products and entrusts the retailer to collect the used products. We numerically analyze the impact of customer acceptance of the direct channel (θ) on pricing decisions and excepted profits of the CLSC. The results show that when the variableθchanges in a certain range, the wholesale price, retail price, and expected profits of the retailer all decrease whenθincreases, while the direct online sales price and manufacturer’s expected profits in the retailer-Stackelberg game all increase whenθincreases. However, the optimal recycling transfer price and optimal acquisition price of used product are unaffected byθ.

scholarly journals Study on Emission Reduction Strategies of Dual-Channel Supply Chain Considering Green Finance

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cheng Che ◽  
Yi Chen ◽  
Xiaoguang Zhang ◽  
Liangyan Zhao ◽  
Peng Guo ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Chain Model ◽  
Carbon Trading ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Green Finance ◽  
Emission Reduction Strategies ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain ◽  
The Impact

As a weapon for economic development, green finance plays an important supporting and promoting role in the economic recovery and transformation of enterprises in the post-epidemic era. By constructing a dual-channel supply chain model, this paper considers two situations in which manufacturers participate in carbon trading and green finance loans, and uses Stackelberg game to study the impact of different situations on participants’ profits and emission reduction decisions. The results show that: under the carbon trading mechanism, the carbon emission reduction level of the manufacturer is inversely proportional to the relevant price, and the demand and profit of the two channels increase with the increase in emission reduction; when carbon trading and green financial loans are carried out at the same time, participants have lower profits, but with the increase in emission reductions, it is still a growing trend.

scholarly journals Dual-Channel Green Supply Chain Decision-Making and Coordination considering CSR and Consumer Green Preferences

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Xiaochun Chen ◽  
Rui Zhang ◽  
Bo Lv
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Rapid Development ◽  
Consumer Surplus ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chain Performance ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Green Preferences ◽  
Corporate Social ◽  
The Impact

With the rapid development of the Internet and changes in consumer buying habits, many manufacturers are increasingly relying on online channels to sell their products as opposed to traditional retail channels. In this study, we innovatively investigate the impact of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and consumer green preferences (CGP) on supply chain performance and product green level in the dual-channel green supply chain (DCGSC). Specifically, four models of DCGSC (centralized, independent CSR, cooperative CSR, and collaboration contract) are investigated. Next, we use game theory to investigate the optimal product green level, online and offline selling prices, social welfare, profits of supply chain enterprises, and the whole supply chain under the four models. We give numerical examples to demonstrate the effectiveness and viability of the four models. We find several interesting conclusions. First, increasing the attention to both CSR and CGP by supply chain enterprises is conducive to stimulating innovation and improving product green level. Second, when supply chain enterprises actively execute their CSR, they can reasonably control online and offline selling prices and increase consumer surplus and the profits of whole supply chain and social welfare are increased. Third, it is beneficial to increase the value of supply chain enterprises to enhance CSR within a certain threshold, but when CSR is higher than the threshold, the profitability of supply chain enterprises is weakened. Finally, collaboration contracts are capable of coordinating DCGSC and guaranteeing the profitability of supply chain enterprises.

scholarly journals Pricing Strategies in Dual-Channel Supply Chain with a Fair Caring Retailer

Complexity ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-23 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lufeng Dai ◽  
Xifu Wang ◽  
Xiaoguang Liu ◽  
Lai Wei
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Pricing Strategy ◽  
Pricing Strategies ◽  
Equilibrium Solutions ◽  
Channel Competition ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Fairness Concerns ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain ◽  
The Impact

Manufacturers add online direct channels that inevitably engage in channel competition with offline retail channels. Since price is an important factor in consumers' choice of purchasing channel, pricing strategy has become a popular topic for research on dual-channel competition and coordination. In contrast to previous research on pricing strategies based on the full rationality of members, we focus on the impact of retailers' fairness concerns on pricing strategies. In this study, the hybrid dual-channel supply chain consists of one manufacturer with a direct channel who acts as the leader and a retailer who acts as the follower. First, we use the Stackelberg game approach to determine the equilibrium pricing strategy for a fair caring retailer. Simultaneously, we consider a centralized dual-channel supply chain as the benchmark for a comparative analysis of the efficiency of a decentralized supply chain. Furthermore, we study pricing strategies when the retailer has fairness concerns and determine the complete equilibrium solutions for different ranges of the parameters representing cross-price sensitivity and fairness. Finally, through numerical experiments, the pricing strategies, the profit and utility of the manufacturer and retailer, and the channel efficiency of the supply chain are compared and analysed for two scenarios. We find that fairness concerns reduce the manufacturer's profits, while for the most part, the retailers’ profit can be improved; however, the supply chain cannot achieve complete coordination.

Analysis of sales and financing modes in a green platform supply chain with a capital-constrained manufacturer

Kybernetes ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jun Wang ◽  
Song Yao ◽  
Xin Wang ◽  
Pengwen Hou ◽  
Qian Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Optimal Strategies ◽  
Service Improvement ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Sales Channels ◽  
Online Sales ◽  
Cost Coefficient

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to investigate the optimal operational strategies in a green platform supply chain and provide suggestions on the selection of sales and financing modes for the capital-constrained manufacturer.Design/methodology/approachThis study combines different sales channels with financing modes and investigates three sales-financing modes, i.e. traditional sales-prepayment financing (TSPF), traditional sales-bank financing (TSBF) and online sales e-retailer financing (OSEF). By establishing and comparing Stackelberg game models of these sales-financing modes from the perspectives of economy, environment and social welfare, the optimal strategies of emission reduction, financing, pricing and service improvement are obtained.FindingsThe results suggest that as the commission rate increases to a certain level, a threshold of the cost coefficient of emission reduction can be found such that the manufacturer should choose OSEF below this threshold and TSBF above this threshold. OSEF is Pareto optimal when this cost coefficient is low, and this mode can lead to the highest social welfare when the platform loan interest rate is relatively low. The Pareto areas in TSBF and OSEF enlarge as the default coefficient decreases.Practical implicationsThese results can provide operational insights on how to select sales channels and financing modes when manufacturer faces financial constraints in emission reduction.Originality/valueThis paper combines different sales and financing modes to study their comprehensive influence on the decision-makings of chain members and the resulting performance of economy, environment and social welfare.

scholarly journals Comparison of Dual-Channel Supply Chain Structures: E-Commerce Platform as Different Roles

2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 ◽  
pp. 1-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cong Wang ◽  
De-li Yang ◽  
Zhao Wang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Consumer Surplus ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain

E-commerce platforms can act as an e-tailer or a third-party intermediary that charge a commission and allow manufacturers to sell products on their platform directly. These two forms of dual-channel supply chain structures have different impacts on decisions and profits of manufacturers and traditional retailers. This paper establishes different Stackelberg game models for both dual-channel supply chain structures and achieves the equilibrium results. The results state that both structures can increase the consumer surplus and social welfare. More importantly, when the platform acts as an e-tailer, the manufacturer and the traditional retailer can form a “win-win” situation. Nevertheless, when the platform acts as a third-party intermediary allowing manufacturers to sell products on the platform directly, it is bound to harm the interests of the traditional retailer.

Coordination Contracts of Dual-Channel Supply Chain Considering Advertising Cooperation

2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-89
Author(s):  
Xue-Mei Zhang ◽  
Ying-Ying Li ◽  
Zhi Liu ◽  
Qian-Wen Li
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Marketing Channel ◽  
Coordination Mechanism ◽  
Optimal Decision ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Chain System ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain ◽  
The Impact

To study the impact of advertising cooperation on the decisions of dual-channel supply chain, a dual-channel supply chain system consisting of a single manufacturer and a single retailer is considered. The manufacturer can sell products to customers either through a direct marketing channel or through a traditional retail channel. This paper analyses the level of advertising investment and supply chain profits of centralized and decentralized dual-channel supply chains based on a Stackelberg game. Then, the decision models of dual-channel supply chain under different contracts are constructed, and how manufacturers can optimize the profits of both sides through an effective coordination mechanism is analyzed. The research results show that the improved advertising costs and revenue sharing contract can perfectly coordinate the dual-channel supply chain system. Numerical experiments illustrate the impacts of parameters on the optimal decision results.

scholarly journals Research on Closed-Loop Supply Chain Decision-Making in Different Cooperation Modes with Government’s Reward-Penalty Mechanism

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (11) ◽  
pp. 6425
Author(s):  
Quanxi Li ◽  
Haowei Zhang ◽  
Kailing Liu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Recycling Rate ◽  
Transfer Payment ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Asymmetry Of Information ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Impact

In closed-loop supply chains (CLSC), manufacturers, retailers, and recyclers perform their duties. Due to the asymmetry of information among enterprises, it is difficult for them to maximize efficiency and profits. To maximize the efficiency and profit of the CLSC, this study establishes five cooperation models of CLSC under the government‘s reward–penalty mechanism. We make decisions on wholesale prices, retail prices, transfer payment prices, and recovery rates relying on the Stackelberg game method and compare the optimal decisions. This paper analyzes the impact of the government reward-penalty mechanism on optimal decisions and how members in CLSC choose partners. We find that the government’s reward-penalty mechanism can effectively increase the recycling rate of used products and the total profit of the closed-loop supply chain. According to the calculation results of the models, under the government’s reward-penalty mechanism, the cooperation can improve the CLSC’s used products recycling capacity and profitability. In a supply chain, the more members participate in the cooperation, the higher profit the CLSC obtain. However, the cooperation mode of all members may lead to monopoly, which is not approved by government and customers.

scholarly journals Decisions and Coordination in E-Commerce Supply Chain under Logistics Outsourcing and Altruistic Preferences

Mathematics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 253
Author(s):  
Yuyan Wang ◽  
Zhaoqing Yu ◽  
Liang Shen ◽  
Runjie Fan ◽  
Rongyun Tang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Consumer Preferences ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Altruistic Behavior ◽  
Fixed Cost ◽  
Equilibrium Solutions ◽  
Factors Affecting ◽  
Dual Channel

Considering the peculiarities of logistics in the electronic commerce (e-commerce) supply chain (ESC) and e-commerce platform’s altruistic preferences, a model including an e-commerce platform, third-party logistics service provider, and manufacturer is constructed. Based on this, three decision models are proposed and equilibrium solutions are obtained by the Stackelberg game. Then, an “altruistic preference joint fixed-cost” contract is proposed to maximize system efficiency. Finally, numerical analysis is used to validate the findings of the paper. The article not only analyzes and compares the optimal decisions under different ESC models, but also explores the intrinsic factors affecting the decisions. This paper finds that the conclusions of dual-channel supply chains or traditional supply chains do not necessarily apply to ESC, and that the effect of altruistic behavior under ESC is influenced by consumer preferences. Moreover, there is a multiparty win–win state for ESC, and this state can be achieved through the “altruistic preference joint fixed-cost” contract. Therefore, the findings of this paper contribute to the development of an e-commerce market and the cooperation of ESC members.

scholarly journals Who Drives Green Innovation? A Game Theoretical Analysis of a Closed-Loop Supply Chain under Different Power Structures

2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (7) ◽  
pp. 2274 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dooho Lee
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Innovation Strategy ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Green Innovation ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Innovation Strategies ◽  
Market Leadership

As awareness of environmental protection increases worldwide, enterprises have been building their supply chains in ways that conserve natural resources and minimize the creation of pollutants. One of the practical ways to make supply chains more sustainable is for enterprises to utilize green innovation strategies and to increase resource reuse. In this work, we focus on a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) consisting of a manufacturer, a retailer, and a collector. In the investigated CLSC, the manufacturer and the retailer drive the green innovation strategy either individually or simultaneously to boost market demand. In the reverse flow of the CLSC, the collector is responsible for collecting consumers’ used products and transferring them to the manufacturer for remanufacturing. By combining two types of the market leadership and three types of green innovation strategies, we establish six different Stackelberg game models and solve them analytically. Through an extensive comparative analysis, we show who should have market leadership and who should drive the green innovation strategy in the CLSC. Various numerical examples are also given to support our major findings. One of our key findings suggests that the supply chain members must participate in green innovation activities at the same time to achieve a win-win scenario in the CLSC.

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